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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF SCHOOL AUTONOMY ON STUDENTS` READING ACHIEVEMENT IN  
EARLY GRADES: A DOSE-RESPONSE TREATMENT APPROACH 
BY 
ESTHER F. S. CARVALHAES 
 
Advisor: Professor Sophia Catsambis 
 School autonomy is at the core of influential educational policies aimed at 
improving school effectiveness and students’ academic performance both in the United 
States and abroad. Initiatives that promote a transfer of authority from higher levels of the 
school system to local schools, such as the charter school movement and School-Based 
Management (SBM), have become increasingly popular in the last two decades. These 
initiatives operate under the premise that local stakeholders (principals, teachers, and 
parents) understand their students’ needs better than higher-level administrators, which 
enables them to make better educational decisions regarding students’ academic success. 
However, despite the prominence of such decentralization efforts in the current policy 
environment, evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of autonomous schools on 
students’ learning is surprisingly limited and inconsistent. 
The question of  primary interest in this dissertation is: What are the effects of 
increased school autonomy on schools’ average reading gains for students in 
Kindergarten and first grade? Data for this investigation came from the Early Childhood 
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Longitudinal Study - Kindergarten (ECLS-K), a nationally representative sample of 
schools and of students who were followed from Kindergarten through eighth grade. The 
independent variables were constructed from a series of questions about decision-making 
answered by the principal in each school, resulting in three measures of school autonomy: 
(1) school autonomy over instructional matters; (2) school autonomy over 
personnel/administrative issues; and (3) a global measure of school autonomy. 
To minimize the problem of estimation bias inherent in observational studies such 
as this, and to account for the non-binary nature of the independent variables, propensity 
scores for dose-response models were used (Joffe and Rosenbaum, 1999). Using this 
approach, we are able to compare similar schools (those with similar propensity scores) 
that are exposed to different doses of school autonomy. Such a comparison allows us to 
estimate the effects of incremental doses of the treatment (school autonomy) on the 
outcomes variables (reading gains).  For each measure of school autonomy, one 
propensity score – defined as the probability of assignment to a particular dose of the 
treatment, given a set of covariates – was computed per school. The effects of the 
treatments were estimated by regressing each outcome variable on the doses of school 
autonomy, controlling for the respective propensity score. This was done separately for 
each measure of school autonomy.  
The results of these analyses show that none of the treatment effects is statistically 
significant. Increased doses of school autonomy are not associated with higher reading 
gains in Kindergarten or first grade in this nationally representative sample of schools. 
The conclusion was the same when I estimated the treatment effects using a 
subclassification method.  
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Surprisingly, increased doses of every school autonomy measure were found to 
have positive effects on schools’ average reading gains for a particular subgroup of 
schools: private schools that adopted School-Based Management (SBM). This finding, 
however, is based on a small number of schools and requires further investigation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 School autonomy is at the core of major educational policies aimed at improving 
school effectiveness and students’ academic performance both in the United States and 
abroad. Initiatives such as School-Based Management or Site-Based Management 
(SBM), and more recently, the charter school movement, have placed increased school 
autonomy at the heart of their reform efforts in response to the challenge of turning low-
performing, often high-poverty schools into centers of true educational opportunity 
(Barrera-Osorio, Fasih, Patrinos, & Santibáñez , 2009; Wohlstetter, 1995). In the United 
States, the charter school movement has swept the country in the past 20 years and its 
total enrollment is estimated to be around 2.3 million students (Center for Research on 
Education Outcomes [CREDO] at Stanford University, 2013). Around the world, 
investments in SBM projects by The World Bank alone amount to more than $1.7 billion 
dollars from 2000-2006, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has repeatedly documented the trend among its member countries 
towards higher decentralization of school systems through increased school autonomy 
(Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009; OECD, 2004). 
 A trademark of these types of school reforms is a transfer of decision-making 
power from higher to lower levels of the school system hierarchy, a process known as 
devolution. Levels of decentralization achieved through devolution vary widely 
depending on how much power is devolved to which players and over what areas of 
jurisdiction (budget, curriculum, admissions and disciplinary policies, personnel, etc.). 
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 The appeal of increased school autonomy as a strategy for school reform has 
some understandable motivations. Firstly, research on school effectiveness over the years 
has contributed to the realization that mere increases in economic resources are 
misdirected in the absence of some accompanying organizational reform since higher 
spending does not always result in higher achievement (Hanushek, 1997). In this context, 
a transfer in power and responsibility is just the type of low-cost school reform that 
seems to be worth trying if it promises better results for no additional spending. 
Secondly, increasing demands for local control of schools have found wide support from 
very distinct constituencies, from advocates of community-governed schools to 
proponents of privatization of the school system (Levin, 2001). Thirdly, analyses of 
countries participating in international standardized achievement tests have revealed a 
positive correlation between school autonomy and students’ performance (Barrera-Osorio 
et al., 2009; OECD, 2013).  Lastly, and most importantly, increased school autonomy is a 
conditional offer: It is granted in exchange for increased accountability and better 
educational outcomes (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009; CREDO, 2009; Zajda & Gamage, 
2009;). 
 Advocates of increased school autonomy believe that the process of devolution is 
beneficial to students’ achievement because  local stakeholders (principals, teachers, and 
parents) know and understand their students’ needs better than higher-level 
administrators, which enables them to make better educational decisions regarding their 
students’ academic success (Caldwell, 2005; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Wolhstetter, 1995). 
Critics, on the other hand, point out that it might be unrealistic to expect decentralization 
to have any real impact on students’ achievement as the proposed reform is within the 
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realm of school governance and not necessarily in the areas of curriculum and instruction, 
which are more closely related to students’ learning. According to this view, the true 
effects of decentralization might be not on students’ achievement, but rather on 
organizational behavior - mostly related to managerial styles, participatory structures, 
resource allocation, and school climate, among other operational aspects of the school 
(Leithwood & Menzies, 1998). 
 Despite the ambitious aspirations and prominence of these reform proposals in the 
current policy environment, the amount of credible evidence demonstrating the 
effectiveness of autonomous schools on students’ learning is surprisingly limited and 
presents inconsistent results. An assessment of the impact of charter schools on students’ 
achievement using pooled student-level data from 27 states show that charter schools 
advance the learning gains of their students more than traditional public schools in 
reading, but learning gains in math are similar to those of students in traditional public 
schools. State-by-state analyses show wide variation of effects: in reading, charter school 
students outperformed traditional public schools in 16 states, did worse in eight states, 
and about the same in three states. In math, charter school students outperformed students 
in traditional public schools in 12 states, underperformed their counterparts in 13 states, 
and had similar performance in two states (CREDO, 2013). A report by the U. S. General 
Accounting Office (1994) found support for SBM’s ability to promote change in 
instruction (such as extended-day programs, and addition of special education and gifted-
and-talented programs) and budget (adjustments in spending on staff, supplies, and 
equipment), but the effects on student learning could not be established. A review of 
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SBM by The World Bank (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009) identified a few studies where test 
scores were positively affected and others where negative or no effects were found. 
 Ironically, research on the impact of autonomous schools has not kept pace with 
the fast-growing popularity of this type of intervention that has made accountability one 
of its cornerstones. 
 
Research Questions and Goals 
This dissertation investigates the following questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of autonomous schools? 
2. Are private schools, schools of choice, and schools that adopt SBM more 
autonomous than regular public schools? 
3. What are the effects of increased school autonomy on schools’ average 
reading gains for students in Kindergarten and first grade? 
 Questions 1 and 2 are part of my exploratory analyses to help unveil some critical 
characteristics of autonomous schools. Question 3 is the question of primary interest in 
this study. I focus on early literacy, which sets the foundation for later reading 
proficiency, the quintessential basic skill required for learning in advanced grades. It is 
not only the benefits of reading proficiency that last for a lifetime: being deficient in 
reading skills has pervasive long-term consequences for individuals reaching far beyond 
childhood and into adult life. It may affect negatively future job opportunities, earning 
capacity, overall health (e.g. related to an inability to understand and follow medical 
recommendations and to maintain a healthy lifestyle), reproductive health (e.g. higher 
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incidence of early pregnancy), and even relationships (e.g. higher incidence of separation 
and divorce). These outcomes have been extensively documented (Bynner & Parsons, 
1997; DeWalt, Berkman, Sheridan, Lohr, & Pignone, 2004;  Harper & Haq, 1997; Reder 
& Bynner, 2009) prompting calls for action and placing reading skills on the top of the 
national educational agenda (Carnagie Council on Advancing Adolescent Literacy, 2009; 
Gewertz, 2009). Kindergarten and first grade are an optimal time for this study because it 
offers a chance to observe children learning when they are first exposed to school. 
Learning that occurs before entry at Kindergarten is entirely attributed to child 
developmental and family factors, but once in Kindergarten differences observed 
between groups of children can reveal the effects of schooling.  
 Data for this empirical examination came from the Early Childhood Longitudinal 
Study-Kindergarten (ECLS-K). Utilizing a nationally representative database of schools 
allows the estimation of treatment effects that would be unlikely to be obtained in 
traditional experimental fashion. The difficulties of conducting random experiments to 
answer these questions are obvious: schools are not typically assigned to different levels 
of autonomy at random, nor are students assigned to schools randomly.  
 Observational studies, however, have their own challenges. A previous study 
attempting to establish a causal link between school autonomy and students’ learning in 
high school (Chubb & Moe, 1990) utilized a large-scale dataset for the analysis, but 
failed to demonstrate causality. While in randomized experiments the computation of the 
average treatment effect is straightforward (i.e. the difference between the average 
outcome in the treatment group and the average outcome in the control group), in 
observational studies the estimation of causal effects is complicated by the possibility that 
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initial differences between units in the treatment and the control group might be 
contributing to any observed outcome difference between the groups thus producing a 
biased estimate of the causal effect. 
 To address this problem, I utilize Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) potential 
outcomes framework of causality in which they propose the use of propensity scores and 
demonstrate their superiority in reducing estimation bias when compared to traditional 
methods of adjusting for covariates. A propensity score is defined as the conditional 
probability of exposure to a treatment, given a set of covariates. It is a way to model 
treatment assignment in an effort to account for pretreatment differences between groups 
in nonrandom studies. Units with the same propensity score are thought to be similar in 
the distribution of covariates but different only in the treatment they received thus 
mimicking an experimental design.  
 Propensity scores are typically used to model treatment assignment to binary 
treatments. In this dissertation, I use an extension of propensity scores proposed by Joffe 
and Rosenbaum (1999) to estimate treatment effects in the case where the treatment is not 
binary, but ordinal instead. Our independent variables - school autonomy and its 
dimensions - are thought to have different levels or doses of the intervention. The interest 
is in learning the effects of incremental doses of the treatment on the outcome variables. 
This can be accomplished through the use of propensity scores for dose-response models 
as recommended by Joffe and Rosenbaum (1999), which provide the theoretical 
foundation and estimation methods employed in this study. 
 By examining the above research questions, it is my purpose in this dissertation: 
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 (a) to assess the plausibility of claims that increased school autonomy leads to 
increases in student learning, which can contribute to a better understanding of the impact 
of decentralization efforts as strategies for school reform; 
 (b) to capitalize on the availability of a nationally representative database of 
schools offering Kindergarten, which is an auspicious grade to start examining school-
level effects as it captures children’s learning when they are first exposed to school life; 
 (c) to demonstrate how propensity scores for dose-response models can be applied 
to help find answers to critical educational policy questions. Methods utilizing the 
potential outcomes framework of causality have not been sufficiently explored in the 
study of school-level effects in spite of its many advantages, especially in cases where 
randomized studies are not feasible (Stuart, 2007). 
A comprehensive assessment of the potential benefits of increased school 
autonomy is beyond the scope of this study, but it is important to recognize that a full 
evaluation of these types of policies and programs should incorporate not only an 
assessment of how they are meeting their goals in terms of students achievement, but also 
observe possible unintended consequences, positive or negative, for various stakeholders. 
For example, have these policies been successful in motivating increased parental 
participation in their children’s education? Or have they increased teachers’ satisfaction 
and retention? Are there other effects among school personnel? In the evaluation 
literature, such a broad approach to evaluation has been developed by Michael Striven 
who coined the term “goal-free evaluation”. This approach takes the perspective of a 
large group of potential beneficiaries of programs and it focuses on what policies are 
doing rather than on what they intend to do (Mathison, Sandra. 2005). For the purposes of 
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this dissertation, I limited the study to the impact of increased school autonomy on 
students’ learning, the primary goal of programs that advocate greater decentralization of 
the school system. Potential effects on other constituencies are possible but were not 
tested here, and remain as suggestions for future research. 
This dissertation is organized as follows: the remainder of this chapter is an 
introduction to the topic of centralized versus decentralized forms of governance, from its 
origins in organization theory to its manifestations in the American educational system. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the impact of recent decentralization reform efforts 
(i.e. autonomous schools) on student learning. Chapter 3 describes the data and methods 
used in the study, including the theoretical framework employed for the estimation of 
treatment effects and its application to our research question. Chapter 4 presents the 
results from the data analyses specifying the effects of different doses of school 
autonomy on the outcome measures. The concluding chapter, Chapter 5, is a discussion 
of the results, including methodological issues raised by the analyses as well as policy 
implications; it also presents suggestions for future research. 
 
(De)centralization: School Effectiveness by Design? 
 Preferences for centralized or decentralized organizational forms imply quite 
distinct views about the locus of technological knowledge, the tasks to be accomplished 
and how to accomplish them, as well as the workers themselves and how they fit into the 
overall goals of an organization. This section provides an overview of the origins of 
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initiatives towards organizational centralization and decentralization and their rationales 
in organizational theory as well as their manifestations in the American school system. 
 Underlying the notion that increased school autonomy is bound to produce higher 
student achievement is a belief that the school’s governance structure has the potential to 
affect changes in student learning, possibly by altering the conditions in which instruction 
takes place. That is, proponents of school autonomy support the idea that the 
organizational design of the school, in particular its line of decision-making authority and 
leadership, has implications for the effectiveness of school on student achievement 
(Chubb & Moe, 1990; Maslowski, 2007). 
 From a conceptual standpoint, the notion that school governance has an impact on 
effectiveness has been borrowed from organizational management theories and 
philosophies of management, which are prevalent in the private sector.  Not surprisingly, 
school reforms advocating higher decentralization of the school system are frequently - 
although not always - associated with market-based reforms oriented towards higher 
deregulation, increased competition among schools, increased school choice by parents 
and students, and various strategies of privatization of the public schools (Chubb & Moe, 
1990; Levin, 2001). 
 The key question surrounding the issue of organizational effectiveness is: how 
can an organization coordinate its activities among its members so as to maximize its 
outcome? In classical management theory, which emerged in industrial organizations in 
the first quarter of the 20
th
 century, the answer came from Frederick W. Taylor who 
postulated a ‘scientific way of organizing activity so as to maximize productivity’ 
(Taylor, 1911; Taylor, 1947).  Taylor’s ‘scientific management’ was shown to 
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dramatically increase human productivity in industrial settings where activities are highly 
routinized, standardized, and can easily be decomposed into smaller components, which 
is typical of work in assembly lines. The goal is to assure that an optimal pace of 
production is adopted and that workers can produce at their capacity, which was 
accomplished through the systematic study of the work environment and the tasks to be 
performed. Extraordinary emphasis is placed on the study of physiological variables, 
such as fatigue and muscle functioning, motion economy, and time saving procedures in 
order to determine the limits of the worker’s physical capacity (March & Simon, 1993; 
Taylor, 1911; Taylor, 1947). 
 One implication of this model is that as long as the tasks could be programmed 
and well-defined, there was no need to employ a highly qualified workforce in the 
production floor as  little input from the employees was needed. This proved to be an 
enormous competitive advantage at a time when a low-skilled, cheap immigrant labor 
force was abundantly available. In order to ensure, however, employees’ compliance to 
the prescribed activities, a hierarchical solution was necessary to align the employees’ 
actions to the organization’s preferred choices of behavior. Managers were responsible 
for implementing decisions made at the top echelons of the organization; they supervised 
the employees and enforced the expected behaviors using a system of rewards 
(exclusively monetary) and sanctions to keep the alignment of individual and group 
interests in check.  
 The creation of hierarchies was thus primarily an organizational response to the 
need to secure a competitive advantage in an industrial world. It sought to: (i) ensure 
employees’ compliance to prescribed tasks designed to maximize efficiency in industrial 
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settings; (ii) provide a unified way to coordinate the activities of large numbers of 
employees, which was particularly important as production depended on the integration 
of one unit’s work by the next; (iii) realize economies of scale, a primary concern in 
large-scale production. By focusing on these issues, the adoption of hierarchical 
structures simultaneously touched on two potentially deterrents of productivity: it 
addressed the cognitive problem of decision-making at the lower levels of the hierarchy 
by reducing the number of behavior choices available to employees at the same time as it 
provided the top leadership a system for monitoring and controlling behavior to increase 
predictability. This top-down, highly centralized approach to management had a 
remarkable success in large-scale industries and became an enduring feature of 
organizational design in the American industrial enterprise of the early 20
th
 century being 
responsible for placing the United States in the forefront of economic productivity in the 
world (March & Simon, 1993). 
 Hierarchical solutions served well the purpose of boosting production to levels 
never before achieved. Over time, however, as increasing numbers of companies realized 
the efficiencies associated with better governance, finding competitive advantages 
became more challenging: with prices of products dropping and production costs rising, 
the opportunities for profits in companies specializing in a single product or line of 
products became limited. By the time of the World War II, the largest corporations in the 
United States were looking for new profitability opportunities by diversifying their 
portfolio, which in general terms meant either initiating new lines of products or 
expanding operations to new geographical locations (Chandler, 1990). This 
diversification euphoria, itself a byproduct of the accumulation of resources generated by 
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the earlier industrial boom, presented new organizational challenges calling for 
innovative solutions. 
 When adopting new lines of products, for example, large corporations often 
acquired entire new companies that possessed the technological knowledge required for 
production. Higher levels of specialization proved to be a challenge for top managers 
who were not familiar with new production lines. Specialized knowledge, it turned out, 
could not easily be derived from a top-down approach as managers had to rely on 
specialists. Additionally, unfamiliar and complex production processes require constant 
searches for answers to new technological problems, which are better accomplished by 
workers in the front line of production rather than by management. A breakdown in the 
lines of authority from managers to workers seemed inevitable: The competitive push for 
growth in this era of diversification necessitated the devolution of authority to lower 
levels of the hierarchy. Decentralization became the most adaptive solution for 
production problems that required judgment, creativity, problem-solving, expert 
knowledge and continual searches for new solutions, as well as high interdependency 
among workers and units. In decentralized organizations, a more expedient approach to 
problems was possible because workers could bypass rigid lines of authority to bring 
organizations to higher levels of efficiency. The classical account of decentralization as 
the innovative solution to the problem of efficiency in an expanding post-war industrial 
sector is found in Chandler (1990). Organizational theorists understandably characterized 
the centralized forms of governance as “mechanist” against the more “organic” or 
“holistic” forms of decentralized authority.  
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 In the American educational system, periods of decentralization and centralization 
can also be identified much like in the evolution of industrial organizations, but not 
always with the same motivations. From its onset, decentralization has been the rule 
rather than the exception in the history of the U.S. educational system; it lasted until the 
second half of the 20
th
 century. A political culture of federalism has granted the states 
legal authority over educational matters, but in practice the system has been traditionally 
dominated by local school control (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Scott & Meyer, 1994; 
Sunderman, 2010; Tyack, 2000). This is partly due to how education funding has been 
established in the United States: the lion’s share of the funds for public education 
originate from property taxes, which favors local rather than federal control of the 
schools with school districts, school boards, and school administrators making most 
decisions hinging on the management, operations, and organization of instruction in the 
schools.  
 While states retained regulatory authority over the schools by determining 
requirements such as students’ attendance, graduation, teacher certification, curriculum 
and textbooks, it became evident, at least to organizational theorists, that the ultimate 
authority over how instruction is organized and delivered rested with teachers with little 
oversight from the government. This state of weak bureaucratic control over the schools 
by their regulatory agencies became the defining trait of the school system according to 
loose coupling theory in the organizational literature (Bidwell, 1965; Rowan, 1990). 
Compared to other formal organizations, schools as “loosely coupled systems” appeared 
to be somewhat less organized and professional. 
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 Partly as a reaction to this detrimental characterization and partly as a result of 
larger societal changes, attempts to reverse the long-standing decentralization in the 
system started to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s and continued to grow in the following 
decades. Education reform took a turn towards increased levels of bureaucratic controls 
of the schools with a gradual strengthening of the state and federal roles in education over 
time (Scott & Meyer, 1994; Sunderman, 2010).  
 In the 1960s, the civil rights movement worked as a catalyst for issues of equity in 
educational opportunities and the federal government responded by court decisions and 
by passing a series of laws to protect vulnerable populations of students: the legendary 
efforts towards desegregation of the school system (Brown vs. Board of Education, 1954) 
were followed by the passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act  (ESEA) 
in 1965, and other additional legislation such as the All Handicapped Children Act 
(1975), and the Bilingual Education Act (1968). The provision of funds by the federal 
government to support these laws inaugurated what became known as “marble cake 
federalism” in which federal and state governments shared the responsibility for 
administering these new compensatory educational programs (Sunderman, 2010). States 
were required to implement, monitor, and report on local use of federal funds. The need 
for new forms of control in public education financing gave rise to an unprecedented 
bureaucratization of the system at the state and district levels.  
 Under the auspices of the New Deal movement and the Great Society programs, 
state levels of funding subsequently increased as well, aimed at correcting funding 
disparities among school districts, and at reducing poverty through the creation of 
training programs for low-income populations (Sunderman, 2010).  This school finance 
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movement of the 1960s and 1970s further promoted higher bureaucratization in the 
organization of education. The upward shift in the control of educational matters marked 
a change towards higher centralization of the school system (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Scott 
& Meyer, 1994;). 
 Scott and Meyer (1994) document the extent of this bureaucratization by 
examining data from state educational systems for the period of 1940-1980. They found 
dramatic increases in the formalization, scale, and standardization of the education 
system. Some key indicators are the increase in the size of schools  (fewer larger schools 
rather than many small ones), the decline in the number of school districts per state, an 
enlargement of district sizes (number of schools), a rise in the number of administrative 
state employees vs. a drop in local community forms of involvement, among others. 
 Were there repercussions of increased centralization at the classroom level where 
instruction is more likely to impact educational outcomes? Rowan (1990) points out that 
higher bureaucratization represents an effort to rationalize education production through 
formalization and standardization of its practices as a way to counter the predicaments of 
loose control in the education system, and to affect educational outcomes more directly. 
State controls are increased over the inputs of the education process (through curriculum 
guidelines), its outputs (design of standardized tests which lead to curriculum alignment 
practices), and over teachers’ behaviors (through the provision of in-service teaching 
training). Much in the same way as observed in the organizational literature, Rowan 
regards these increased controls in education as part of a ‘mechanistic’ approach to 
improve efficiency. 
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 Mounting opposition to this view has been expressed through concerns that it 
narrowly defines the role of teachers, it emphasizes the means over the ends of education, 
and it fails to promote students’ higher-level skills and analytical thinking. Approaches 
on this end of the spectrum have been dubbed ‘organic’ or ‘holistic’: they favor increased 
teachers autonomy, an expanded role of teachers in decision-making over school policy, 
and a school environment of increased collegiality to improve teachers’ commitment 
(Rowan, 1990). These notions of increased teachers’ participation in the destiny of the 
school gave rise to initiatives, such as School Based Management (SBM) or Site-Based 
Management (Rowan, 1990). I provide a review of the effects of this management 
practice in the next chapter. 
 Other forms of opposition to bureaucratic control emerged, all of them advocating 
the replacement of a centrally organized bureaucracy by a more decentralized structure 
through devolution to local control. The most vocal advocates of increased school 
autonomy claim that bureaucratization places too many constraints on school 
administrators and teachers depriving them from the ability to use their discretion and 
expertise in building effective schools: “the most important prerequisite for the 
emergence of effective school characteristics is school autonomy, especially from 
external bureaucratic influence.” (Chubb & Moe, 1990, p. 23). According to them, a top-
down approach to school reform is doomed to fail for various reasons: (i) the technical 
requirements of providing high quality education are situated at the bottom of the 
educational hierarchy (teacher, parents, and students) and not at the top; (ii) the 
administrative requirements for verifying that a good education is being offered are often 
eluded by all sorts of problems in measuring a good education, while at the local level 
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measurement problems dissipate in favor of more customized assessments of success; 
(iii) the evaluation of how well schools are doing should come from the direct 
beneficiaries of the services, i.e. parents and students, as fashioned in ‘customer 
satisfaction’, market-oriented approaches (Chubb & Moe, 1990).  
 The rationale in favor of local control of schools is clearly articulated in the 
notion that success is local: “Because education is based on personal relationships and 
interactions, on continual feedback, and on the knowledge, skills, and experience of 
teachers, most of the necessary technology and resources are inherently present in the 
school itself, and thus are at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy (if there is one). 
Higher-level administrative units have little to contribute that is not already there.” 
(Chubb & Moe, 1990, p. 36). Also: “Principals and teachers can get to know their 
students, gain a sense for their special needs and talents, and respond accordingly. 
Administrators cannot. Administrators know students in terms of numbers, categories, 
rules, summary statistics, theories, and methods, all of which lead to precisely the kind of 
treatment that parents and students do not want: treatment that is insensitive to what is 
different or special or unique about them. Bureaucracy inherently requires equal 
treatment for people who are in fact very different. Schools can recognize and respond to 
those differences – as long as they are unconstrained by bureaucracy.” (Chubb & Moe, 
1990, p. 37). 
 Empirical evidence to demonstrate whether a centralized, bureaucratic system 
enhances or hinders educational outcomes is still limited and inconclusive as will be seen 
in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The most current research findings on the effects of autonomous schools on 
students’ learning are reviewed in this chapter. First, the evaluation of charter schools is 
covered, followed by studies of School-Based Management (SBM) initiatives in the 
United States and abroad. Lastly, results of the most influential empirical study 
examining school autonomy using a large-scale database are also reviewed. 
 
Charter Schools 
 Charter schools are public schools that are managed by private entities (teachers, 
principals, groups of parents, not-for-profit or for-profit organizations as well as 
combinations of different agents). They were created as an alternative to traditional 
failing public schools and represent the flagship of the school choice movement 
(CREDO, 2009).  
 In charter schools, the bureaucratic control typical of the public school system is 
dramatically reduced so they can operate as autonomous, self-managing schools. The 
belief is that eliminating the burden of bureaucratic operations should free up the schools 
to focus on innovation and the creation of high-performance organizations (for example, 
by giving principals the ability to operate outside of collective bargaining union 
contracts). The increased freedom to self-manage is granted in exchange for increased 
accountability in the form of high academic outcomes. Individuals or groups of 
individuals interested in running a charter school must submit a detailed proposal to a 
state granting authority (e.g. the school district or a designated university in the area) for 
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review. Upon approval, the schools are usually granted permission to operate for periods 
varying from three to five years at which point their performance is reviewed by the 
authorizing agency for renewal consideration. Charter schools that fail to meet the 
agreed-upon performance goals should lose their permission to operate, which in reality 
has proved harder to implement than originally envisioned (CREDO, 2009). They 
typically receive public funding based on enrollment corresponding to the same dollar 
amount allocated to per pupil education in the feeding school district. Additional funds in 
the form of grants or facilities (not included in standard charter concessions) are at the 
discretion of each state. 
 Nowadays, charter schools are the most visible expression of school reform 
geared towards decentralization from central government to more local control, having 
become a fast-growing trend in the American educational landscape.  The first charter 
school law in the United States was passed in Minnesota in 1991, a state with a long 
history of school decentralization. Since then, many other states have passed similar 
legislation and, currently, charter school laws are in effect in 40 states and the District of 
Columbia. The total enrollment in charter schools is estimated to be around 2.3 million 
students across the country (CREDO, 2013). 
 Despite the promise of autonomy imbued in the charter school concept, in reality 
the decision-making power retained by the principal and teachers varies from school to 
school. The wide range of philosophical orientations adopted by charter schools usually 
implies different power-sharing arrangements. Brown, Henig, Lacireno-Paquet, and 
Holyoke (2004) point out that principals and teachers in charter schools managed by 
large EMOs (educational management organizations, operated on models of corporate 
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efficiency and economies of scale), tend to exhibit lower levels of decision-making 
authority than those in community oriented charter schools which rely on principles of 
high participation and cooperation between principals, teachers, and parents. 
 Have charter schools delivered on the promise of higher academic student 
outcomes? Given the relatively recent history of charter schools, and the varying amount 
of time that they have been in operation in various parts of the country, it might take a 
few more years for more definitive assessments of the impact of charter schools on 
student outcomes to emerge. To date, the largest study in scope available is a national 
report on the assessment of charter schools and students’ performance released in 2013 
(CREDO, 2013). The study uses longitudinal data available for students enrolled in 
charter schools and their conventional public school counterparts in 27 states, 
representing more than 95% of all charter school students in the country. 
 The researchers compared learning gains (state standardized test scores) in 
reading and math between students enrolled in charter schools and their “virtual twins” in 
traditional public schools. The virtual twins are defined by the students’ demographic 
characteristics and matched to charter school students coming from the same feeder 
public school. The overall performance including all 27 states shows that the average 
charter school student performs 0.01 standard deviations higher than their counterparts in 
traditional public schools in reading, but their learning gains in math are no different 
from those observed among the students in traditional public schools. This reflects an 
improvement since the previous wave of results in 2009 that included 16 states: charter 
school students then performed 0.01 standard deviations below public school students in 
reading; in math, their learning gains were 0.03 standard deviations behind the public 
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school students, on average.  Though small in magnitude, those differences reached 
statistical significance. The state-by-state analysis shows wide variation of effects: in 
reading, charter school students did better than their counterparts in 16 states, worse in 
eight states, and about the same in three states; in math, charter school students 
outperformed students in traditional public schools in 12 states, underperformed their 
counterparts in 13 states, and had similar performance in two states. Finally, the school-
level analysis shows that in math, 40% of charter schools show no significant difference 
in academic growth when compared to traditional public schools; 29% did significantly 
better and 31% significantly worse than traditional public schools. In reading, 25% of 
charter schools outperformed traditional public schools, 56% were not significantly 
different, and 19 % of charter schools exhibited lower gains. 
 Another study of narrower scope compared the academic performance of students 
in charter schools to that of students in traditional public schools in the state of California 
(Zimmer & Budin, 2007). The authors examined the effects of various operational and 
organizational characteristics of schools on student achievement. Charter schools in their 
sample exhibited higher levels of control than public schools over instructional and 
administrative issues. Nonetheless, greater autonomy was not associated with higher 
student achievement in elementary, middle, or high schools. Their data, however, were 
limited by the fact that no initial achievement data was available in their cross-sectional 
study making it impossible to know whether school autonomy played any role in students 
learning gains. 
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School-Based Management (SBM) 
 School-Based Management or Site-Based Management (SBM) is another popular 
strategy for decentralization in school reform, widely adopted both in the United States 
and in many other countries. The World Bank’s report on SBM introduces some broad 
definitions of the practice: “School-based management is the decentralization of 
authority from the central government to the school level (Caldwell, 2005). In the words 
of Malen, Ogawa, and Kranz (1990), ‘School-based management can be viewed 
conceptually as a formal alteration of governance structures, as a form of 
decentralization that identifies the individual school as the primary unit of improvement 
and relies on the redistribution of decision-making authority as the primary means 
through which improvement might be stimulated and sustained’” (Barrera-Osorio et al., 
2009, p. 2).  
 In practice, the degree of autonomy devolved to the local school varies along a 
continuum of autonomy that can go from local control limited to planning of instructional 
activities to more involved forms of control which include the hiring and firing of 
teachers and principals, the budget, the evaluation of teachers, standards for the 
evaluation of students, and the curriculum. In SBM, transferring the locus of decision-
making to the local school is typically accomplished by the creation of local school 
councils, often formed as a legal entity with wide representation of the key stakeholders 
in the school: the principal, the teachers, the parents and/or representatives of the 
community, and occasionally in the case of high-schools, the inclusion of a student 
representative. The local school councils are vested with decision-making authority over 
agreed-upon areas of control in the operation of the school and represent the most 
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expressive effort of SBM initiatives towards increased participation of the local 
stakeholders in the management of schools. The belief is that those involved at the local 
level know their students’ needs better than any higher, central administration, and 
therefore are better positioned to make decisions that meet those needs (Barrera-Osorio et 
al., 2009). 
 Similar to charter schools, in SBM increased autonomy is regarded as the key 
ingredient in support of increased accountability. The transfer of authority to the school-
level comes with the responsibility for improved educational outcomes. The school is 
accountable for results in every direction: upwards, the school is responsible for meeting 
the learning standards and curricular goals established by the central school authorities 
(school district, state, or Ministry of Education); at the local level, the principal and 
teachers are under closer scrutiny from parents who can monitor teachers’ performance 
and students’ progress through their participation in the school councils. SBM initiatives 
face their own host of implementation challenges. The lack of a culture of participation as 
well as experience in decision-making and management might undermine the purpose of 
the SBM councils, which in many schools might settle for a mere advisory role (Barrera-
Osorio et al., 2009; Cook, 2007; deGrauwe, 2005; Duflo, 2007; Rowan, 1990). For a 
more detailed discussion of implementation problems, please refer to Cook (2007).  
 A comprehensive review of the empirical literature on SBM has been conducted 
by The World Bank in preparation for their summit meeting on Education for All (EFA-
High Level Group), held in December, 2008 (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009). Although 
SBM has been widely adopted in various countries around the world, not many rigorous 
evaluation studies are available to allow for causal inferences of the impact of SBM on 
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educational outcomes. The great majority of studies present a number of methodological 
difficulties that undermine the confidence in their results. Some of the problems include 
the difficulty of conducting randomized experiments or other credible methods such as 
regression discontinuity design, the use of questionable instrumental variables, the lack of 
baseline data on pretreatment variables needed for propensity score matching, and others.  
For our purposes, only the results of the most rigorously conducted studies abroad are 
presented here;  these include one randomized study in Kenya (the only one available at 
the time of this review), one study utilizing a difference-in-differences method and 
another utilizing matching estimators, both in Mexico. To illustrate the experience of 
SBM in the United States, the present review also includes the results of the Chicago 
citywide implementation of SBM that was enacted by the Chicago School Reform Act of 
1988. For a complete review of these and other studies, refer to Santibáñez (2006) and 
the full report of The World Bank (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009).  
 The randomized study was conducted in Kenya (Duflo, Dupas, & Kremer, 2007). 
The researchers wanted to evaluate the impact of a civil service teacher compared to a 
contract teacher (hired on a temporary basis for a fraction of the salary of the civil service 
teacher) as well as the impact of a SBM intervention that included training the school 
council on how to monitor the contract teachers’ performance during the time of the 
study. A total of 140 schools were first randomly assigned to two different groups: one in 
which first-grade students were not ‘tracked’ based on ability, and one where they were 
divided in two sections based on initial achievement. In the first half of the schools, 
students were randomly assigned to either a civil service teacher or a contract teacher. In 
the other half, within each subgroup defined by ability, the students were also assigned to 
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either type of teacher at random. Additionally, half of the schools were randomly selected 
to receive the SBM intervention. The researchers found that the contract teachers and the 
grouping of students by ability did not produce test scores distinguishable from those of 
the civil service teachers. The effect, however, reached statistical significance (alpha = 
0.10) when coupled with the SBM intervention, with an effect size of 0.19 of a standard 
deviation. 
 Two studies examined the impact of the AGE program (Apoyo a la Gestión 
Escolar), the Mexican version of SBM, on various educational outcomes: repetition and 
failure rates, dropout rates, and test scores. One evaluation using a difference-in-
difference estimation (i.e. comparing change in outcomes in the treatment group to 
change in outcomes in the control group) with fixed effects (to control for time-invariant 
differences between the treatment and the control groups) demonstrated similarity in 
educational outcomes between the treated and untreated units prior to the intervention. 
The researchers then found that students in rural primary schools that participated in the 
AGE program had a 4% reduction in repetition rates and a 4.2% reduction in failure rates 
compared to the control students; no effects on dropout rates were found (Gertler, Rubio-
Codina, & Patrinos, 2006). The other evaluation of the same program (Lopez-Calva & 
Espinosa, 2006) used matching estimators and found that the intervention had a positive 
effect on test scores. These results have been challenged due to the limitations in baseline 
data (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009). 
 The Chicago School Reform Act of 1988, as part of an overall strategy to ‘turn 
around’ a long history of poor academic achievement, adopted decentralization in the 
form of SBM to be implemented in all of its schools. Local school councils with 
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expanded authority over such matters as hiring and firing of teachers and principals, as 
well as curriculum and instruction were established. Ten years after the reform 
implementation, 94% of schools in the city had higher proportions of students performing 
above the national average (Hess, 1999). In elementary schools, test scores were 4 to 8% 
higher compared to the pre-reform period. An earlier study (Hess, 1996) showed mixed 
results for elementary and high school students: test scores improved in five schools, 
were the same in three, and were lower in six schools. In none of these cases were the 
gain scores controlled for possible alternative explanations, thus shedding serious doubts 
about any effects of the school reform. A more carefully controlled comparison of test 
scores using the same students at two points in time and similar forms of the same test 
(adapted to grade level) reveals greater gain scores in a later period (1996) compared to 
an earlier period (1994) in both, math and reading, grades 3 through 8. These results 
provide better support for an upward trend in test scores (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009).  
 In sum, the most credible evidence on the impact of SBM on educational 
outcomes both in the United States and abroad is still very limited. There is some 
evidence for a positive effect of SBM in reducing repetition and failure rates, and less 
rigorous studies showing some reduction of dropout rates (Gertler et al., 2006; Jimenez & 
Sawada, 2003; Paes de Barros & Mendonça, 1998; Skoufias & Shapiro, 2006). Among 
studies examining the impact on test scores, only the randomized study in Kenya 
produced solid evidence in favor of SBM (Duflo et al., 2007). Other studies in Brazil and 
Honduras showed no effect on math and reading test scores (DiGropello & Marshall, 
2005; Paes de Barros & Mendonça, 1998). Finally, the Chicago test scores have exhibited 
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some upward trend in the post-reform period, but it has been difficult to unambiguously 
attribute these improvements to the SBM intervention. 
 
School Autonomy in a Nationally Representative Dataset 
 The most well-known empirical study examining the effects of school autonomy 
on students’ learning comes from Chubb and Moe (1990). They argue that the chronic 
problems of underperforming public schools is not only associated with a lack of local 
school autonomy, but are in fact caused by it. The authors claim that massive academic 
failure is a predictable result of a democratically run public school system characterized 
by a top-down hierarchical approach to education. According to them, a system in which 
schools are submitted to the direct control of school districts and central government is 
highly volatile to the cyclical changes in political power, which prevents any consistent 
program of education from taking roots and being effective, thus pushing many public 
schools into systematic failure. 
 They conducted a secondary data analysis of two nationally representative 
datasets: the High School & Beyond (HSB) dataset, which provides information on high 
school students followed from their sophomore to senior year (1980 and 1982), and the 
Administrator and Teacher Survey (ATS), which was later completed (1984) for a subset 
of schools selected in the HSB dataset. Following in the footsteps of the effective schools 
literature, they attempted to demonstrate that schools in fact have a measurable impact on 
students’ learning beyond the effect of the student’s own ability and family background, 
thus countering the notion of no or little school effect popularized by the Coleman report 
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in the 1960s (Coleman, 1966). Their school effectiveness measure is the school aggregate 
IRT gain scores of high school students (sophomore to senior year), which in their 
models is determined not only by the students’ academic ability, family background, 
school resources, and student body, but also by a comprehensive measure of school 
organization (its goals, leadership, personnel, and classroom practices). School 
organization, in turn, is affected by the level of bureaucratic control (the equivalent, but 
flip side of school autonomy) exercised by external authorities (school district, 
superintendent, unions, school board). Bureaucratic control - the major impediment to 
school success in their view - is largely determined by school sector (public vs. private), 
after accounting for schools’ location and their students and family background 
characteristics. 
 Although conceptually the notion of causality between bureaucratic control and 
school ineffectiveness runs deep through every step of their argument, their empirical 
demonstration does not rely on the use of methods that allow causal inferences to be 
made.  Three separate multiple regression models are run where the dependent variables 
are, in sequence: school effectiveness, school organization, and school control (i.e. 
autonomy or lack thereof), each being affected by the next among other factors.  
 In order to facilitate the interpretation of their results, they put their students’ gain 
scores into a new scale: grade equivalent of achievement. In this new scale, the learning 
observed is expressed as a percentage of a one-year of learning (obtained by computing 
the yearly average gain scores from sophomore to senior year). They find that school 
organization has a significant and substantial influence on students’ learning after 
controlling for students’ ability, family SES and school SES. According to their 
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estimates, a student placed in a well-organized school (highest quartile of the school 
organization distribution) would gain the equivalent of nearly a half year of learning 
more when compared to a student placed in a poorly organized school (lowest quartile of 
the distribution), all else being held constant. 
 When school organization is regressed on school control, they find that 
“autonomy from bureaucratic influence is the strongest individual determinant of school 
effectiveness” (p. 164), after controlling for students’ ability and behavior, parents SES, 
and school size.  Their model predicts that a shift in the bureaucratic control of an 
average school from a low (lowest quartile of the distribution) to a high level (highest 
quartile) would cause the school to experience a dramatic drop in its school organization:  
from the 82
nd
 percentile down to the 26
th
 percentile of the distribution. The magnitude of 
this effect, they conclude, is sufficient to produce a substantial change in students’ 
learning in light of their previous model. 
 Even though the authors make an explicit causal argument between school 
autonomy and students learning, their empirical study is insufficient to demonstrate 
causality for at least two reasons.  First, they show that school control is a determinant of 
school organization, but do not specify which aspects of school organization are most 
affected by it. As their measure of school organization is so comprehensive and 
multifaceted – it includes the goals and priorities of the school, the types of principals and 
their qualifications, the teachers’ certification and experience, as well as their impressions 
of the school climate – it is not possible to know whether the aspects of organization most 
affected by school autonomy are those most responsible for the students learning as their 
separate regression models imply. 
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 Secondly, because there was no randomization of schools to different levels of 
school control, there is no way to know whether an unobserved factor is causing both 
school control and school organization to behave the way they do. In the absence of 
randomization (schools are not typically assigned at random to different levels of control 
nor are the students assigned to their schools by chance), a better controlled study would 
compare students’ learning gains in schools of equal organizational level that differ only 
in their level of school control, which the authors for some reason did not attempt to do. 
 As seen in this review, positive effects of increased school autonomy on students 
learning are far from being sufficiently demonstrated, for various reasons: scarcity of 
well-controlled studies, failure to demonstrate causality, mixed results of evaluation 
studies. Aside from a single randomized study that has not been replicated (Duflo et al., 
2007), an observational study of a large-scale dataset (Chubb & Moe, 1990), and a 
national assessment of charter schools in support of some positive effects of autonomous 
schools on learning, other studies have either failed to demonstrate any effect 
(DiGropello & Marshall, 2005; Paes de Barros & Mendonça, 1998; Zimmer & Budin, 
2007) or have shown negative effects as is the case in various charter schools and SBM 
initiatives (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009; CREDO, 2013). My research examines the effects 
of varying levels of school autonomy on schools average reading learning gains among 
Kindergarten and first-grade students in American schools. It extends the literature by 
addressing some typical difficulties encountered in studies examining these types of 
school effects:  
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 the use of a rich large-scale dataset allows for a well-controlled study with the 
inclusion of important students, family, teachers, and school characteristics. 
Baseline information on the outcome variables is also available; 
 studying a nationally representative sample of schools increases generalizability 
of the findings;  
 the lack of randomization of schools to treatment cannot be overcome. Thus, 
propensity score methods are employed, which are suitable for the investigation 
of treatment effects in observational studies because  they minimize estimation 
bias under certain conditions and assumptions, which are detailed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
 This chapter presents the data to be used in this study with particular attention to 
the construction of my school autonomy measures, followed by the methods section, 
which encompasses a theoretical discussion as well as the application of a dose-response 
treatment approach to my examination of school-level effects of increased autonomy on 
students’ reading gains in Kindergarten and first grade. The methods section provides an 
overview of the potential outcomes framework of causality and the use of propensity 
scores in the case of a binary treatment, which sets the stage for the ensuing discussion: 
an extension of propensity scores for the case where the treatment variable is not binary, 
but takes on discrete, ordered categories. This is where I introduce the conceptual and 
theoretical formulation of propensity scores for dose-response models as proposed by 
Joffe and Rosenbaum (1999) as well as some adaptations offered by Imai and Van Dyk 
(2004) which will facilitate the estimation tasks in this study. 
 Next, I turn to the application of these methods to my research question. Specific 
design features of the study are presented, namely the choice of unit of analysis, and the 
quantities of interest. In the sequence, the steps to be adopted in the estimation of 
treatment effects are detailed, which involve: the computation of propensity scores for 
each school, a demonstration of the covariates balance, and the estimation of effects 
using two different procedures. First, the effects were computed using a general outcome 
model for each of the independent variables (a parametric solution), then the same effects 
were computed again, this time using stratification or subclassification (a nonparametric 
solution). I proceed now to the description of the data. 
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Data 
 The Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Kindergarten (ECLS-K), a database 
sponsored by the National Center of Education Statistics, was used for this research. This 
is a nationally representative sample of American students who entered Kindergarten in 
the Fall of 1998 (the first year of data collection). The study follows an initial cohort of 
over 20,000 children through eighth grade, having collected extensive information on 
students, their families, their teachers and classroom environment, as well as their 
schools.  The database is also a nationally representative sample of American schools 
offering Kindergarten classes during the 1998-1999 academic year. Questionnaires were 
given to parents, teachers, and school administrators, and their answers compiled in a 
database comprised of a child-level, a teacher-level, and a school-level file. The child-
level file contains both parents’ answers to the survey questions as well as students’ 
scores in standardized tests (child direct assessment). The reading scores examined here 
came from three rounds of data:  Fall 1998 (Kindergarten), Spring 1999 (Kindergarten), 
and Spring 2000 (first grade). Because  the interest in this study was in estimating school-
level effects, the aggregation of data from the student file and from the teacher file to the 
school level was required. This was done by computing school averages of the student-
level and the teacher-level variables selected for the study. The resulting variables 
represent either school averages or school proportions, depending on the level of 
measurement of the original variables. A more detailed discussion about the need to 
perform school-level analyses is presented later in the chapter under the methods section. 
 A total of 866 schools participated in the ECLS-K study, of which 630 are public. 
Special education schools, as well as schools where only a single child was assessed were 
34 
 
excluded from the analytical sample. Additionally, schools in which either the school 
board or the school district were represented in the SBM committee were excluded from 
the analysis because they undermine SBM’s original intent of devolution of authority to 
the local school. The remaining school-level dataset (a total of 633 school: 466 public 
and 167 private schools) was supplemented with information available about the children, 
their families, as well as their teachers and classrooms (aggregated to the school-level as 
mentioned before). For aggregation, not every type of Kindergarten classroom was 
selected. The following types of programs were excluded: classes that were part of a 2-
year Kindergarten class, transitional or readiness Kindergarten (this type of program 
provides an extra year of school for Kindergarten-age eligible children who are judged 
not ready for Kindergarten), transitional first or pre-first grade (this type of program 
provides an extra year of school for children who have attended Kindergarten but have 
been judged not ready for first grade), and ungraded classrooms (these contain 
Kindergarten-age students, possibly in combination with other ages, without being 
formally identified as a Kindergarten class). This left me with a sample of elementary 
schools that offer more typical Kindergarten and first grade classes. 
Finally, data on all students nested into the classrooms and schools selected were 
aggregated to the school-level as mentioned above, with a few exceptions: (i) for the 
Kindergarten analyses, I excluded children who were in Kindergarten for the second time 
and students with special needs (their learning gains might be determined by factors other 
than those assumed for the general population of students to which I wish to generalize 
the findings to); (ii) for the first grade analyses, I limited the sample to those students 
who remained in the same school after Kindergarten (inclusion of students who changed 
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schools between Kindergarten and first grade would have required the creation of a 
separate school-level file linking each child to his/her new teacher and school). School-
level analyses were performed to answer the following research question:  
 What is the effect of varying levels of school autonomy on schools average 
learning gains in reading during Kindergarten and first grade? 
 The variables of interest for the analyses are listed in the sequence. The 
descriptive statistics of all variables used in the study are available in the Appendix “A”.  
 
Dependent Variables 
As mentioned earlier, early literacy skills are at the foundation of subsequent 
learning skills and is associated with better performance at later grades. Deficiencies in 
reading skills can have negative effects on individuals that may last a lifetime. The long-
term consequences may negatively affect a range of personal and social outcomes, such 
as future job opportunities, earning capacity, overall health, and even relationships. While 
the literature on school autonomy does not specify that its positive effects are more likely 
to appear in any particular age or school grade, it is reasonable to expect that this type of 
school effects will be best observed in early grades, such as Kindergarten and first grade, 
because that is when children are first exposed to formal schooling. Learning that occurs 
before entry at Kindergarten is entirely driven by children developmental and family 
factors, but once in Kindergarten, differences observed between groups of children can 
reveal the effects of schooling.  
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School mean reading IRT gain scores, Kindergarten. The IRT (Item Response 
Theory) measure of reading gains in Kindergarten is based on direct child assessments 
administered in the Fall 1998 and in the Spring 1999. The assessments collected data on 
children’s language use and were designed to measure a progression of skills in early 
literacy in the following areas: letter recognition (upper and lower case), beginning and 
ending sounds in words (association of letters to sounds), recognition of common words 
(vocabulary), and comprehension (use of words in context). IRT scores were selected 
because they are appropriate to track achievement gains over time in the dataset: These 
scores are vertically equated scales designed for the investigation of change in students 
performance and they minimize ceiling and floor effects. The construction of the IRT 
scales is described in detail in the User’s Manual for the ECLS-K Base Year (Early 
Childhool Longitudinal Study Kindergarten [ECLS-K], 2001). 
In this study, the gain score for each child was computed by taking the difference 
in the student’s reading IRT scores between the Spring 1999 and the Fall 1998. Once gain 
scores were computed for all the students, the mean reading IRT gain score was obtained 
for each school in the sample. 
 School mean reading IRT gain scores, first grade. Similarly, the measure of 
reading gains in first grade is also derived from the direct child assessment and was 
obtained by subtracting the student reading IRT score in the Spring 1999 from the score 
obtained in the Spring 2000 (Fall 1999 data is only available for a small subsample of 
children, which is why I selected Spring 1999 as the baseline data for first grade learning 
gains). The individual students’ gain scores were averaged at the school level generating 
the school mean reading IRT gain score for first grade. 
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Independent Variables 
Constructing School Autonomy Measures. The literature on school autonomy 
recognizes it as a multidimensional construct, defined partly by who in the educational 
system holds decision-making power and also by which areas of control are covered by 
this exercise of authority (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Wolhstetter, 
1995).  Accordingly, school autonomy was measured by a set of variables indicating the 
extent to which different decision-makers control key areas of the school management.  
 But first, let me define school autonomy in this study: school autonomy is the 
difference between the school’s internal decision-making power (exercised by one or 
various agents) and the power of external agents (exercised by one or various individuals 
or groups) over given areas of control (e.g. instruction, personnel/administrative issues). 
School autonomy is a complex construct, and it is important to emphasize that other 
possible dimensions of school autonomy are not examined here (for example, how 
participatory the decision-making process is in the school or what types of decisions are 
made by different agents with similar levels of autonomy). This study aims at capturing 
the level of system decentralization by focusing on the balance between decision-making 
of internal versus external agents. 
 The measures of school autonomy came from a series of questions about decision-
making in the school that are available in the administrators’ questionnaire of the ECLS-
K dataset. The principal in each school was asked to rate how much decision-making 
influence individuals or groups of individuals have over the following issues:  
 (a) establishing criteria for hiring and firing teachers; 
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 (b) selecting textbooks and other instructional materials; 
 (c ) setting curricular guidelines and standards; 
 (d) establishing policies and practices for grading and student evaluation; 
 (e) deciding how school discretionary funds will be spent; 
 (f) planning professional development. 
 The principal rated levels of influence (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 
2=major influence; 3=not applicable to that school) in each of the above items for each of 
the following decision makers:  
 (a) Principal or Director; 
 (b) Teacher Organization or Individual Teachers; 
 (c) Parent Organization; 
 (d) School Board or Council; 
 (e) School District Office; 
 (f) School-Based Management (SBM) Committee. 
 Based on the principals’ answers to these questions, three independent variables 
were constructed: school autonomy on instructional matters (IN), school autonomy on 
personnel/administrative issues (PA), and a global measure of school autonomy (SA). 
 In order to construct these measures we first obtained a school autonomy score for 
each of the six areas of control (hiring/firing, textbooks, standards, grading/evaluation of 
students, spending, and professional development). The first independent variable, school 
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autonomy over instruction (IN), is a composite measure that combines the school’s 
autonomy scores for those areas thought to be more closely associated with instructional 
practice in the classroom: selecting textbooks and other instructional materials, setting 
curricular guidelines and standards, and establishing policies and practices for grading 
and student evaluation. 
 The second independent variable, school autonomy over personnel/administrative 
issues (PA), combines the remaining three areas of control thought to be more 
administrative/managerial in nature: establishing criteria for hiring/firing teachers, 
deciding how school discretionary funds are spent, and planning professional 
development.  
 The global measure of school autonomy (SA) combines the principal’s responses 
over all six areas of control available in the survey. 
 Let me detail how each of these measures was constructed. Before I describe the 
steps involved, it is important to note that alternative methods for constructing these 
variables were considered, such as factor analysis or latent class analysis, but found not to 
be appropriate for this particular data. For example, the range of the response scale of the 
survey questions was too limited for conducting factor analyses. On the other hand, the 
large number of possible response patterns across all the decision-making questions in the 
survey made it difficult to meet the data requirements of latent class models. I therefore 
chose to build the school autonomy measures in the manner described in the sequence. I 
first obtained a school autonomy score for each of the six areas of control. Because I was 
interested in the difference between internal versus external authority, I created two 
variables: one to indicate the school ‘internal authority’ (exercised by the 
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principal/director, teachers, parents, and SBM committee), and one to represent ‘external 
authority’ (exercised by the school board/council and the school district). The sequence 
of procedures below was implemented separately for each of the six areas of control.  
  
1. Compute school’s ‘internal authority’ for a specific area of control (say, 
hiring/firing) by dividing the total influence scores for internal players (reported) by the 
maximum score that could be obtained in that school; specifically: 
1.a. sum the reported influence scores for all internal decision-makers 
(principal/director, teachers, parents, and SBM committee); the influence scores are the 
answers principals gave to the question: “How much decision-making influence these 
individuals or groups of individuals have over such area of control?” 
1.b. compute the maximum possible influence score for that area of control by 
multiplying the number of active decision-makers by 2, as  “2” is the highest possible 
rating any player could obtain from the principal (i.e. 2=major influence); in this step I 
adjust for the fact that schools vary in the composition of decision-makers
2
; 
1.c. take the ratio of (1.a ) to (1.b.); this is the school’s internal authority over that 
area of control and corresponds to the proportion of the maximum influence of internal 
decision-makers that is actually exercised in that school.  
 
                                                          
2
 It is important to account for the fact that schools vary in the composition of decision-makers; some 
schools, for example, do not have a SBM committee. The internal authority score should, therefore, reflect 
the influence of internal players that are active decision-makers in each school after discounting those that 
do not exist. The ratio of reported vs. maximum possible influence score creates a common scale for 
“internal authority” that allows comparison across schools with different compositions of decision-makers. 
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2. Compute school’s ‘external authority’ in a similar fashion: 
2.a. sum reported influence scores for all external decision-makers (school board 
and school district); 
2.b. compute the maximum possible influence score for that area of control by 
multiplying the number of active decision-makers by 2 (2=major influence); as in the 
previous case, we adjust here for school variation in the composition of decision-makers 
(e.g., a school district might not be a relevant decision-maker in certain areas of control 
as is the case, for example, in charter schools); 
2.c. take the ratio of (2.a ) to (2.b.); this is the school’s external authority over that 
area of control and corresponds to the proportion of the maximum influence of external 
decision-makers that is actually exercised in that school.  
 
3. Compute the school autonomy measure for the given area of control by taking 
the difference between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ authority: (1.c) minus (2.c.). Because we 
are subtracting two proportions, this resulted in a continuous variable with a scale that 
ranges from -1 to 1. Interpreting the scores obtained for each school is straightforward. A 
positive score on this measure indicates a school where internal decision-making power 
exceeds external power; a negative score indicates a non-autonomous school in which 
external authority exceeds local control, and a score of zero stands for schools in which 
the control over that particular area (e.g. hiring/firing) is equally shared among internal 
and external decision-makers. 
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 The next step was to combine the school autonomy scores to form the three 
independent variables. The ‘school autonomy over instruction’ measure was obtained by 
averaging the school’s autonomy scores across the following areas of control: selection of 
textbooks, standards, and grading/evaluation of students.  Similarly, the ‘school 
autonomy over personnel/administrative matters’ is the average school autonomy score 
across the remaining areas of control: criteria for hiring/firing teachers, discretionary 
spending, and professional development. The ‘global measure of school autonomy’ is the 
average school autonomy score across all six areas of control for each school. 
The distribution of the school autonomy measures is presented in Figure 1. All 
three independent variables approximate a normal distribution with a higher 
concentration of schools around the mean scores where the discrepancy between the 
external and internal authority is zero or close to zero. School autonomy is higher for 
those schools on the right tail of each distribution and schools on the left tail are those 
where external players’ control exceeds that of the internal players. This pattern is similar 
for all three school autonomy variables: global measure, instruction, and 
personnel/administrative autonomy. 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the School Autonomy Variables: Global Measure (SA), Instruction (IN), and Personnel/Administrative (PA)
Mean = .01 
St. Dev. =  .27 
Mean = -.02 
St. Dev. =  .35 
Mean = .04 
St. Dev. =  .29 
 
4
3 
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Handling Special Cases. A note on how special cases were handled is in order. In 
constructing the school autonomy measures, special attention was required in the 
interpretation and recoding of the response category ‘3=not applicable’. Because of the 
way in which the questions were worded in the survey, an answer ‘3’ might mean 
different things for different respondents. For instance, it could mean that a particular 
decision-maker does not exist in that school (e.g. answer ‘3’ given to questions about the 
decision-making power of the SBM committee in schools that do not have one). 
Alternatively, it could simply mean that a particular decision-maker is present in the 
school, but has no authority over a given area of control. Appendix B illustrates how 
variables with this response category were recoded. 
 Additionally, for schools where only external players were reported, the 
computation for ‘external’ authority was conducted as usual. The missing value 
representing the ‘internal’ authority measure was treated as zero (provided it was not 
coded as ‘don’t know’ in the survey) to allow the computation of the school autonomy 
measure for that school. Thus, for example, a school with a score of 1 for external 
authority and missing internal authority resulted in a school autonomy measure of -1 for 
that area of control. A similar procedure was used in the reverse case where only internal 
decision-makers are reported. This time, however, the resulting school autonomy 
measure equals the internal authority score: 1 (internal) – 0 (external) = 1.  
 Doses of School Autonomy. The continuous independent variables (SA, IN, PA) 
were each broken down into categorical variables with three increasing doses of school 
autonomy. I selected cut off points that yielded approximately a similar number of 
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schools in each of the three doses, as can be seen from Table 1, in order to facilitate 
comparisons across doses. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of Schools among Doses of the School Autonomy Variables 
Levels of  
Treatment 
Independent Variables 
SA: Global Measure SA: Instruction SA: Personnel/Admin. 
Dose 1 208 200 235 
Dose 2 212 219 215 
Dose 3 213 214 183 
Total 633 633 633 
 
The decision to treat these variables as ordinal for the analyses of treatment 
effects was motivated first, by the interest in creating school autonomy measures that are 
more easily interpretable (interpreting the distance between dose 1 and dose 2 or dose 3 
of the treatment, for example, is more straightforward than interpreting a unit increase in 
the continuous version of the treatment variables); and second, by the recognition that 
many treatments are better represented in reality as exhibiting “more” or “less” of the 
intervention rather than its presence/absence. Such is the case of school autonomy and its 
dimensions. 
 Schools in dose 1 of the treatment present the lowest level of school autonomy; 
these schools are characterized by greater external control over given areas of decision-
making; schools in dose 3, on the contrary, are the most autonomous schools where 
internal decision-makers exert greater influence than the external players over given areas 
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of control; schools assigned to dose 2 of the treatment exhibit the least discrepancy 
between the influence of external and internal decision-makers (they better approximate a 
model of shared control of the school between internal and external players). A more 
detailed characterization of schools receiving different doses of each school autonomy 
measure is presented in the Results chapter, under the section “Characteristics of 
Autonomous Schools”. 
It is important to highlight that schools with the same dose of school autonomy on 
a measure have somewhat similar school autonomy scores, but may vary in the 
underlying pattern of decision-makers’ influence scores as reported by their principals. 
This reflects the fact that the same autonomy score for a particular area of control, say 
hiring/firing of teachers, can be generated by various combinations of the influence 
scores as exemplified in Table 2. As mentioned earlier, these school autonomy measures 
compute the difference in decision-making authority between internal and external agents 
without distinguishing other possible dimensions of school autonomy, such as levels of 
participatory management. It is clear from this table, for example, that the first school 
exhibits a more participatory management style by involving other stakeholders than the 
last school in which the principal makes decisions alone. However, when the influence 
scores between internal and external agents are compared both schools display the same 
resulting difference, i.e. the same autonomy score over that particular area of control 
matching the definition of school autonomy in this study. 
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Table 2 
Underlying Pattern of Influence Scores (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 2=major 
influence; 3=Not Applicable) for School Autonomy over Hiring/Firing Teachers in Four 
Different Schools 
 
Principal 
(A) 
Teachers 
(B) 
Parents 
(C) 
SBM 
(D) 
Internal 
Authority 
(E)
a
 
School 
Board 
(F) 
School 
District 
(G) 
External 
Authority 
(H)
b
 
School 
Autonomy 
(I)
c
 
2 2 2 2 1 2 1 .75 .25 
2 2 0 2 .75 1 1 .50 .25 
2 1 0 3 .50 0 1 .25 .25 
2 0 0 0 .25 0 3 .00 .25 
a 
To obtain Internal Authority: add influence scores of internal players A, B, C, D (SumI); calculate 
Maximum score (MaxI) = Number of Valid Internal Players*2; take the Ratio = SumI/MaxI. 
b
 To obtain 
External Authority: add influence scores of external players F, G (SumE); calculate Maximum score (MaxE) 
= Number of Valid External Players*2; take the Ratio = SumE/MaxE. 
c
 School Autonomy = Internal 
Authority (E) – External Authority (H). 
 
School autonomy scores in the same dose of a treatment are comprised of various 
patterns of area-specific component measures. For example, school autonomy scores in 
dose 1 of the personnel/administrative (PA) measure reflect different patterns of school 
autonomy over hiring/firing, spending, and professional development. I illustrate the 
most typical patterns associated with the doses of this treatment in Table 3. The patterns 
behind the doses of the other two treatments, namely the school autonomy over 
instruction (IN), and the global measure of school autonomy (SA) also vary in similar 
fashion. 
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Table 3 
Typical patterns of Area-Specific School Autonomy Scores for the PA Treatment Variable 
Scores of Component Measures Aggregate 
Score 
Personnel/ 
Administrative 
School 
Autonomy 
Dose of the 
Treatment 
School 
Autonomy over 
Hiring/Firing 
School 
Autonomy over 
Spending 
School 
Autonomy over 
Professional 
Development 
-1 -0.13 0.13 -0.33 
1 
-0.5 -0.5 0 -0.33 
-0.33 -0.25 -0.42 -0.33 
-0.63 0.25 -0.13 -0.17 
-0.5 -0.25 0.25 -0.17 
-0.13 -0.38 0 -0.17 
-0.75 0 0.5 -0.08 
-0.5 0.17 0.08 -0.08 
0 -0.33 0.08 -0.08 
-0.63 0.38 0.25 0 
2 
-0.5 0.25 0.25 0 
0.38 -0.75 0.38 0 
-0.5 0.5 0.25 0.08 
0 0.13 0.13 0.08 
0.75 0 -0.5 0.08 
-0.67 0.5 0.67 0.17 
0 -0.38 0.88 0.17 
0.38 0.75 -0.63 0.17 
-0.5 0.75 0.38 0.21 
3 
0 0.5 0.13 0.21 
0.5 0 0.13 0.21 
-0.63 0.63 0.75 0.25 
0 0.58 0.17 0.25 
0.75 0 0 0.25 
-0.5 1 0.5 0.33 
0 0.5 0.5 0.33 
0.75 0.13 0.13 0.33 
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Control Variables: the Building Blocks for Propensity Scores 
Extensive sets of school characteristics and contextual variables were used for the 
estimation of propensity scores (explained in the methods section). When estimating 
propensity scores, a special effort must be made to include an extensive number of 
covariates that might help predict units’ assignment to treatment; in this study, these are 
variables thought to predict school assignment to different doses of autonomy. As 
mentioned before, in addition to school-level variables, child- and teacher-level variables 
were used. They were aggregated to the school-level by computing their school average. 
The resulting variables represent either school means or proportions depending on the 
level of measurement of the original variables. A complete list of all covariates with an 
indication of the original file source of each variable (parent, teacher, or administrator 
questionnaire) and their level of measurement is in Appendix C. The choice of school-
level analyses is further discussed in the methods section. The control variables selected 
encompass characteristics of the schools, their organization, and policy, classroom 
resources and environment, teachers practices, education and background, student body 
composition and family background, as well as the parents involvement in the students’ 
progress as presented in the sequence.  
 Student body composition and academic performance. Students’ race, gender, 
age at entrance in Kindergarten, and early literacy skills at the beginning of the school 
year were all aggregated from the student-level to the school-level. In addition, I used the 
following school-level variables from the administrator’s questionnaire: percentage of 
students eligible for free lunch, of minority students, of gifted/talented children, of 
students bussed to integrate, of students from the neighborhood, of those receiving 
50 
 
bilingual or English as a Second Language (ESL) services, and of limited English 
proficiency (LEP) students. 
 Students’ family background. These variables originated from the student-level 
file and were aggregated to the school-level: Parents SES, parents income and highest 
level of education, poverty level, home language, family type, number of household 
members, types of non-parental/center-based care received by child (at the current school 
year, and the year prior to Kindergarten), whether the school is a family choice, parental 
academic expectation (highest degree expected of child), home reading/early literacy 
activities. 
 School characteristics, organization and resources. These are school-level 
variables from the administrator’s questionnaire: School location, school enrollment, total 
Kindergarten enrollment, whether it is a school of choice/magnet school, adoption of 
SBM committee, school year length, whether school receives Title I funds, additional 
sources of funding received, adequacy of the facilities (a composite measure rating 
adequacy of the computer lab, the library, the cafeteria, etc.), whether computers are 
available for student use (and how many). 
 School policy.  The following are also school-level variables from the 
administrator’s questionnaire: Admission requirements (e.g. use of readiness or 
placement test), retention policy and rates, school goals and objectives for Kindergarten 
teachers (these are composite measures indicating academic goals, such as emphasis on 
language and number skills, social/behavioral skills, raising test performance, etc. or 
professional goals, such as working well with other staff and communicating well with 
parents). 
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 Classroom characteristics/environment. The following variables describing the 
classroom characteristics were aggregated to the school-level from the teacher-level file: 
Number of class hours per week, instruction grouping practices (whole class, small 
groups, individual activities), time spent on child-selected activities, time teachers speak 
a language other than English in class, classroom resources, teachers beliefs about 
literacy in Kindergarten and homework practices, teachers’ unpaid preparation hours. 
 Teaching staff characteristics. Racial composition of teachers (a school-level 
file), and teachers’ experience and certification (aggregated from the teacher-level file) 
were used. 
 Principal’s characteristics. These are school-level variables: Principal’s gender, 
education and experience, time allocation to different school management tasks (e.g. time 
working with teachers, time spent with student discipline or with required paperwork, 
time needed to meet with parents, etc.), and how much influence standardized test scores 
have on principal’s evaluation. 
 Community characteristics and involvement. Ratings of neighborhood safety 
(substance abuse, violence, vacant buildings, etc.), and parental participation in school 
activities (rated by the principal) were obtained from the administrator’s questionnaire. 
Additionally, teacher’s rating of parental involvement with child’s school progress was 
used (aggregated to the school level). 
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Methods: Theoretical Framework and Application 
The Potential Outcomes Framework of Causality and Propensity Scores 
In the potential outcomes framework of causality (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), 
a causal effect is defined by the difference between the outcome observed for an 
individual i under the treatment condition (T=1) and the outcome observed for that same 
individual under the control condition (T=0): 
   =      
 
-      
 
.                                                                        (1) 
   is the causal effect on individual i,      
  is the potential outcome for individual i 
under the treatment condition (superscript 1 refers to T=1) and      
 (superscript 0 refers to 
T=0) is the potential outcome for individual i under the control condition. 
 In reality, however, an individual cannot be observed under both conditions at the 
same time, and only one of the two possible outcomes can be observed while the other 
remains unknown, which is called a ‘counterfactual’ (a ‘what-if’ value as in Morgan & 
Winship, 2007). This is the foundation for the potential outcomes framework of causal 
effects: in an experiment with a treatment and a control group, each individual has two 
potential outcomes, one observed and one counterfactual.  If one could learn the value of 
the counterfactual, it would be possible to estimate the effect of treatment for an 
individual by taking the difference between the outcomes.  
 Suppose unit 1 = unit 2 (i.e. unit 2 is a replica of unit 1). If one could expose unit 
1 to the treatment condition and observe the response while at the same time exposing 
unit 2 to the control condition, we could say that the response expected from unit 2 
corresponds to the response that unit 1 would have obtained had it been assigned to the 
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control condition since the units are similar. The value obtained from unit 2 would give 
us the counterfactual needed to compute the effect for the first unit, and vice-versa, thus 
solving the computational problem. When applied to human subjects, however, the 
problem of the missing counterfactual persists because no two individuals are ever the 
same (Schneider et al., 2007). While the direct computation of the causal effect is not 
possible at the individual level, it is possible, however, at the group level. The estimation 
of the average causal effect will be consistent and unbiased under specific circumstances 
and assumptions. Morgan and Winship’s formulation and notation (2007) are adopted 
here with minor adaptations.  
 The average treatment effect in the population is: 
       =                  .      (2) 
          =                      . 
 Can this average causal effect be estimated by simply taking the difference 
between the mean observed outcome of individuals in the treatment condition and the 
mean observed outcome of individuals in the control condition? Sometimes yes, provided 
that the following assumptions discussed below are met:  (1) SUTVA, Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (Rubin, 1980; Rubin, 1986), and (2) Strong Ignorability of 
Treatment Assignment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Assumption 1. SUTVA, Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption. According 
to Rubin (1980, 1986), this assumption requires that the value of Y for unit i when 
exposed to treatment T be the same: 
 a. regardless of the mechanism used to assign treatment T to unit i; and 
54 
 
 b. regardless of what treatment T the other units receive. 
 The stability of the potential outcomes applies to all units i = 1, …N and all 
T = 1, ...K. 
 Because schools and not students are the units of analysis in this study, the 
SUTVA assumption posits that the outcomes of individual schools in this sample are 
unaffected by the levels of autonomy adopted in the other schools in the sample. This 
assumption would be much harder to sustain had the outcome analysis been performed at 
the individual rather than at the school level (Stuart, 2007)
3
. 
Assumption 2.  Strong Ignorability of Treatment Assignment. This 
assumption states that the potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment: 
   ,       .        (3) 
 That is, knowledge of which condition an individual has been assigned to does not 
yield any information about his/her potential outcome or any of their functions, such as 
the treatment effect (Morgan & Winship, 2007). By default, this is the case in 
experimental designs, where treatment is assigned randomly, for the following reason: 
E [       ]   E [       ] .     (4) 
E [       ]   E [       ] .     (5) 
                                                          
3
 While schools in this sample receive heterogeneous levels of school autonomy (they vary by doses), it is 
unlikely that their level of autonomy would be interdependent because schools in this nationally 
representative sample are not in close proximity to each other: they are not from the same school district 
and do not come from the same close geographical area. An additional remedy to the threat of unstable 
potential outcomes in the presence of heterogeneous levels of autonomy is to conceptualize the causal 
effects as average causal effects across schools rather than an individual causal effect for each school. 
Computation of the average treatment effects was conducted and the results are presented in Tables 12 and 
13.  
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 In other words, because individuals in the control group are thought to be similar 
to those in the treatment group on average, the units are interchangeable and do not alter 
the potential outcomes that exist in the population. This assumption is what allows for the 
unbiased computation of the average treatment effect even in the absence of the 
counterfactual values: the observed average outcome for those in the control condition 
corresponds to what the individuals in the treatment condition would have obtained had 
they been assigned instead to the control condition, and vice-versa. 
 In observational studies, this assumption can only be met if it is possible to 
carefully model treatment assignment of units to control for any pretreatment differences 
between the groups. If treatment assignment is determined by a set of known, observed 
variables, and if it could be predicted by an exhaustive set of observed variables, let us 
call it X, then any remaining variation in T would be random and strong ignorability of 
treatment assignment achieved under the form:   
   ,           .       (6) 
 The set of variables summarized in X function as a conditioning variable: within 
each level of X, individuals in the treatment and the control group are thought to be 
similar to each other except for their observed assignment, thus mimicking a randomized 
experiment; comparing the outcomes of treated and control units within each level of X 
yields unbiased treatment effects for that stratum. To obtain average causal effects, 
weighted averages of these stratum-level estimates are computed based on their marginal 
probability in the sample. 
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 The goal of modeling treatment assignment is to have within each level of X 
sufficient overlap - though not perfect - in the distribution of X between the treatment and 
the control groups to allow for comparisons (Morgan & Winship, 2007; Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983). When that happens, the data are said to be ‘balanced’. Covariates that 
predict treatment assignment perfectly indicate a potential problem in the ability to 
compute treatment effects. Suppose, for example, that gender predicts assignment 
perfectly such that all males end up in the treatment group and all females in the control 
group. The problem that this creates – called sparseness - is that there will not be 
individuals that are similar between these two groups to allow for comparison. The 
challenge can be compounded by the fact that the absence of observed cases in one of the 
conditions might occur simultaneously within levels of different variables in X. As long 
as sparseness represents random rather than systematic differences in treatment 
assignment, the difficulties it creates in the computation of treatment effects can be 
bypassed by the use of propensity scores as demonstrated by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983). As a result, strong ignorability of treatment assignment can be achieved by 
conditioning on the propensity score rather than on the set of individual variables in X: 
    ,                 .           (7) 
          is the propensity score of receiving treatment for an individual i as a 
function of all the covariates in X.  This simplifies the conditioning task dramatically 
because now different combinations of values for the variables in X can be summarized 
by a single scalar: the propensity score, which can be computed by a logit or probit 
model. Once a propensity is obtained for every unit in the sample, it can be used in 
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various ways in order to estimate a treatment effect, such as stratification, weighting, 
regression, and matching (Morgan &  Winship, 2007).  
 Besides reducing the dimensionality of the variables in X to a single scalar, the 
propensity score explicitly models the treatment assignment mechanism, which lacks 
randomization in observational studies. Most importantly, propensity scores were shown 
to reduce bias in the estimation of causal effects thus increasing the researcher’s 
confidence in estimating plausible causal effects (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  A major 
limitation of the propensity score identified by Rubin (1997) is that it does not control for 
unobserved covariates, unlike experiments which control for both observed and 
unobserved pretreatment differences through randomization. Therefore, there is always 
the possibility of remaining bias in estimation. The problem of ‘hidden bias’ as defined 
by Rosenbaum can only be partially minimized through the performance of sensitivity 
analysis post-estimation (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 1984). 
 In this study, an extension of propensity scores was used to handle the situation 
where the treatment is not binary but has multiple levels instead. This approach has also 
been called ‘many-valued treatment’ or ‘dose-response models’. The application of 
propensity scores to these cases have been developed by Joffe and Rosenbaum (1999), 
Imbens (2000), and Imai and van Dyk (2004), as discussed next. 
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Balancing Covariates in Ordered Dose-Response Models 
 In dose-response models, the impact of variations in the dosage of the treatment is 
the focus rather than the presence/absence of treatment.  This is not uncommon in 
medicine where the effect on health of incremental doses of the same treatment (e.g. a 
drug or a procedure) is of interest, in economics where a classical problem is to examine 
the effect of education (usually measured in years) on labor market earnings, in the study 
of programs/policies whose levels of implementation vary across locations, or in cases 
where the frequency and/or duration of exposure to a treatment vary among individuals 
or groups. Current extensions of propensity scores are available to handle treatments that 
may be ordered (Imbens, 2000; Joffe & Rosenbaum, 1999), unordered (Imbens, 2000), 
continuous (Hirano & Imbens, 2004), as well as cases where treatment categories might 
represent interactions among different levels. Imai and Van Dyk (2004) discuss theory 
and application for a variety of the cases above. An introduction to the topic is available 
in Morgan and Winship (2007) and Guo and Fraser (2010). 
 Estimation of treatment effects in the case of ordered doses starts with the 
computation of a propensity score for each unit.  Just as in the binary treatment case, the 
propensity score is a summary function of the pretreatment variables thought to predict 
treatment assignment of units to different doses of treatment.  The purpose is to account 
for any systematic relationship between the covariates and the treatment assignment (i.e. 
self-selection) so that these differences can be properly controlled for when estimating 
the effects of varying doses of the treatment on the outcome. 
 Joffe and Rosembaum (1999) set up the conditions under which a single variable, 
say a function of all the covariates   represented by the scalar     , can serve as a 
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balancing score for an ordinal treatment variable. Specifically,      will work as a 
propensity score if the distribution of doses is affected by the covariates    only through 
the scalar     , where   is a vector of parameters that uniquely and fully describe the 
relationship between each covariate   and treatment assignment   with doses   (see also 
Imai & Van Dyk, 2004). When this is true,      describes the distribution of treatment 
doses such that                      . Moreover, units with the same propensity score 
but different doses of treatment will have the same distribution of the covariates.  
 These conditions are true in McCullagh’s (1980) ordinal logit model, which can 
be used for estimating the propensity score if it can be assumed to properly describe the 
distribution of doses Tj for a sample of J participants (j=1, 2,…, J)…: 
 log  
         
         
  =     +   
    ,   for    2, 3, 4, 5 (T with 5 levels, for example).  (8)   
 Because the distribution of treatment levels is dependent on the covariates   only 
through       it follows that treatment assignment and covariates are independent 
conditional on     . The maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of  
        ̂
T   can 
therefore be used as a propensity score.  
An illustration of how the ordinal logit model can be employed to estimate the 
propensity score is offered by Lu, Zanutto, Hornik, & Rosenbaum (2001) in an 
observational study examining the impact of a national anti-drug media campaign - 
implemented with different levels of exposure - on the attitudes of youth on the topic. 
Imai and Van Dyk (2004) expanded the theoretical framework of propensity scores to 
cases where the treatment is not binary by defining a generalized propensity function of 
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which the balancing score proposed by Joffe and Rosenbaum (1999) and presented here 
is a special case. In their framework, the scalar        , notation that I adopted in the 
remainder of this chapter for simplicity.  
 They demonstrate that their propensity function defined as “the conditional 
probability of the actual, perhaps multivariate, treatment given the observed covariates” 
(p. 856) is a valid balancing score in treatments with two or more levels or doses, ordered 
or unordered. 
 To demonstrate that  ̂  in fact balances the covariates, each covariate X is 
regressed on the treatment variable T (whether continuous, ordinal or nominal), 
conditional on the propensity score,  ̂. Linear and logistic regression are used for 
continuous and binary covariates, respectively. The treatment variable coefficient in each 
regression is expected to be unrelated (non-significant test statistic) to each covariate 
after controlling for  ̂ (Imai & Van Dyk, 2004).  
 Given the propensity score for dose-response models, the assumption of strong 
ignorability of treatment assignment can thus be expressed as: 
   {     }       .        (9) 
 Once the covariates are balanced, the treatment effects of interest can be 
estimated. 
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Estimating the Effects of School Autonomy on Reading Gain Scores: Analytical 
Strategy 
I applied the theory and computation strategies discussed above - the use of 
propensity scores for dose-response models within the potential outcomes framework of 
causality – in order to answer the research question. I am interested in estimating the 
effects of incremental doses of school autonomy on schools’ average reading gain scores 
of students in Kindergarten and first grade. Before describing the steps involved in the 
estimation of the treatment effects, I discuss below the choice of unit of analysis, and 
present the quantities of interest in this study. 
School-Level Analysis. A variety of approaches has been used to estimate school 
effects. Common modeling strategies are multivariate regression analyses (usually 
formulated as some form of education-production function), value-added models, growth 
models, and hierarchical linear models. All of these methods rest on a number of different 
assumptions that are more or less plausible depending on each particular application. An 
important design consideration when selecting a method is the unit of analysis to be used. 
When estimating the effect of some intervention on student learning, different 
aggregation levels are possible (state, district, school, classroom, student), and oftentimes 
these decisions are dictated by the level at which data have been collected. Test scores, 
for example, are easily available at the student level while school resources are usually 
allocated and tracked at the school level (Schwartz & Stiefel, 2001). 
 In light of availability of student level data, an appealing approach is to examine 
the impact of school-level interventions on the gain scores of individual students. A 
natural strategy for this type of analysis would be to use a multilevel model (Raudenbush 
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& Bryk, 2002) with students at the lower level of analysis, and schools at the higher level 
(students ‘nested’ within schools). Under this framework, the student-level gain scores 
are modeled in two stages: a level-1 equation controls for the student-level characteristics 
thought to predict student achievement so that remaining influences captured in the 
intercept represent the average gain score observed in that student’s school. Both the 
intercept and the slopes of level-1 equation can then be modeled at level-2 as a function 
of school-level characteristics thus allowing the analyst to examine school influences 
both on the school average of students’ gain scores (random intercept) as well as on their 
average rate of growth (random slopes).  
 As appealing as this analytical choice is, it does pose some practical difficulties in 
this specific application. One possibility would be to include in the level-1 equation a 
long series of student-level covariates, which fortunately are available in such a large-
scale database. The result would be an extensive number of slopes, all of which could 
potentially be influenced by a school-level treatment variable. The school autonomy 
effect on the school average gain scores would be given by the intercept, but the 
remaining effects of treatment on the learning growth of students would be fragmented 
among the various slopes creating potential difficulties in summarizing the treatment 
effect. Positing a random-intercept, fixed-slopes model is an analytical possibility but the 
assumption that school autonomy affects the average gain scores in the school but has no 
bearing on the speed at which students learn runs counter the claims made by advocates 
of increased school autonomy. 
 A more plausible alternative to estimating treatment effects in this case is to run a 
school-level analysis instead. In some cases, such as in the current study, the school 
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might be the logical unit of analysis (Schwartz & Stiefel, 2001; Stuart, 2007) for a 
number of reasons. First, the treatment is observed at the school-level: It is the entire 
school – not each student – that exhibits a certain level of the treatment (students within a 
school are thus uniformly exposed to the same dose of autonomy). Second, in the current 
accountability environment, states routinely aggregate individual student scores at the 
school level as a way to hold schools accountable for performance. Thus, for policy 
makers and administrators, school-level aggregate measures of student performance are 
measures of practical interest, based on which consequences such as rewards or sanctions 
are applied (Buzick & Laitusis, 2010; Kane, 2008). Thirdly, in order to examine 
treatment effects in an observational study within the potential outcomes framework of 
causality, a key assumption is that the potential outcomes for a particular unit are not 
dependent on the treatment received by other units in the sample. This assumption is 
certainly more easily sustained at the school level rather than at the student level (Stuart, 
2007). 
 School-level analyses, however, carry their own difficulties. Stuart (2007) warns 
of special care that must be taken when estimating effects using school-level data: 
caution must be exercised to avoid what is called an ‘ecological fallacy’, that is, the 
mistake of incorrectly attributing relationships found at one level of aggregation to a 
different level
4
. Additionally, utmost effort must be made to properly balance the data 
prior to any outcome analysis to allow for comparison of schools that are similar in an 
extensive number of pre-treatment variables. The requirement here is to show that 
                                                          
4
 Aggregation allows for the possibility that a positive treatment effect of school autonomy on reading 
gains at the school level may occur in spite of a negative effect on reading at the student level, for example. 
Student-level effects are not examined in this study. 
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treatment assignment is independent of the covariates, conditional on the propensity score 
(i.e., self-selection has been controlled for), which gives support to the assumption of 
strong ignorability of treatment assignment in the potential outcomes framework of 
causality as seen previously. 
Quantities of Interest. The set up in this study is as follows: Each school   in our 
total sample of   schools receives a different dose   of the treatment variable  , with 
observed outcome,     The multi-valued treatment variable   contains levels   = 1, 2, 3 
indicating increasing doses of school autonomy.   
  refers to the outcome observed for 
school j under a particular dose   of treatment received, while     represents the average 
outcome for all schools exposed to dose d of treatment  . The pretreatment variables are 
indicated by   , a vector of observed covariates for each school. 
 I adopt Imai and Van Dyk’s (2004) extension of Rubin’s causal model (Holland, 
1986) to define the potential outcomes for multi-valued treatments as   {   
     
               }, where   is a set of potential treatment values,   
  is the outcome for 
unit j under a particular dose   of treatment.  
 The treatment effects of interest are listed in Table 4. They represent the effects of 
varying doses of school autonomy and its dimensions on the schools average reading gain 
scores of students. The same set of school estimates were computed for Kindergarten 
students and for first grade students. 
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Table 4.  
Quantities of Interest: Effects of School Autonomy on Schools Average Reading Gains of 
Students (Kindergarten and First Grade, computed separately) 
School Autonomy, Global Measure
a
 
 Dose 1 Dose 2 
Dose 2 E[SA, 12 SA] = E[Y
2
SA – Y
1
SA SA]  
Dose 3 E[SA,13 SA] = E[Y
3
SA – Y
1
SA  SA] E[SA,23 SA] = E[Y
3
SA – Y
2
SA  SA] 
School Autonomy over Instructional Matters
a
 
 Dose 1 Dose 2 
Dose 2 E[IN,12 IN] = E[Y
2
IN – Y
1
IN IN]  
Dose 3 E[IN,13 IN] = E[Y
3
IN – Y
1
IN IN] E[IN,23 IN] = E[Y
3
IN – Y
2
IN IN] 
School Autonomy over Personnel/Administrative Issues
a
 
 Dose 1 Dose 2 
Dose 2 E[PA,12 PA] = E[Y
2
PA – Y
1
PA PA]  
Dose 3 E[PA,13 PA] = E[Y
3
PA – Y
1
PA PA] E[PA,23 PA] = E[Y
3
PA – Y
2
PA PA] 
a
 The independent variables are indicated by the subscripts: SA specifies the global measure of school 
autonomy, IN refers to school autonomy over instructional matters, and PA refers to school autonomy over 
personnel/administrative issues.  
 
 Each of the average effects in table 4 represents the difference in the average 
outcomes of schools exposed to two different doses of the treatment, conditional on the 
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propensity score. In particular,  represents the average treatment effect to be indexed 
according to the measure being examined, namely: SA, IN, and PA, where the subscript 
SA specifies the global measure of school autonomy, IN refers to school autonomy 
measure over instructional matters, and PA refers to school autonomy over 
personnel/administrative issues. The same subscripts index the respective propensity 
score, SA, IN, and PA. For each independent variable, I examined three contrasts: 
 .., 12, the difference in mean outcome of schools exposed to dose 2 of the 
treatment and those exposed to dose 1, conditional on the propensity score;  
 ..,23, the difference in mean outcome of schools exposed to dose 3 of the treatment 
and those exposed to dose 2, conditional on the propensity score; and 
 ..,13, the difference in mean outcome of schools exposed to dose 3 of the treatment 
and those exposed to dose 1, conditional on the propensity score. 
Computing the Propensity Scores. Because the mechanism for treatment 
assignment of schools to different levels of school autonomy is unknown, modeling the 
distribution of doses as a function of observed covariates   is a necessary first step in the 
estimation of treatment effects. McCullagh’s ordinal logit model (1980) was used, 
following the proposal of Joffe and Rosenbaum (1999) for computing balancing scores in 
ordered dose-response models as seen previously. The interest is in using the linear 
predictor in the model,  ̂T   as an estimate of  
        (Imai and Van Dyk, 2004; Joffe 
and Rosenbaum, 1999). The ML regression coefficients  ̂ were used to compute  ̂, which 
functions as the propensity score for each school in the sample.  
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 Three propensity scores per school were computed, one for each independent 
variable in the study: the global measure of school autonomy, SAˆ , school autonomy over 
instructional matters, INˆ , and school autonomy over personnel/administrative issues, 
PAˆ .  
Verifying Balance in the Covariates. As in Imai and Van Dyk (2004), 
verification that balance in the covariates is achieved was conducted by regressing each 
covariate in   on the treatment variable  , conditional on the propensity score  ̂. Linear 
and logistic regressions were used for continuous and binary covariates, respectively. The 
goal of these regressions was to assess whether the treatment and the covariate were 
unrelated given the propensity score, which is evidenced by the significance test of the 
treatment variable coefficient. The full demonstration of the covariates balance is in the 
next chapter. 
 General Outcome Models. Once the covariates were balanced, I proceeded with 
the estimation of the treatment effects. In particular, the general outcome model below 
was used to estimate the effects of the school autonomy levels on schools average reading 
gain scores in Kindergarten: 
 e   Dose3)( (Dose2))ˆ(Y 3210  .   (10)  
 In this equation, Y is the predicted school average reading gain score in 
Kindergarten; 
  ̂ is the estimated propensity score; 
Dose2 is a dummy variable (dose 2=1; otherwise=0); 
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 Dose3 is also a dummy variable (dose 3=1; otherwise=0);  
 β0 is the expected average reading gain score for schools receiving the lowest 
dose of the treatment variable, conditional on the propensity score; 
 β2 is the average difference in the mean outcome between schools receiving dose 
2 of the treatment and dose 1, conditional on the propensity score; that is, this is the 
estimated effect  ..,12; 
 β3 is the average difference in the mean outcome between schools receiving dose 
3 and  those receiving dose 1, conditional on the propensity score; β2 estimates the effect 
..,13  
 The effect ..,23 is given by β3 – β2, which corresponds to the difference in the 
mean outcome of schools receiving dose 3 and those receiving dose 2 of the treatment. 
 e is the residual term, assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation   . 
  This outcome model was computed separately for each of the three independent 
variables (   ,    , and    ). The same model was used for estimation of effects on 
schools average reading gains of first grade students.  
Subclassification (a.k.a. Stratification). The treatment effects estimates obtained 
parametrically through the general outcome models (equation 10 above) are dependent on 
the basic model assumptions, which if violated can seriously bias the estimation (Dehejia 
& Wahba, 1999; Drake, 1993). For this reason, the same treatment effects were also 
estimated in a nonparametric way: subclassification, which is known to further reduce 
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estimation bias in the estimation of causal effects (Imai & Van Dyk, 2004). This allows 
the researcher to verify the plausibility of the parametric results, and therefore, of its 
assumptions. 
 When stratifying the data, the goal is to create classes within which the units are 
very similar to each other based on their balancing score. This is equivalent to 
conditioning on the propensity score. Because the schools within each class are thought 
to be very similar in the distributions of the covariates but different in the doses of 
treatment (reduced variation in ˆ ), the effects can be computed directly within each 
stratum, and averaged over the entire sample of schools using appropriate weights. 
 The procedure is simple and easy to apply: the data were sorted by values of the 
propensity score and divided into five classes/strata of approximately equal sizes that 
group schools with similar propensity scores. Within each class, the  difference in the 
observed mean outcome of groups with different doses of treatment was computed. To 
arrive at the average treatment effects, weighted averages of the within-class effects were 
computed based on their marginal probability in the sample. 
 The entire modeling process involved in the estimation of effects is illustrated in 
Figure 2 below.
     
 
Figure 2. Modeling Process for Estimation of Treatment Effects 70 
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Missing Data 
Missing data, a pervasive problem in large-scale datasets such as this, were 
handled by conducting multiple imputation in Amelia software (Blackwell, King, & 
Honaker, 2011). Each level of the dataset – child, teacher, and school – presented some 
degree of missing data (survey questions were left unanswered for various reasons; for 
example, the respondent refused to answer or the interviewer did not record the answer, 
answer was marked ‘not ascertained’, or the respondent was not found for a particular 
wave of data collection). The extent to which data is missing varies at each level.   
The child level file contains 9,473 cases after filtering out students that met the 
exclusion criteria. Of 57 variables, 47 had either complete data or less than 1% of missing 
data; in 9 variables, missing data ranged from 1% to 7.25% of cases; and 1 variable had 
16.97% of missing cases, namely, the ‘First Grade Reading IRT Score’.  
In the teacher level file, with a total of 42 variables and 3,305 cases, most 
variables had a low to moderate percentage of missing cases: less than 5% in 29 
variables, and between 6% and 13% in 10 variables. The highest percentage of 
missingness was observed in 3 variables related to the ‘daily time teachers speak non-
English in the classroom’: 19% (PM classes), 25% (AM classes), and 52% (All day 
classes). 
Similarly, the rates of missingness for the school-level file (total of 866 schools 
prior to removal of cases that meet exclusion criteria, 169 variables) are low to moderate 
for most variables. They are as follows: 10% or less in 127 variables, between 11% and 
19% in 40 variables, and particularly high for two variables: ‘percentage of free lunch 
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eligible students’ (26%) and ‘percent of Limited English Proficiency (LEP) children’ 
(55%). 
Even though the rate of missingness is generally low in the vast majority of the 
variables for each level of the data, when taken collectively missing data can present 
serious problems for the estimation of the outcome models. Most standard software 
packages utilize listwise deletion, which excludes all the cases with missing data in any 
of the variables; the number of cases excluded in this method easily adds up especially if 
cases missing data on variable X, for example, are not the same ones with missing data 
on the other variables. The potential loss of information is compounded by the fact that 
our data is nested: losing a school that is missing information on a single variable 
represents the loss of all the information available for the teachers and students within 
that school. While listwise deletion produces results with many desirable properties (such 
as unbiased estimates for remaining cases in the analysis), the loss of units raises 
questions about the representativeness of the analytical sample.  
To address the missing data problem and avoid the potential loss of cases, I 
conducted multiple imputation (MI). Multiple imputation is known to produce estimates 
that are consistent, efficient, and asymptoptically normal under the assumption that the 
mechanism by which data is missing is ‘ignorable’ or ‘random’, that is, missing data on a 
variable is unrelated to the values of the variable itself controlling for the values of the 
other variables in the dataset; this is the MAR (missing at random) assumption (Allison, 
P., 2002; Rubin, 1976).  
One of the advantages of MI is that it can be used with any type of data and 
model. It produces a predicted value for any case where the answer is missing based on 
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all the information available in the other variables. Under a multivariate normal model, 
each variable with missing cases is regressed on all the other variables with information 
available. The parameters are obtained through maximum likelihood (ML) and used to 
generate predicted values for each missing data point. To account for the intrinsic 
uncertainty associated with these imputations, the generation of multiple complete 
datasets is recommended, each with different imputed values (Rubin, 1987; Schafer, 
1997). 
I utilized the software Amelia (Blackwell et al., 2011) to conduct multiple 
imputations for each level of the data. Imputation occurred prior to the creation of any 
composite measures and prior to the aggregation of units to the school level. A total of 
five imputed datasets (M=5) was generated for each level of the data: child, teacher, and 
school. The answer “not applicable” – very common in large scale surveys - was treated 
as a value within the range of possible imputed values for all the variables where it had 
been observed but not for the others. The following post imputation adjustments were 
performed in all imputed datasets: imputed values outside the range of the original values 
were rounded off to the variable’s closest lowest or highest bound; values outside the 
logical bounds of the variable were adjusted in a similar manner (e.g., a negative value to 
a question such as “how many books the child has at home” was changed to ‘zero’); 
additional rounding for decimals and integers took place to align imputed values with the 
original scale of the variable. 
Aggregation to the school-level was conducted by linking the imputed datasets in 
the order in which they were generated: imputed dataset M1 from the child-level was 
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linked to imputed dataset M1 from the teacher level, then aggregated to the school-level 
imputed dataset M1. This was done for all 5 series of imputed datasets.   
In order to integrate the results of the analyses over all five imputed datasets, I 
used the PROC MIANALIZE procedure in SAS in all regression models conducted for 
exploratory analyses, as well as those performed to verify covariates balance and to 
estimate treatment effects. At the time of the analyses I was not familiar with multiple 
imputation procedures in STATA. 
School standardized sampling weights were used to obtain all descriptive 
statistics, and to examine bivariate relationships. They were also applied to all regression 
models in the study (specifically, exploratory models, those used to demonstrate 
covariates balance, as well as those estimating treatment effects) with the exception of 
those estimating propensity scores
5
. 
The results of the data analyses are presented in the next chapter. 
 
  
                                                          
5
 There seems to be no agreement among experts about the use of standardized sampling weights in the 
estimation of propensity scores. While methodological studies in this area are still in development, my 
decision to not use sampling weights in regression models estimating propensity scores was driven by the 
fact that the primary purpose of these models is not to make inferences about the general population under 
study, but rather to generate appropriate estimates for the sample at hand. I therefore reserved the use of the 
standardized sampling weights for the outcome analyses where the intent is to generalize the findings from 
the sample to the population of schools in question. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
This chapter starts with a characterization of schools according to their level of 
autonomy with special attention given to their demographic and instructional 
characteristics. This characterization of schools provides answers to the research question 
number 1. I then proceeded to answer the research question number 2: are certain types of 
schools, namely, private schools, schools of choice, and schools that adopt SBM in fact 
more autonomous than regular public schools?. The subsequent section is dedicated to 
answering research question number 3, which is of primary interest in this study: what 
are the effects of increased school autonomy on schools’ average reading gains in 
Kindergarten and first grade? The section starts with modeling the assignment of schools 
to different doses of treatment through the creation of the propensity scores (one for each 
autonomy measure), and a demonstration of how they balance the set of covariates. Once 
the covariates were balanced, the treatment effects were estimated: first, through a series 
of OLS regression equations, and then utilizing a subclassification method. The results 
are presented separately for reading gains in Kindergarten and first grade. 
 
Characteristics of Autonomous Schools 
Variation in levels of school autonomy is associated with a number of students 
and school characteristics. Table 5 shows the correlations of the school autonomy 
measures with various characteristics of the students and their families, teachers, 
principals, and schools.  
 
 
     
 
Table 5  
Correlations between School Autonomy Measures and Students, Family, Teachers, and Schools' Characteristics 
Variables 
SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Adm. 
r p-value r p-value r p-value 
Student Variables             
Mean Age of Students at K Entry (Months) -.155 .000 -.099 .012 -.170 .000 
Proportion of Minority Students -.061 .123 -.102 .010 .007 .858 
Proportion of White Students .025 .524 .058 .146 -.021 .590 
Proportion of Hispanic Students .052 .231 -.014 .729 .111 .030 
Proportion of Black Students -.144 .001 -.163 .000 -.074 .074 
Proportion of Asian Students .259 .000 .202 .000 .242 .000 
Proportion of Students Whose Home Language is English -.075 .061 -.049 .211 -.080 .048 
Mean SES of Students .270 .000 .256 .000 .197 .000 
Proportion of Free Lunch Eligible Students -.207 .000 -.227 .000 -.113 .004 
Proportion of Students At or Above Poverty Level .218 .000 .230 .000 .130 .001 
Mean Reading IRT Score, Fall 1998 .151 .000 .159 .000 .093 .020 
Mean Reading IRT Score, Spring 1999 .173 .000 .158 .000 .134 .001 
Mean Reading IRT Score, Spring 2000 .132 .001 .132 .001 .088 .032 
Mean Kindergarten Reading IRT Gain Score (fall 98 to spring 99) .125 .002 .080 .049 .136 .001 
Mean First Grade Reading IRT Gain Score (spring 99 to spring 00) .041 .351 .066 .136 -.003 .942 
Family Variables 
            
Proportion of Students in Two-Parents Household .201 .000 .199 .000 .135 .001 
Mean Family Income .248 .000 .260 .000 .151 .000 
Proportion of Parents with College (Completed) .244 .000 .184 .000 .234 .000 
Proportion of Parents Who Expect Child to Finish College .081 .067 .088 .025 .046 .382 
Proportion of Parents Who Expect Child to Earn a Higher Degree (Master's, PhD, MD or 
Equivalent) .129 .001 .087 .027 .135 .001 
Proportion of Children Attending School Selected .372 .000 .339 .000 .289 .000 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Correlations between School Autonomy Measures and Students, Family, Teachers, and Schools' Characteristics 
Variables 
SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Adm. 
r p-value r p-value r p-value 
Teacher and Classroom Variables 
            
Proportion of White Teachers -.009 .828 .036 .368 -.060 .130 
Proportion of Hispanic/Latino Teachers .008 .831 -.047 .232 .071 .075 
Proportion of Black Teachers -.185 .000 -.184 .000 -.124 .002 
Proportion of Asian Teachers .118 .005 .079 .063 .124 .002 
Proportion of American Native Teachers -.143 .000 -.115 .004 -.127 .001 
Proportion of Teachers With a Master's Degree or above -.093 .019 -.126 .002 -.022 .582 
Proportion of Teachers With Regular Certification or Higher -.178 .000 -.171 .000 -.127 .001 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught K 5 years or more -.080 .065 -.066 .117 -.069 .141 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught 1st Grade 5 years or more -.097 .013 -.085 .033 -.080 .047 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught at This School 5 years or more .010 .803 .042 .288 -.031 .435 
Number of Class Hours per Week: AM Classrooms -.020 .754 .020 .753 -.059 .355 
Number of Class Hours per Week: PM Classrooms -.010 .902 -.076 .371 .071 .403 
Number of Class Hours per Week: All Day Classrooms -.101 .055 -.075 .155 -.099 .060 
School Variables 
            
Total School Enrollment -.152 .000 -.229 .000 -.012 .761 
Total School K Enrollment -.189 .000 -.246 .000 -.062 .120 
School Year Length -.018 .659 -.024 .539 -.003 .932 
Average Adequacy of K Classroom Resources - Teacher Rating (scale 0-11) -.038 .340 -.042 .289 -.021 .599 
Adequacy of the School Facilities (alpha=0.797) .040 .318 .029 .469 .039 .326 
Number of Additional Types of Funds (alpha=.599) -.141 .001 -.129 .002 -.108 .025 
Neighborhood Problems (alpha=0.868) -.099 .023 -.141 .002 -.016 .708 
Admissions Requirements, Academic Selection (alpha=0.852) .234 .000 .252 .000 .135 .001 7
7 
     
 
Table 5 (continued) 
Correlations between School Autonomy Measures and Students, Family, Teachers, and Schools' Characteristics 
Variables 
SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Adm. 
r p-value r p-value r p-value 
Emphasis on Student Acad/Develop. Goals (alpha=0.596) -.085 .035 -.079 .075 -.064 .123 
Principal: Number of Years as Principal .091 .021 .112 .006 .037 .369 
Principal: Number of Years as a Principal at This School .079 .045 .112 .006 .013 .744 
Influence of Standardized Test Scores on Principal's Evaluation -.238 .000 -.254 .000 -.140 .000 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week for Student Discipline/Absence -.155 .000 -.158 .000 -.099 .022 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week for Monitoring School Areas -.126 .002 -.162 .000 -.041 .300 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week for Required Paperwork (local, state, federal) -.101 .009 -.088 .027 -.083 .033 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week Meeting w/ Students -.064 .109 -.119 .009 .023 .562 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week Working w/ Teachers -.061 .115 -.081 .037 -.016 .687 
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Students’ age, race, and SES are significantly associated with all measures of 
school autonomy. Schools where students are older at Kindergarten entry tend to have 
lower levels of autonomy on all three measures. On average, schools with higher 
proportions of Asian students display increased autonomy on all measures while those 
with higher proportions of Black students score significantly lower on autonomy over 
instruction. Having more Hispanic students is associated with higher autonomy over 
personnel/administrative issues, but not over instruction. The variables related to the 
socio-economic background of students are significantly associated with the global 
measure of autonomy and show a consistent pattern: schools with higher percentages of 
wealthier students tend to display higher autonomy over instruction and over 
personnel/administrative issues. The same pattern is observed when looking at the family 
background of the students: schools where more parents have higher degrees (college or 
above) and income, and whose children attend the school selected show significantly 
higher levels of autonomy on all measures. Higher academic expectations held by the 
parents are also positively associated with the school’s levels of autonomy in all areas of 
control. 
Students’ academic achievement as measured by standardized reading IRT scores 
is positively associated with every school autonomy measure on each round of data 
collection. Higher reading scores are more strongly associated with school autonomy 
over instruction while reading gains (Kindergarten only) are more strongly associated 
with autonomy over personnel/administrative issues. 
Some teachers’ characteristics such as race and education are associated with 
increased levels of autonomy. In particular, the racial background of the teachers seem to 
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replicate the findings for the race of students: schools with more Black teachers show 
overall lower levels of autonomy while those with more Asian teachers display higher 
levels of autonomy.  
There is an unexpected relationship between school autonomy and teachers’ 
education: One would think that schools with higher autonomy would have more 
qualified teachers, but the data do not support this idea. Schools with more highly 
educated teachers are not more likely to be autonomous; on the contrary, on average, 
these schools have slightly lower levels of autonomy. A similarly surprising finding 
appears when looking at teachers’ experience: schools with higher proportions of 
teachers who taught first-grade for at least five years tend to exhibit lower levels of 
instructional and personnel/administrative autonomy.  
These findings are partially  explained by school sector: public schools, while 
exhibiting overall lower levels of school autonomy (details later in this chapter), have 
significantly higher percentages of certified and more experienced teachers compared to 
the private sector. Specifically, a series of t-tests (Appendix D) show that public schools 
have a significantly higher proportion of teachers with a master’s degree or above 
(average of 35% versus 20% in private schools) as well as teachers with regular 
certification or higher (average 90% versus 72% in private schools). In addition, the 
proportion of teachers who taught first grade for at least five years is about twice as high 
in public than in private schools (13% versus 6% in private schools). Once I controlled 
for school sector in an OLS regression, the initial negative associations between the 
school autonomy measures and the teachers experience variables (years of teaching) 
disappeared. However, small, but significant associations persisted even after controlling 
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for schools sector as follows: (i) an association between the instruction measure of school 
autonomy and schools’ proportion of teachers with a Master’s degree or above 
 (β=-0.058; p-value= 0.095); (ii) an association between the instruction measure of school 
autonomy and school’s proportion of teachers with regular certification and higher  
(β=-0.088; p-value=0.048); (iii) an association between the global measure of school 
autonomy and schools proportion of teachers with a Master’s degree or above (β=-0.075; 
p-value=0.03). The reasons for the results are unknown and warrant future investigation. 
Finally, larger schools and those with higher Kindergarten enrollment tend to 
display lower autonomy over all areas of control as do those that report receiving 
additional funds (i.e. funds other than those originated from tuition or the school district). 
This makes sense as funds are usually attached to conditions that impose restrictions 
upon the decision-makers in the schools. Surprisingly, autonomy levels are not associated 
with the overall adequacy of the classroom resources/facilities or even with the school 
year length. More selective schools, as expected, are more likely to exhibit higher 
autonomy levels on all measures. What about principal’s characteristics? Schools with 
more experienced principals display higher levels of autonomy over instruction. 
However, the more time per week the principal spends with students and teachers as well 
as monitoring school areas and dealing with required paperwork the lower the level of 
instructional autonomy. The latter finding has in the past been used as evidence that 
public schools are unduly burdened by bureaucratic controls, which prevents them from 
being self-governing bodies (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Considerably larger in magnitude, 
however, is the negative association between each autonomy measure and the impact of 
standardized test scores on principal’s evaluation. 
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As discussed in the Methods chapter, the decision to create doses of school 
autonomy from the continuous distributions of the autonomy measures was motivated by 
the interest in creating more easily interpretable, more intuitive ways to represent 
increases in school autonomy and their potential effects on the outcome variables. 
Communicating the effects of increases from a low dose of school autonomy (dose 1) to a 
high dose of school autonomy (dose 3), for example, is more straightforward than 
interpreting a unit increase in the continuous version of the treatment variables; 
furthermore, certain types of treatments are better represented in reality as exhibiting 
roughly “more” or “less” of the intervention rather than unit increases that are difficult to 
comprehend, communicate, and replicate in practice. While such categorization of 
continuous variables has its disadvantages (one may lose a fine-grained description of the 
construct of interest), in certain cases the advantages of doing so may outweigh its 
limitations. For example, it is not uncommon for social scientists to categorize a 
continuous income variable into low, middle, and high; for medical researchers to 
describe severity of pain in similar fashion; or for economists to describe levels of 
consumers trust with simple categories, such as complete trust, tendency to trust, and lack 
of trust. The adequacy of such decisions depend on the purposes of each particular 
analysis.  
In this study, while some precision in the description of the school autonomy 
levels is lost due to the categorization of the treatment variables into doses, it is still 
possible to observe how schools placed in different doses of school autonomy vary in 
their background characteristics. As expected, the characterization of autonomous 
schools by doses of autonomy echoes the patterns observed when evaluating bivariate 
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relationships using the continuous versions of the school autonomy variables as it was 
done in Table 5. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of some variables found to be 
associated with school autonomy by doses of autonomy through a series of ANOVA 
tests. The F-ratio values of all these associations were statistically significant unless 
otherwise indicated in the table. A brief profile of schools in each dose of school 
autonomy is presented in the sequence.
     
 
Table 6. 
Descriptive Statistics of Selected Schools Characteristics by Doses of School Autonomy (N=633) 
Note. The F-ratio values testing the differences in means between the doses of the school autonomy measures for the variables in this table were all statistically 
significant (p < .001 or p < .01) unless otherwise indicated. 
a
 F-ratio value non-significant. 
Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3
N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183
0.81 0.84 0.90 0.81 0.83 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.88
Percentage of Students At or Above Poverty 
Level
(0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
Proportion of Children Attending School 0.27 0.34 0.57 0.29 0.34 0.55 0.29 0.40 0.52
Selected (0.30) (0.36) (0.40) (0.32) (0.35) (0.41) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40)
0.11 0.20 0.48 0.13 0.20 0.46 0.16 0.27 0.40
Private School (Yes=1 No=0) (0.31) (0.40) (0.50) (0.34) (0.40) (0.50) (0.37) (0.44) (0.49)
0.36 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.44 a 0.36 0.36 0.52
Central City (Yes=1 No=0) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50)
66.21 63.31 47.41 69.41 63.25 44.64 59.04 61.43 55.74 a
Total School K Enrollment (Range=5; 170) (42.09) (41.61) (33.50) (43.52) (38.32) (34.01) (41.38) (40.26) (37.97)
Composite: Admissions Requirements, Academic 
Selection
0.07 0.12 0.22 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.15 0.17
election (Range= 0-1) (0.20) (0.26) (0.32) (0.20) (0.24) (0.33) (0.24) (0.29) (0.28)
Influence Standardized Test Scores on Principal's 2.19 2.08 1.87 2.20 2.05 1.90 2.12 2.04 1.95
Evaluation (1=None; 2=Some; 3=A Great Deal) (0.64) (0.68) (0.75) (0.66) (0.68) (0.73) (0.64) (0.72) (0.74)
SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative
Variables
8
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Schools in Dose 1 exhibit the lowest level of school autonomy over all areas of 
school management. They have a lower percentage of students at or above poverty 
compared to schools in the other doses, and tend to serve larger groups of Kindergarten 
students than schools with greater autonomy levels. They also have the lowest levels of 
admissions requirements of all schools in the sample. The vast majority of schools in this 
dose are public, located in central cities or large towns. Principals in these schools report 
the highest levels of influence of students’ performance in standardized testing in their 
own evaluation. 
Schools placed in Dose 2 of the school autonomy variables experience a more 
shared control of the school management. These are the schools where the discrepancy 
between decision-making authority between internal and external agents is least 
pronounced. More than 80% of the students in such schools are at or above poverty 
levels, which is a slightly higher proportion of such students compared to schools in Dose 
1. At least a third of their students report attending the school selected by their parents. 
This makes sense: although the majority of these schools are public, almost twice as 
many private schools receive Dose 2 of school autonomy compared to Dose 1. They 
practice moderate levels of academic selectivity compared to schools in other doses of 
autonomy, and evaluation of principals in these schools is somewhat influenced by 
students performance in standardized testing.  
Schools in Dose 3 of the school autonomy variables are the most autonomous 
schools in the sample. More than half of their student population reports attending the 
school selected by their families compared to less than a third of such students in Dose 1. 
Schools in Dose 3 have the largest share of private schools: almost half of the private 
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schools in the global measure of school autonomy are private. These schools have the 
least proportion of economically disadvantaged students (12 % at most), and are more 
heavily concentrated in central cities and large towns than schools in the other doses of 
autonomy. These schools are smaller than schools in other doses of autonomy and enroll 
significantly lower numbers of Kindergarten students. Schools in Dose 3 of the global 
and the instructional measure of autonomy score about three times as high in academic 
selectivity compared to schools in Dose 1 of those measures. Principals in these schools 
report significantly lower levels of influence of students’ performance in standardized 
testing in their own evaluation. 
Collectively, these two sets of analyses, one using the continuous versions of the 
school autonomy measures (Table 5) and the other showing differences in schools’ 
characteristics by doses of autonomy (Table 6), show that overall, autonomous schools 
seem to be more highly associated with the demographic characteristics of the students 
and teachers rather than instructional characteristics of the schools. They are more likely 
to have more students from wealthier backgrounds who attend the school selected, and 
less likely to have free lunch eligible students. These schools have larger proportions of 
more educated parents as well as students from two-parent households. Autonomous 
schools are also more selective academically and display higher reading gains in 
Kindergarten (but not in first grade).  
Are certain organizational characteristics of schools related to greater autonomy? 
To answer this question, I tested the relationship between the school autonomy measures 
and specific types of schools believed to display higher levels of autonomy when 
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compared to others, namely, private schools, schools of choice, and schools that adopt 
SBM committees. The results are presented next. 
 
School Autonomy by School Sector, Schools of Choice and Adoption of SBM  
Are certain types of schools more autonomous than others? Which types of 
schools enjoy greater autonomy over their instructional and administrative decisions? 
There is special interest, for example, in observing how the school autonomy measures 
vary across school sector. Previous studies have characterized variations in school 
autonomy mainly as a function of school sector: private schools assumed to be 
autonomous whereas public schools were assumed to lack internal control (Chubb & 
Moe, 1990). But it is not only private schools that may claim greater freedom from 
bureaucratic controls. Among public schools, certain types of schools stand out as 
plausible candidates for greater autonomy, namely: schools of choice and schools that 
adopt SBM committees. In the past two decades, the school choice movement has 
successfully advocated for the expansion of charter schools in the United States, which 
by design are expected to be more autonomous than other public schools. Similarly, SBM 
committees have been adopted in many schools as a strategy for increasing local control 
through greater participation of local stakeholders in the school management. Table 7 
shows a series of t-tests examining the relationship between the school autonomy 
measures and these types of schools. The distribution of the school autonomy measures 
by school sector, schools of choice, and SBM schools is available in Appendix E. 
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As expected, private schools score, on average, significantly higher than public 
schools on every measure of school autonomy; they also display greater variation around 
the mean than public schools. The mean difference observed between private and public 
schools amounts to almost an entire standard deviation (0.81) on the instruction measure, 
and more than half of a standard deviation (0.58) on the personnel/administrative 
measure. 
Table 7
N Mean SD
Public 466 -0.051 0.230 -8.69 ***
Private 167 0.175 0.306
Public 466 -0.094 0.304 -8.91 ***
Private 167 0.190 0.369
Public 466 -0.009 0.271 -6.53 ***
Private 167 0.159 0.316
N Mean SD
SA School of Choice 45 -0.046 0.197 -0.18
Other 421 -0.052 0.234
IN School of Choice 45 -0.130 0.300 0.85
Other 421 -0.090 0.305
PA School of Choice 45 0.042 0.223 -1.56
Other 421 -0.014 0.276
N Mean SD
SA SBM School 338 -0.061 0.221 1.54
Other 128 -0.025 0.253
IN SBM School 338 -0.132 0.292 4.46 ***
Other 128 0.007 0.315
PA SBM School 338 0.009 0.271 -2.30 *
Other 128 -0.056 0.268
 
a
 All Schools (N=633). 
b
 Public Schools Only (N=466)
 * p < .05.  ** p < .01.  *** p < .001.
t
t
t
Relationship between School Autonomy Measures and School Sector, 
Schools of Choice, and Schools that Adopt SBM Committees
School Sector
a
Schools of Choice
b
SBM School
b
SA
IN
PA
89 
 
Surprising results were found for the other two types of schools. Schools of 
choice are no different than other public schools on any measure of school autonomy.  
These results might reflect the fact that only a small number of schools of choice is 
available for comparison, but perhaps, most importantly, the fact that schools of choice in 
this dataset include not only charter schools, but also open-enrollment schools and 
schools that adopt a non-specialized curriculum. In a broader sense, schools of choice are 
meant to offer more autonomy to parents when choosing a school in which to enroll their 
children. For example, schools classified as ‘schools of choice’ may be schools in 
districts that allow either intra-district or inter-district enrollment, which implies more 
autonomy for parents, but says little about how much more autonomy the local school 
experiences as a result of these flexible enrollment programs. Unfortunately, there is no 
identifier in the dataset for charter schools alone. 
As for the comparison between public schools that adopt a SBM committee and 
those that do not, I found that SBM schools score significantly lower than other public 
schools on the instructional autonomy measure (equivalent to 0.40 of a standard 
deviation), and slightly higher on the personnel/administrative autonomy measure 
(equivalent to 0.22 of a standard deviation). These unexpected findings may be related to 
implementation challenges faced by SBM committees; to the scope of devolution 
intended vs. achieved by SBM committees in these schools; or to some unique 
characteristics of schools that choose to adopt SBM. 
As seen in chapter 2, the ideal operation of SBM involves intense participation of 
the local actors in each school; in reality, however, there is a lot of variation in how 
successful schools are in devolving authority to local decision-makers (Barrera-Osorio et 
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al., 2009). It is possible that certain activities related to the operations and management of 
the school (e.g. discretionary spending, and professional development) are more easily 
devolved to SBM committees rather than decisions over the curriculum or evaluation of 
teachers and students, both of which are strongly influenced by policies defined beyond 
the school walls. While this may explain why these schools score slightly higher on the 
personnel/administrative autonomy measure, it does not help us understand why they 
have less instructional autonomy than other public schools.  
One possibility is that adoption of SBM committees is more likely to occur 
among “failing schools” that are in search of innovative ways to improve their academic 
performance: the heavy external oversight by school districts in such cases might then 
explain a loss of autonomy over instructional matters in relation to other schools. To 
explore this possibility, I ran a series of additional t-tests comparing SBM and other 
public schools on their average reading scores and reading gains, both in Kindergarten 
and in first grade.  
The results revealed no significant differences in reading outcomes between these 
schools that could lend support to the “failing schools” explanation. Unfortunately, 
additional information needed to properly verify this hypothesis is not available, such as 
data on when SBM was adopted as well as clear pre-intervention student achievement 
data.  A few significant differences were found, however, that suggest that SBM schools 
may serve a population of students different from that served by other public schools. 
Specifically, public schools that adopt SBM have a higher percentage of minority 
students (between 10 and 25% compared to less than 10% among other public schools), 
and a lower percentage of students at or above poverty level (79% compared to 85% 
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among other public schools). Additionally, a higher proportion of SBM schools is located 
in urban fringes and large towns (40.2%) compared to other public schools (23.6%). 
It is noteworthy that, even though the autonomy scores of the schools of choice 
were not statistically different from those of other public schools, the direction of those 
differences follows closely the pattern observed for the SBM schools: schools of choice 
tend to be lower in autonomy over instruction but either similar or higher in autonomy 
over personnel/administrative issues. Separate t-tests showed that schools of choice, 
much like the SBM schools in this sample, are not distinguishable from other public 
schools in their average reading scores and reading gains in Kindergarten and first grade. 
Understanding the observed differences in levels of school autonomy for schools 
of choice and SBM schools in comparison to other public schools remains a topic for 
future research. Additional characteristics of schools that could help unveil possible 
reasons for such surprising findings are: what motivated the adoption of SBM 
committees/the designation of schools of choice, how long these practices have been 
operating for, information about the scope of devolution intended/achieved, as well as 
pre-intervention data and details about the implementation of such interventions. 
As seen thus far, variation in levels of school autonomy is related to students 
demographic characteristics: autonomous schools have higher proportions of students 
from wealthier families who attend the schools they selected; they also display higher 
reading scores in Kindergarten and first grade as well as higher reading gains in 
Kindergarten. Some school characteristics are also associated with their level of 
autonomy. Autonomous schools are more likely to be smaller and more selective, but do 
not necessarily have more experienced teachers, a longer school year or better facilities 
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and classroom resources than other schools. As expected, private schools enjoy greater 
levels of autonomy than public schools in all areas of control. Public schools that have 
SBM committees display greater autonomy over personnel/administrative matters, but 
lower autonomy over instruction compared to other public schools. Schools with greater 
autonomy over instruction are more likely to have more experienced principals.  
 Next, the variation in levels of school autonomy was modeled as a function of a 
full set of covariates (characteristics of students, teachers, principals, and schools) 
resulting in a propensity score for each school per treatment variable (SA, IN, PA). The 
propensity score corresponds to the predicted probability of a school having a given dose 
of autonomy as a function of the selected covariates. 
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Propensity Scores 
Modeling Treatment Assignment of Schools to Doses of Treatment 
Modeling the assignment of schools to the different doses of treatment is 
accomplished by utilizing McCullagh’s ordinal logit model (1980), which in STATA is 
called the “odds proportional model”. Each treatment variable (SA, IN, and PA) was 
regressed separately on a total of 123 covariates (complete list of covariates is in 
Appendix C) that are thought to predict schools’ doses of autonomy. For each treatment 
variable with 3 doses (d=3), STATA computed two equations: 
log 
          
          
   =     -   
    .      (11) 
log  
          
          
  =     -   
    .      (12) 
Together, equations 11 and 12 describe the distribution of schools among the 
three different doses of each treatment. For each school autonomy variable (SA, IN, PA), 
I selected the predicted log-odds of a school being in dose 1 vs. being in doses 2 + 3 (as 
in equation 11) as the propensity score to be used in the outcome models, under the 
assumption that the distribution of doses is dependent on the covariates X only through 
     .I could have selected equation 12 instead, under the same assumption because  they 
both estimate the term I am interested in, i.e.     
6
. The objective was to use a single 
variable that fully describes the relationship between the covariates and the treatment 
                                                          
6
 The ordinal logit regression model makes the assumption of parallel regressions, also known as the 
proportional odds assumption. This assumption states that the slopes of both equations are the same (thus 
     is the same). The only difference is in the estimated intercepts in each equation, also called thresholds 
because they represent cut-points between doses of the treatment. That means that the probability curve 
estimated in equation 11 is the same as the one estimated in equation 12. They differ only in being shifted 
to higher or lower values of the probability range depending on the intercept. For this sample of schools, I 
compared the estimates from both equations, and verified that in fact, the value of the term      estimated 
for each school is the same whether I use equation 11 or 12. Since these equations are interchangeable for 
our purposes, I estimated the propensity scores using equation 11. 
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assignment (a summary of the pre-treatment variables). If the covariates can be shown to 
be independent of treatment assignment conditional on this variable (i.e. if such variable 
“balances” the covariates), then it can be used as a propensity score (Joffe & Rosenbaum, 
1999). 
Before I proceeded to demonstrate how the propensity scores balance the 
covariates, I was interested in knowing how well the propensity scores obtained in 
STATA predicted the assignment of schools to the doses of autonomy in each treatment 
variable, that is, I wanted to compare schools’ predicted doses to their observed doses of 
autonomy. For this step, I used the schools’ predicted probability of assignment to dose 1 
as a reference variable, which was compared to schools’ actual dose of autonomy. The 
dotplots in Figure 3 illustrate this comparison, separately for each treatment variable (SA, 
IN, and PA).  
As expected for each treatment variable, schools with a high probability of being 
in dose 1 (above .80) are seldom observed in the other doses; on the other hand, schools 
with the lowest probability of being in dose 1 (below .10) are often observed in doses 2 or 
3. Looking at the middle range, schools with a low to moderately high chance of 
assignment to dose 1 (from .10 to about .70 or .80) can be observed in all three doses of 
treatment. This is a desirable feature of the prediction models: having schools with the 
same predicted score in all three doses of the treatment ensures that enough units are 
available for comparisons of doses thus allowing the computation of treatment effects. In 
this sample, for the most part, schools with the same predicted probability can be found 
in each of the three doses of treatment. Now, I move to the demonstration of covariates 
balance using the estimated propensity scores. 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Schools’ Predicted Probabilities of Assignment to Dose 1 to 
Schools’ Observed Doses of Autonomy 
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Demonstrating Covariates Balance for the Treatment Variables 
A covariate balance is demonstrated by showing that, conditional on the 
propensity score, school assignment to the different doses of autonomy (i.e. treatment 
assignment) is independent of that predictor.  Accordingly, each of the 123 covariates 
were regressed on a school autonomy variable; this was done for one school autonomy 
variable at a time, say the global measure of autonomy. I used two different models: first, 
I regressed each covariate on the doses of autonomy without controlling for the 
propensity score; next, I reran the OLS regression, this time including the appropriate 
propensity score in the model. This was repeated separately for the other two school 
autonomy measures (IN and PA). To learn whether the covariate and the treatment are 
unrelated, one needs to check the regression coefficients of the school autonomy 
variables in the models: if independence holds, the coefficients’ t-values are not 
significant. To illustrate the performance of the propensity scores in achieving covariates 
balance, I graphically represented the results of these regression analyses in Figure 4. The 
plots show the t-values of the coefficients testing the association between the school 
autonomy measures and all the covariates in the models.  For each school autonomy 
measure (SA, IN, PA), the graph on the left shows t-values of the regression coefficients 
obtained prior to the inclusion of the propensity score in the model; the graph on the right 
shows the t-values of the coefficients after controlling for the propensity score.  
Specifically, the global measure of school autonomy was initially associated with 
61 covariates (49 at the .05 level, 10 at the .10 level, and 2 were marginally associated at 
the .10 level); after inclusion of the propensity score in the models, all covariates were 
unrelated to the treatment (t-values are now between -1.96 and +1.96). The results for the 
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school autonomy over instruction measure show that, of the 123 covariates, 72 were 
initially associated with the doses of autonomy (55 at the .05 level, 15 at the .10 level, 
and 2 marginally associated at the .10 level); after conditioning on the corresponding 
propensity score, only 5 covariates remained significantly related to the treatment (2 at 
the .05 level, and 3 at the .10 level; these are fewer significant results than would be 
expected by chance). Finally, of the initial 28 covariates associated with the school 
autonomy over personnel/administrative measure (23 at the .05 level and 5 at the .10 
level), only 1 remained significantly associated at the .05 level after conditioning on the 
propensity score.  
These results demonstrate that the propensity scores obtained for each treatment 
(SA, IN, PA) successfully balanced the covariates. This means that schools with different 
doses of autonomy on a treatment variable but the same propensity score are similar in 
their distribution of covariates; they can, therefore, be compared on the outcome 
variables, thus allowing for the estimation of treatment effects (the mean difference in 
outcome between schools with different doses of treatment). The next section discusses 
the estimation of such school-level treatment effects, first through the use of OLS 
regression models, then using a subclassification method. 
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Figure 4. Association of School Autonomy Measures and Covariates as represented by 
Regression Coefficients’ t-values (non-significant coefficients represented between bars) 
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Estimated Effects of Increased Doses of School Autonomy on Average Kindergarten 
Reading Gains 
Table 8 displays the descriptive statistics of the schools average Kindergarten IRT 
Reading Gain Scores (from Fall 1998 to Spring 1999) and how they vary by doses of 
school autonomy. I used ANOVA tests for an initial assessment of the relationship 
between the reading gain scores and the school autonomy variables. The results of these 
tests revealed that schools with higher doses of autonomy over personnel/administrative 
issues also exhibit greater Kindergarten reading gains. On average, schools in dose 3 of 
the PA measure score almost a quarter of a standard deviation (0.23) above schools in 
dose 1 on their Kindergarten reading gain scores. However, school autonomy over 
instruction and the global measure of autonomy are not associated with higher K reading 
gains in these schools. These associations were further tested using various regression 
models.  
 
Table 8. 
Relationship between School Autonomy Measures and Schools Average Kindergarten 
IRT Reading Gains 
 
 
Mean Reading 
Gain Score St. Deviation
F-ratio 
(df=2, 629) p-value
11.739 (3.972)
SA Dose 1 11.544 (3.720) 0.612 0.543
Dose 2 11.699 (3.569)
Dose 3 11.967 (4.554)
IN Dose 1 11.799 (3.635) 0.448 0.639
Dose 2 11.539 (3.463)
Dose 3 11.887 (4.704)
PA Dose 1 11.433 (3.623) 2.979 0.052
Dose 2 11.566 (3.689)
Dose 3 12.336 (4.627)
All Schools (Range: 1.93-32.65)
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A series of exploratory OLS regression models (Table 9) confirmed that only the 
personnel/administrative measure of autonomy is significantly associated with the 
schools average K reading gains in this sample after controlling for some key 
demographic characteristics of the students and schools. School sector fully explains the 
initial associations found between schools average K reading gains and both the SA and 
the IN measures. The coefficient for the PA measure, however, is only partially explained 
by school sector (regression 2) and remains significant even after controlling for a 
number of additional students and schools characteristics (in regression 5, for example, I 
added all the covariates that were not balanced by the propensity scores as seen in the 
previous section). Introducing the additional variables in model 5 reduced somewhat the 
estimated coefficient of school sector on K reading gains while the estimated effect of PA 
remained nearly unchanged. This finding suggests that schools with increased 
personnel/administrative autonomy may have a positive impact on reading outcomes that 
goes beyond school differences in socioeconomic background. Subsequent regression 
models employing the propensity scores further tested the robustness of this association. 
 
 
     
 
Table 9 
Schools Average K Reading Gain Scores Regressed on School Autonomy Measures and Controls: Additive Models (N=633) 
SA Global Measure SA Instructional Matters SA Personnel/Administrative Issues 
Regression 1 Estimate St. Error 
 
Regression 1 Estimate St. Error  Regression 1 Estimate St.Error  
Intercept 11.711 0.152 *** Intercept 11.740 0.153 *** Intercept 11.681 0.152 *** 
SA Global 1.831 0.581 ** SA Instruction 0.916 0.463 † SA Personnel/Admin. 1.853 0.555 ** 
Regression 2 
   
Regression 2    Regression 2    
Intercept 11.375 0.178 *** Intercept 11.345 0.180 *** Intercept 11.343 0.175 *** 
SA Global 1.043 0.619 
 
SA Instruction 0.209 0.496  SA Personnel/Admin. 1.373 0.569 * 
Private 1.318        0.369 *** Private 1.492 0.371 *** Private 1.337 0.353 *** 
Regression 3    Regression 3    Regression 3    
Intercept 9.342 0.719 *** Intercept 9.210 0.724 *** Intercept 9.304        0.712 *** 
SA Global 0.859 0.620  SA Instruction 0.043 0.499  SA Personnel/Admin. 1.287        0.571 * 
Private 0.975 0.385 * Private 1.137 0.386 ** Private 0.963        0.373 * 
Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
2.505 0.859 * Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
2.626 0.862 ** Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
2.522        0.854 ** 
Regression 4    Regression 4    Regression 4    
Intercept 9.400 0.791 *** Intercept 9.250 0.790 *** Intercept 9.464        0.787 *** 
SA Global 0.863 0.620  SA Instruction 0.038 0.501  SA Personnel/Admin. 1.323       0.576 * 
Private 0.949 0.411 * Private 1.120 0.408 ** Private 0.890       0.404 * 
Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
2.487 0.866 ** Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
2.615 0.867 ** Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
2.471        0.861 ** 
School Has SBM -0.060 0.339  School Has SBM -0.043 0.340  School Has SBM -0.164        0.341  
   † p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.                                                                                                                                                                         (continues) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Schools Average K Reading Gain Scores Regressed on School Autonomy Measures and Controls: Additive Models (N=633) 
SA Global Measure SA Instructional Matters SA Personnel/Administrative Issues 
Regression 5    Regression 5    Regression 5    
Intercept 2.829 2.036  Intercept 2.908 2.041  Intercept 2.823 2.027  
SA Global 0.990 0.615  SA Instruction 0.174 0.500  SA Personnel/Admin. 1.355 0.558 * 
Private 1.090 0.477 * Private 1.250 0.475 † Private 1.053 0.473 * 
Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
0.738 1.132  Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
0.830 1.134  Prop. At/Above 
Poverty 
0.771 1.129  
School Has SBM -0.097 0.343  School Has SBM -0.069 0.344  School Has SBM -0.189 0.345  
Prop. Free Lunch 
Students 
0.014 0.006 * Prop. Free Lunch 
Students 
0.014 0.006 * Prop. Free Lunch 
Students 
0.013 0.006 * 
Urban/Large Town 0.356 0.404  Urban/Large Town 0.313 0.407  Urban/Large Town 0.317 0.402  
Central City 0.163 0.402  Central City 0.158 0.405  Central City 0.084 0.402  
Mean K IRT score 
Reading Score 
0.146 0.040 *** Mean K IRT score 
Reading Score 
0.144 0.040 *** Mean K IRT score 
Reading Score 
0.147 0.040 *** 
Mean SE  Students 0.207 0.512  Mean SE  Students 0.260 0.511  Mean SE  Students 0.172 0.510  
Prop. Parents Expect 
Child Finish College 
-0.982 0.859  Prop. Parents Expect 
Child Finish College 
-1.019 0.859  Prop. Parents Expect 
Child Finish College 
-0.965 0.861  
School Success at 
Prof. Outlook: Goals 
0.738 0.432 † School Success at 
Prof. Outlook: Goals 
0.703 0.432  School Success at 
Prof. Outlook: Goals 
0.768 0.432 † 
   † p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Main Effects Models 
The treatment effects of increasing doses of school autonomy on the schools’ 
average reading gains in Kindergarten were estimated separately for each measure of 
school autonomy. In each case, the dependent variable was regressed on the doses of the 
treatment (dose 1 is the reference category), conditional on the propensity score (log-odds 
of assignment to dose 1 vs. doses 2 + 3 of the respective autonomy measure) as in the 
general outcome model below (details discussed in the previous chapter): 
  e   Dose3)( (Dose2))ˆ(Y 3210  .      (13),   
School standardized sampling weights were used in these regression models as 
mentioned in the methods section. The results are presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10 
OLS Regressions Estimating the Effects of the School Autonomy Measures 
on Schools Average Kindergarten Reading Gain Score 
 
 
The effects estimated are all very small in magnitude and none of them reached 
statistical significance. The contrasts between all the doses of school autonomy are made 
explicit in Table 11.  
  
Variable Estimate St. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 11.375 0.283 40.18 <.0001
Propensity ScoreSA -0.367 0.162 -2.26 0.0298
Dose 2 -0.003 0.450 -0.01 0.9945
Dose 3 -0.035 0.543 -0.06 0.9488
Variable Estimate St. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 11.696 0.283 41.29 <.0001
Propensity ScoreIN -0.375 0.169 -2.23 0.0317
Dose 2 -0.519 0.442 -1.17 0.2446
Dose 3 -0.446 0.471 -0.95 0.3444
Variable Estimate St. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 11.259 0.263 42.81 <.0001
Propensity scorePA -0.563 0.200 -2.82 0.0088
Dose 2 0.057 0.427 0.13 0.8943
Dose 3 0.261 0.503 0.52 0.6053
School Autonomy, Global Measure
School Autonomy, Instructional Matters
School Autonomy, Personnel/Administrative Matters
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Table 11 
Difference in Mean K Reading Gains between Schools with Different Doses of 
Autonomy (95% Confidence Interval) 
 
Note. These estimated treatment effects represent the difference in schools mean reading 
gains between the higher dose and the lower dose of autonomy in each comparison. For 
example, increasing school autonomy from dose 1 to dose 2 of the Global Measure 
corresponds to an estimated decrease in mean reading gains of 0.003).  
 
The contrasts in Table 11 show the impact of incremental increases in doses of 
school autonomy on the dependent variable. The effects are nearly zero for all contrasts 
of the global measure. Incremental increases of autonomy on the instruction measure 
have a somewhat larger, mostly negative impact on schools mean reading gains, and the 
direction of the effects is inconsistent across the doses of the treatment. Finally, while the 
effects of the personnel/administrative measure follow a more linear pattern - incremental 
doses of autonomy show progressive increases in reading gains – these differences are 
small and not statistically significant. Therefore, the notion that increasing school 
autonomy may lead to increases in the average schools reading gains is not supported in 
this sample of schools for the Kindergarten year.  
Dose 1 Dose 2
Dose 2 -0.003 (-0.905; 0.899)
Dose 3 -0.035 (-1.137; 1.067) -0.032 (-0.902; 0.838)
Dose 1 Dose 2
Dose 2 -0.519 (-1.400; 0.363)
Dose 3 -0.446 (-1.373; 0.481) 0.073 (-0.776; 0.921)
Dose 1 Dose 2
Dose 2 0.057 (-0.795; 0.909)
Dose 3 0.261 (-0.745; 1.268) 0.204 (-0.640; 1.049)
School Autonomy, Global Measure
School Autonomy, Personnel/Administrative Matters
School Autonomy, Instructional Matters
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Subclassification Method 
 The treatment effects above were also verified using a subclassification method. 
The propensity score for each treatment variable was sorted from its lowest to highest 
values, and the variable divided into five strata of approximately equal sizes. Schools in 
each stratum of the propensity score – similar in covariates but different in doses of 
autonomy – were then compared to obtain the difference in average K reading gains 
between schools receiving different doses of the treatment. 
 The overall treatment effects obtained through this method were slightly larger in 
absolute value than the ones obtained from the regression models above, but all of them 
fell within the confidence intervals of the aforementioned estimates thus reinforcing the 
previous conclusions. A particular pattern of findings revealed through the stratification 
method is noteworthy: the magnitude of the effects of moving from the lowest (dose 1) to 
the highest dose (dose 3) of autonomy in the IN and PA measures. Such pattern is 
displayed in Table 12.  
 
Table 12 
Effects on Schools Average K Reading Gains of Moving from Lowest (Dose 1) 
to Highest Dose (Dose 3) of School Autonomy by Propensity Score Stratum 
 
 
1 0.186 (116) -0.219 (128) -0.087 (96)
2 0.174 (83) 0.634 (82) -0.261 (69)
3 -0.299 (66) -0.090 (68) -0.047 (66)
4 0.130 (74) -1.382 (70) 1.145 (80)
5 -1.078 (88) -1.622 (79) 1.990 (116)
Weighted Average  
Treatment Effect
a
a 
Average treatment effects were weighted by the marginal probability of schools in each stratum of 
the propensity score.
-0.150 -0.439 0.582
Propensity Score 
Stratum
SA (n) IN (n) PA (n)
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Table 13 
Effects on Schools Average K Reading Gains of Moving from Dose 2 
to Dose 3 of School Autonomy by Propensity Score Stratum 
 
 
In table 12, the effects seem much larger for schools in strata 4 and 5 for the IN 
and PA measure. These are schools with higher probabilities of being low in autonomy 
(recall that our propensity scores are the log-odds of a school being assigned to dose 1 vs. 
doses 2+3 of autonomy). These estimates, however, do not warrant any strong inferences 
because at more extreme values of the propensity scores there are fewer units of schools 
available for comparisons. This makes sense: at higher probabilities of being low in 
autonomy, fewer units are actually assigned to the high autonomy dose; in this case, less 
than 2% of schools (n=9) can be observed in dose 3 of stratum 5, for example. Similar 
patterns were observed in table 13 that shows estimates of the average treatment effects 
on the outcome variable of moving from Dose 2 to Dose 3 of the school autonomy 
measures. These treatment effects also fall within the confidence intervals of the 
coefficients estimated by the previous regression models, and confirm the conclusion of 
no treatment effects of increased school autonomy on schools reading gains in 
Kindergarten.  
 
1 -0.005 (128) -0.025 (143) 0.116 (115)
2 0.064 (107) 0.142 (110) 0.081 (83)
3 -0.039 (86) -0.019 (82) 0.067 (86)
4 0.002 (67) -0.067 (55) -0.035 (69)
5 -0.331 (34) -0.257 (35) 0.376 (30)
Weighted Average  
Treatment Effect
a
a 
Average treatment effects were weighted by the marginal probability of schools in each stratum of 
the propensity score.
Propensity Score 
Stratum
SA (n) IN (n) PA (n)
-0.310 -0.225 0.605
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Interaction Effects 
To test whether a possible interaction between school autonomy and certain types 
of schools - namely, private, schools of choice, and schools that adopt SBM – accounts 
for changes in reading scores, I ran an additional series of regression models. This time, I 
used the continuous version of the school autonomy variables in the analyses. Table 14 
contains the results obtained by incorporating interaction terms in the models while 
controlling for main effects and propensity scores. 
 
     
 
Table 14 
OLS Regressions Testing Interactions between School Autonomy and School Sector, Schools of Choice, and Adoption of SBM  
in the Kindergarten Outcome Models (N=633) 
 
Variable Estimate SE Variable Estimate SE Variable Estimate SE
Intercept 11.36 0.22 *** Intercept 11.51 0.23 *** Intercept 11.92 0.33 ***
Propensity ScoreSA 0.00 0.20 Propensity ScoreSA -0.22 0.17 Propensity ScoreSA -0.18 0.17
SA (continous) 0.64 0.94 SA (continous) 1.36 0.79 † SA (continous) -0.14 1.10
Private 1.24 0.47 * School of Choice -0.33 0.60 SBM -0.55 0.33 † 
SA*private 1.03 1.41 SA*School of Choice -4.03 2.99 SA*SBM 2.39 1.24 † 
Variable Estimate SE Variable Estimate SE Variable Estimate SE
Intercept 11.35 0.23 *** Intercept 11.53 0.25 *** Intercept 11.91 0.38 ***
Propensity ScoreIN 0.02 0.22 Propensity ScoreIN -0.24 0.20 Propensity ScoreIN -0.17 0.21
IN (continuous) -0.03 0.70 IN (continuous) 0.60 0.67 IN (continuous) -0.15 0.84
Private 1.44 0.46 ** School of Choice -0.51 0.64 SBM -0.49 0.35
IN*Private 0.76 1.07 IN*School of Choice -3.66 2.00 † IN*SBM 0.94 0.99
Variable Estimate SE Variable Estimate SE Variable Estimate SE ***
Intercept 11.21 0.20 *** Intercept 11.41 0.20 *** Intercept 11.84 0.28
Propensity ScorePA -0.31 0.23 Propensity ScorePA -0.49 0.21  * Propensity ScorePA -0.47 0.20  *
PA (continuous) 0.48 0.81 PA (continuous) 0.92 0.75 PA (continuous) -0.60 1.10
Private 1.00 0.40  * School of Choice -0.44 0.60 SBM -0.75 0.31  *
PA*Private 1.10 1.38 PA*School of Choice -0.56 2.59 PA*SBM 2.57 1.17  *
† p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
School Autonomy, Global Measure
School Autonomy, Instructional Matters
School Autonomy, Personnel/Administrative Matters
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A significant interaction was found between the PA measure and schools’ 
adoption of SBM. This finding prompted a rerun of the SBM interaction models, this 
time separately for public and private schools (Table 15). 
 
Table 15 
Models testing Interactions between School Autonomy and Adoption of SBM in the K 
Outcome Models: Disaggregated Analyses by School Sector 
 
 
 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Intercept 11.92 0.33 *** 11.46 0.33 *** 13.10 1.01 ***
Propensity ScoreSA -0.18 0.17 0.04 0.20 -0.07 0.43
SA (continous) -0.14 1.10 1.53 1.30 -2.15 1.92
SBM -0.55 0.33 † -0.13 0.34 -3.40 1.15 **
SA*SBM 2.39 1.24 † -1.23 1.54 11.79 3.01 ***
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Intercept 11.91 0.38 *** 11.68 0.35 *** 12.47 1.19 ***
Propensity ScoreIN -0.17 0.21 0.27 0.17 -0.41 0.60
IN (continuous) -0.15 0.84 1.56 0.99 -2.06 1.68
SBM -0.49 0.35 -0.33 0.36 -2.71 1.16 *
IN*SBM 0.94 0.99 -1.84 1.21 8.41 2.52 ***
Variable Estimate SE *** Estimate SE *** Estimate SE
Intercept 11.84 0.28 11.37 0.30 12.99 0.71 ***
Propensity ScorePA -0.47 0.20  * -0.31 0.22 -0.12 0.48
PA (continuous) -0.60 1.10 0.40 1.19 -1.79 2.02
SBM -0.75 0.31  * -0.23 0.35 -3.12 1.15 **
PA*SBM 2.57 1.17  * 0.17 1.29 11.51 2.87 ***
† p < .1. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
School Autonomy, Global Measure
School Autonomy, Instructional Matters
School Autonomy, Personnel/Administrative Matters
All Schools (N=633) Public Schools (N=466) Private Schools (N=167)
All Schools (N=633) Public Schools (N=466) Private Schools (N=167)
All Schools (N=633) Public Schools (N=466) Private Schools (N=167)
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The disaggregated analyses by school sector reveal that such effect is not present 
among public schools. Instead, it is entirely driven by the significant interaction found 
among private schools. In fact, the significant interactions among private schools seem to 
suggest that the effects of all school autonomy measures on K reading gains vary as a 
function of whether or not the schools adopt SBM. To gain a better understanding of how 
the effect of SBM schools interacts with the autonomy measures in predicting reading 
gains in the private sector, I computed predicted average K reading gains based on the 
above models for the following schools: those placed in the lowest (dose 1) and highest 
(dose 3) doses of the autonomy measures. I then took the difference between them. I did 
this separately for private schools that adopt SBM and those that do not. The predicted 
values are in Table 16. Comparisons between dose 2 and dose 3 of the autonomy 
measures were also computed, but the effects were much smaller than the ones 
comparing dose 1 to dose 3, which is why they were not reported here. 
 
Table 16 
Predicted Average K Reading Gains for Schools Placed in the Lowest (Dose 1) and 
Highest (Dose 3) Doses of School Autonomy, Private Schools Only (N=167)  
Note. Confidence Intervals for the Difference in Average Kindergarten Reading Gains 
(Dose 3 - Dose 1) were calculated using the lower and upper bounds of the respective 
interaction coefficients for schools that adopt SBM. For schools without an SBM committee, 
the interaction term equals 0, thereforeI used the lower and upper bounds of the respective 
school autonomy variable coefficient to estimate the confidence intervals. . 
Dose 1 Dose 3 Dose 3 - Dose 1
SA
School without SBM 13.923 12.556 -1.367 -3.784 1.050
School with SBM 7.175 13.294 6.120 2.351 9.889
IN
School without SBM 14.305 12.732 -1.574 -4.170 1.023
School with SBM 8.692 13.543 4.851 1.081 8.620
PA
School without SBM 13.686 12.468 -1.218 -3.991 1.555
School with SBM 7.810 14.427 6.618 2.763 10.472
95% Confidence Interval
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According to these fitted values, the effects of autonomy for schools with no SBM 
committee are in the opposite direction from those of schools that adopt SBM. In fact, 
they suggest that while school autonomy alone has no positive effects on K reading gains, 
the effects can be considerably large for SBM schools: moving from the lowest dose 
(dose 1) to the highest dose (dose 3) appears to have an impressive positive effect. These 
results should be taken with a lot of reservation because they are based on only a small 
number of schools available for these comparisons. Of the 167 private schools, 44 have a 
SBM committee, and only a handful were observed in Dose 1 of each treatment variable, 
specifically: global measure of autonomy (N=5), school autonomy over instruction 
(N=6), and school autonomy over personnel/administrative issues (N=7). Because private 
schools that adopt SBM also exhibit high levels of autonomy it is difficult to estimate 
reliable treatment effects among these schools. The uncertainty surrounding these 
estimated effects is illustrated by the large confidence intervals obtained. 
 This section has shown that increases in the autonomy measures are not 
associated with schools average reading gains in Kindergarten in this sample of schools. 
The initial association between autonomy over personnel/administrative issues and 
reading gains disappeared once I controlled for the propensity score in the outcome 
models. The same conclusion resulted from the subclassification analyses. Interestingly, 
an interaction effect was found that suggests that greater levels of autonomy may lead to 
higher reading gains for a specific subset of schools: private schools that adopt SBM. 
This finding warrants caution because these results are based on only a handful of 
schools. Overall, the analyses performed thus far do not lend support to the idea that 
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increased levels of school autonomy may lead to higher reading gains in Kindergarten. In 
the sequence, I present the results for the first grade analyses. 
 
Estimated Effects of Increased Doses of School Autonomy on Average First Grade 
Reading Gains 
The descriptive statistics of the First Grade Reading IRT Gain Scores (spring 
1999 to spring 2000) are presented in Table 17, along with ANOVA results testing their 
association with the school autonomy measures. There are no significant associations 
between reading gains in first grade and any of the school autonomy measures. 
 
Table 17 
Relationship between School Autonomy and Schools Average First Grade IRT 
Reading Gains 
 
 
As expected, results of the outcome models controlling for the respective 
propensity scores (Table 16) confirm this conclusion, therefore no further analyses were 
conducted for the first grade round of data. 
Mean Reading 
Gain Score St. Deviation
F-ratio 
(df=2, 629) p-value
All Schools (Range= 13.39-54.87) 33.012 (7.106)
SA Dose 1 32.482 (6.787) 1.61 0.201
Dose 2 32.849 (7.411)
Dose 3 33.691 (7.079)
IN Dose 1 32.646 (7.220) 1.603 0.202
Dose 2 32.655 (6.953)
Dose 3 33.720 (7.132)
PA Dose 1 33.170 (6.808) 0.136 0.872
Dose 2 32.821 (6.944)
Dose 3 33.034 (7.681)
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Table 18 
OLS Regressions Estimating the Effects of the School Autonomy Measures on  
Schools Average First Grade Reading Gains 
 
 
The results obtained in this chapter, both from the outcome models as well as the 
subclassification analyses do no lend support to the notion that increased school 
autonomy, whether over instructional or personnel/administrative issues, is associated 
with higher reading gains neither in Kindergarten nor in first grade. I discuss these results 
in the next chapter. 
  
Variable Estimate St. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 32.079 0.523 61.34 <.0001
Propensity ScoreSA -1.025 0.270 -3.79 0.0003
Dose 2 0.279 0.832 0.34 0.7396
Dose 3 -0.465 0.798 -0.58 0.5601
Variable Estimate St. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 32.214 0.499 64.51 <.0001
Propensity ScoreIN -0.846 0.297 -2.84 0.0069
Dose 2 -0.059 0.747 -0.08 0.9375
Dose 3 0.100 0.943 0.11 0.9162
Variable Estimate St. Error t-value p-value
Intercept 32.864 0.481 68.36 <.0001
Propensity ScorePA -0.724 0.407 -1.78 0.0961
Dose 2 -0.332 0.785 -0.42 0.6742
Dose 3 -0.646 0.915 -0.71 0.4833
School Autonomy, Global Measure
School Autonomy, Instructional Matters
School Autonomy, Personnel/Administrative Matters
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
In the past two decades, the growth of initiatives such as the charter school 
movement and School-Based Management (SBM) have placed school autonomy at the 
heart of educational policy debates. These influential strategies for school reform 
advocate a transfer of authority from higher levels of the school system to local schools 
under the premise that local stakeholders (principals, teachers, and parents) understand 
their students’ needs better than higher-level administrators. This should enable them to 
make better educational decisions regarding students’ academic success. Despite the 
visibility of such decentralization efforts in the current policy environment and their 
promise of increased accountability, evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of 
autonomous schools on students’ learning is surprisingly limited and inconsistent. 
This dissertation examined the following questions:  
1. What are the characteristics of autonomous schools?  
2. Are private schools, schools of choice, and schools that adopt SBM more 
autonomous than regular public schools? 
3. What are the effects of increased school autonomy on schools’ average 
reading gains for students in Kindergarten and first grade?  
Data for this investigation came from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study – 
Kindergarten (ECLS-K), a nationally representative sample of schools. The independent 
variables were constructed from a series of questions about decision-making answered by 
the principal in each school, yielding three measures of school autonomy: (1) school 
autonomy over instructional matters (IN); (2) school autonomy over 
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personnel/administrative matters (PA); and (3) a global measure of school autonomy 
(SA). 
To minimize the problem of estimation bias in observational studies while also 
recognizing the non-binary nature of the independent variables, propensity scores for 
dose-response models were used (Joffe and Rosenbaum, 1999). Under this approach, 
similar schools (those with similar propensity scores) exposed to different doses of school 
autonomy were compared to estimate the effects of incremental doses of the treatment on 
the outcome variables. First, for each measure or school autonomy, one propensity score 
– defined as the probability of assignment to a particular dose of the treatment, given a 
set of covariates – was computed per school. Then, the effects of the treatments were 
estimated by regressing each outcome variable on the doses of school autonomy, 
controlling for the respective propensity score. This was done separately for each 
measure of school autonomy (IN, PA, SA).  
The findings revealed that autonomous schools are more frequently associated 
with the demographic characteristics of the students and teachers rather than instructional 
characteristics of the schools. These schools are more likely to have more students from 
wealthier backgrounds who attend the school selected, and less likely to have free lunch 
eligible students. They have larger proportions of students with more educated parents as 
well as students from two-parent households. Autonomous schools are also more 
selective academically.  
As expected, private schools score significantly higher than public schools in 
every measure of school autonomy. Schools of choice showed no difference in levels of 
autonomy compared to other public schools. This may be due to limitations in the data as 
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discussed later. A surprising finding was the fact that public schools that adopt SBM 
score lower in levels of autonomy over instruction than other public schools, but higher 
in autonomy over personnel/administrative issues. 
Further, the results show that school autonomy has no effect on the average 
school reading gains in Kindergarten and first-grade. In these early grades, the study 
found no support for the popular notion that increasing the local control of schools leads 
to higher student achievement. These findings apply to effects at the school-level. School 
autonomy may well have different effects on reading gains at the individual level, which 
was not tested in this study.  
Exploratory analyses further showed that schools’ average reading gains in 
Kindergarten were not associated with all three measures of school autonomy used in this 
research: an initial association was observed between reading gains and school autonomy 
over personnel/administrative issues, but not with the other two measures of school 
autonomy, namely, autonomy over instruction, and the global measure of autonomy. The 
first grade data showed that reading gains were not associated with any measure of school 
autonomy. Thus, subsequent analyses were conducted only for the Kindergarten data.  
After controlling for the respective propensity scores in the outcome models, none 
of the treatment effects estimated were statistically significant. Increasing doses of school 
autonomy is not associated with higher reading gains in Kindergarten or first grade in this 
sample of schools. This is true for all measures of school autonomy: global measure of 
school autonomy, school autonomy over instruction, and school autonomy over 
personnel/administrative matters.  The results were confirmed when examining the 
treatment effects using a subclassification (or stratification) method:  the estimated 
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effects obtained are slightly larger than those obtained from the regression models, but all 
of them fall within the confidence intervals of the parametric estimates and lead to the 
same conclusion. 
Although none of the effects reached statistical significance, some patterns in the 
data are noteworthy. First, the direction of the findings: the effects of incremental doses 
of personnel/administrative autonomy on reading gains are all positive whereas the 
effects of increased instructional autonomy are largely negative. This is a surprising 
finding especially in light of the notion that decisions over instruction are more directly 
related to the learning conditions of the students, and thus, more likely to affect students 
achievement. Interestingly, Zimmer and Budin (2007) found a similar negative 
relationship between autonomy over curriculum and math scores in a sample of middle 
schools. Possible reasons for such findings are still unknown. 
Second, the magnitude of the treatment effects is not constant across increments 
of the school autonomy measures raising questions about the linearity of the relationship 
between autonomy and reading gains. The estimated difference in reading gains for a 
school moving from dose 1 to dose 2 of the instructional measure, for example, is seven 
times larger than the effect of moving from dose 2 to dose 3. For the 
personnel/administrative measure, the effect is greatest when moving from dose 2 to dose 
3 while little gain is observed when moving from dose 1 to dose 2 of the treatment. Not 
assuming linearity, however, does not change the conclusion of no treatment effects as 
demonstrated by the results obtained through subclassification. As mentioned before, 
subclassification makes no assumptions about the functional form of this relationship. 
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Third, there is considerable variability around all the estimated treatment effects 
as evidenced by their large confidence intervals. The relationship between school 
autonomy and reading gains is, therefore, stronger in some schools and weaker in others. 
Studies utilizing smaller subsets of schools may well find significant effects of autonomy 
on reading gains that will be difficult to replicate in nationally representative samples of 
schools. 
Fourth, the effects of school autonomy on K reading gains may depend on 
whether or not the school adopts SBM. All the school autonomy measures were found to 
interact with school adoption of SBM in predicting K reading gains among private 
schools, but not among public schools. Specifically, increasing doses of autonomy were 
found to have positive effects on schools’ reading gains for private schools that adopt 
SBM. This conclusion, however, warrants caution because it is based on a very small 
number of schools available for comparison in the dataset. 
Overall, the notion that increased school autonomy leads to higher achievement 
gains, as appealing as it may be from a policy standpoint, failed to find empirical 
verification in this nationally representative dataset of schools. The findings are in line 
with those obtained by Zimmer and Budin (2007) who did not find any effects of greater 
school autonomy on students’ achievement scores when comparing charter and 
traditional public schools in the state of California. Their findings span student data in 
elementary, middle, and high school grades. The conclusions in this study contrast with 
those reached by Chub & Moe (1990): In spite of methodological choices that undermine 
the credibility of their study, they claim that higher school autonomy boosts achievement 
among high school students. Although a direct comparison between these studies is 
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inappropriate given the different grade levels examined, the present findings contribute to 
the mounting research evidence showing the limitations of decentralization reforms for 
demonstrating empirically any improvements in students’ achievement. That is not to say 
that these types of reforms are unsuccessful at improving other outcomes, but research 
demonstrating such effects is still scarce. 
 
Contributions to the Literature of School Autonomy Effects on Students Outcomes 
The present study contributes to the literature on the effects of school autonomy 
by overcoming some of the typical difficulties faced by previous studies and by applying 
innovative modeling strategies that reflect the nature of these school level interventions. 
A typical challenge in this literature is the fact that many studies are based on 
small sample sizes with limited generalizability. The use of the ECLS-K, a nationally 
representative sample of schools, in this dissertation increases the generalizability of the 
findings. 
Another prevalent problem among studies examining the impact of school 
autonomy on student achievement is the absence of sufficient controls and the lack of 
baseline information on the outcome variables thus making it difficult to attribute any 
observed increases in students achievement scores to the intervention. The use of a rich 
large-scale dataset in the present study allowed for a well-controlled investigation with 
the inclusion of important students, family, teachers, and school characteristics. Baseline 
reading scores of students in Kindergarten and first grade were also available for this 
research. 
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In addition, this literature relies almost entirely on the results of observational 
studies, given the obvious difficulties of randomly assigning schools to different levels of 
school autonomy. Traditional methods of adjusting for covariates or difference-in-
difference methods (in which average learning gains observed for a group of schools is 
compared to average learning gains of other schools) typically used in this literature do 
not warrant the claims of causality that are often made in such studies. Rigorous 
estimation of treatment effects in observational studies requires a framework that 
minimizes the estimation bias while also specifying under what assumptions the effects 
estimated would represent the theoretical quantities of interest. While the lack of 
randomization of schools to treatment cannot easily be overcome, the present research 
employed a methodology that is suitable for the investigation of treatment effects in 
observational studies, namely, the use of propensity scores. Propensity scores are known 
to minimize estimation bias in non-experimental studies compared to traditional methods 
of covariates adjustment, under certain conditions and assumptions (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983). 
Finally, this dissertation demonstrated how innovative methodology can be 
applied to examine critical educational policy questions. In particular, this research has 
shown how propensity scores for dose-response models can be employed to examine 
school effects in cases where the treatment variable is not binary. In dose-response 
models, the impact of variations in the dosage of the treatment on the outcome is the 
focus rather than the presence/absence of treatment. The use of such methodology can be 
explored in many other contexts in which the increase in doses of the treatment is the 
primary interest. 
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Limitations of This Study 
While the utilization of a nationally representative sample of schools, the use of 
extensive controls, the ability to model learning gains, and the use of rigorous methods 
certainly increase the confidence in the results obtained, certain methodological and data 
limitations remain, which I list below. 
 
Measures of School Autonomy 
The task of creating a widely acceptable measure of school autonomy is an 
ongoing challenge. All studies of school autonomy to date rely on survey data that is 
limited to answers given by the principal about decision-making processes in the school. 
There is no way to verify whether other constituencies agree with the principal on who 
makes decisions in the school and over what areas of control, and ultimately there is no 
consensus about whether school autonomy can be properly measured and how. On a 
brighter note, the most influential studies seem to include some measure of influence or 
control over key areas of management that overlap with those utilized here: decisions 
over curriculum, textbooks, student evaluation, hiring and firing of teachers and staff, 
budget, and professional development.  
 In addition, it is important to recognize that the classification of schools into doses 
of autonomy is largely dependent on the way I constructed the doses variables. The 
decision to create three doses for each treatment was motivated by the normal shape of 
the continuous school autonomy variables and by a classification that allows easy 
interpretation of results. Had the shape of the distribution of the continuous variables 
been different, the division into doses might have differed as well. 
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Specification Errors 
As mentioned before, there is reason to believe that the functional form of the 
relationship between school autonomy and reading gain scores is not linear. Violation of 
the linearity assumption, however, should not alter the conclusions of this study as seen 
by the results obtained from the subclassification method. However, other specification 
errors are possible, for example, in the models used to estimate propensity scores. While I 
employed an extensive number of control variables from the students, the teachers, the 
principals, and the schools, there is always the possibility that an unobserved covariate 
might have been omitted thus producing biased estimates of the effects. For example, 
variations in state legislation regarding authorization of charter schools is likely to affect 
the probability of a school being autonomous, but that information was not available in 
the dataset. Similarly, characteristics of school districts that might affect whether a school 
is granted more local control were not available for the study. Had our study revealed any 
statistically significant effects, sensitivity analyses would have been performed to assess 
the potential bias in the estimates as a result of omitted variables (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983; Rosenbaum, 1984). 
 
Propensity Scores 
The use of the subclassification method to re-estimate the treatment effects 
obtained from the regression models revealed the decreased performance of the 
propensity scores methodology for computing effects at extreme values of the propensity 
scores’ range. For example, at the highest probabilities of assignment to a particular dose 
of the treatment, it was difficult to find enough schools assigned to the alternative dose; 
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the same happened at the lowest probabilities. As a result, the comparisons at the 
extremes values of the propensity scores were based on a very small number of schools 
and should be taken with a lot of reservation.  
 
Data limitations 
 Other limitations exist related to the characteristics of the dataset available for the 
study. As rich in information about students and schools as the ECLS-K study is, one 
important deficiency for the question I investigated is the lack of a unique identifier in the 
dataset for charter schools (merged under the label “schools of choice”) or the lack of 
information about the time of adoption of relevant interventions (specifically, charter 
schools and SBM committees), both of which would allow us to further study under what 
conditions school autonomy may have an impact on schools reading gains. The SBM 
literature, for example, recognizes that five years or more are usually needed for the 
intervention to start showing positive effects (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009). Such an 
assessment was not possible in this study. These limitations, however, indicate important 
areas for future research as discussed next.  
 
Future Research 
This study provides rigorous evidence that school autonomy is not associated with 
students’ learning in Kindergarten and first grade, but it still leaves a number of other 
questions unanswered that could be tackled by future research as suggested below.  
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Charter Schools 
One disadvantage of using the ECLS-K for this study is that much has already 
changed in the policy landscape since its first waves of data collection in 1998. A 
notorious change is precisely the spur of charter schools that have been authorized in the 
country since then. Research using current data on charter schools could greatly 
contribute to this literature with implications for policy-making. A number of questions 
remains unanswered: Are the existing charter schools, in fact, more autonomous than 
other public schools? Does the relationship between school autonomy and student 
achievement vary as a function of years of operation? Is the relationship the same across 
grade levels?  Further research on this topic would require specific information on 
characteristics of charter schools that are expected to affect their levels of autonomy, such 
as whether the charter school uses a market-based vs. a mission-oriented model, years of 
operation, whether the charter is a start-up vs. conversion school (i.e. a public school 
turned into a charter school), among others (Miron, Welner, Hinchey & Mathis, 2012). 
 
School-Based Management (SBM) 
A better understanding of SBM is also in order. A surprising finding in this study 
was the fact that public schools that adopt SBM score lower in levels of autonomy over 
instruction than other public schools, but higher in autonomy over 
personnel/administrative issues. Why would external decision-makers more heavily 
inform instructional matters in these SBM schools? Could this reflect a deliberate 
decision of SBM committees to focus on personnel/administrative matters or be related to 
the particular population of students they serve? Could this be the result of 
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implementation problems? The literature on SBM recognizes that simply adopting the 
intervention as part of a new wave of school reform might not produce the desired 
devolution if the culture of decision-making within the schools is not changed. For 
example, if long-standing ineffective leaders in the school were appointed to the SBM 
committee once it was adopted, true change in how decisions are made might not have 
occurred. In many settings, these committees have turned into mere consulting or 
advisory bodies without any real decision-making power (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009). 
Additional research can help clarify the extent of devolution intended vs. achieved in 
SBM schools.  
 Another aspect of investigation is a comparison of SBM in public vs. private 
schools. The results in this study suggest that increased school autonomy may produce 
greater K reading gains in schools that adopt SBM in the private sector, but not in the 
public sector. This finding needs further investigation as  it is based on a small number of 
schools. Further research on how SBM committees operate in public vs. private sector 
could help explain why SBM schools might be more effective in improving achievement 
in the private sector. 
 In sum, a variety of reasons could have generated the unexpected results found 
here for SBM schools - implementation challenges, years of operation, variation in 
decision-making processes across SBM schools, as well as what types of schools adopt 
SBM – and additional research can help unveil them.  
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Additional outcomes 
Finally, a comprehensive understanding of the potential benefits of increased 
school autonomy for schools and students should include studies of its impact on student 
learning in other grade levels as well as on other types of outcomes. For example, does 
greater school autonomy have positive effects on graduation rates, dropout rates, or 
parents’ involvement? Can it be beneficial for school personnel by increasing, for 
example, job satisfaction and retention rates of teachers? These are just a few questions 
that remain open for future investigation. 
 
 
 
    
 
APPENDIX A 
ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses: School-Level Descriptive Statistics for the Entire Sample and 
For Each Dose of the School Autonomy Measures 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Reading Variables 
  35.84 35.24 35.37 36.88 35.52 35.09 36.90 35.57 35.40 36.70 
Mean Reading IRT Score, Fall 1998 (Range= 24.8; 52.61) (4.72) (4.74) (4.51) (4.76) (4.58) (4.36) (5.03) (4.76) (4.32) (5.03) 
 47.58 46.79 47.07 48.85 47.32 46.63 48.79 47.00 46.97 49.04 
Mean Reading IRT Score, Spring 1999 (Range= 32.16; 70.81) (6.80) (6.54) (6.55) (7.15) (6.17) (6.30) (7.66) (6.48) (6.32) (7.53) 
  80.59 79.27 79.91 82.54 79.96 79.29 82.51 80.17 79.79 82.07 
Mean Reading IRT Score, Spring 2000 (Range= 51.68; 116.88) (11.60) (11.32) (11.72) (11.56) (11.46) (10.94) (12.19) (11.27) (11.03) (12.58) 
Mean Kindergarten Reading IRT Gain Score (fall 98 to spring 99) 11.74 11.54 11.70 11.97 11.80 11.54 11.89 11.43 11.57 12.34 
(Range= 1.93; 32.65) (3.97) (3.72) (3.57) (4.55) (3.63) (3.46) (4.70) (3.62) (3.69) (4.63) 
Mean First Grade Reading IRT Gain Score (spring 99 to spring 00) 33.01 32.48 32.85 33.69 32.65 32.65 33.72 33.17 32.82 33.03 
(Range= 13.39; 54.87) (7.11) (6.79) (7.41) (7.08) (7.22) (6.95) (7.13) (6.81) (6.94) (7.68) 
School Autonomy And Related Variables 
Principal Input on Hire/Fire Criteria (0=no influence; 1=some  1.54 1.37 1.55 1.70 1.47 1.56 1.60 1.35 1.52 1.82 
influence; 2= major influence) a (0.77) (0.82) (0.77) (0.68) (0.79) (0.75) (0.76) (0.83) (0.78) (0.54) 
Principal Input on Textbooks (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.44 1.25 1.40 1.65 1.17 1.46 1.66 1.38 1.39 1.56 
2= major influence) a (0.67) (0.71) (0.68) (0.55) (0.72) (0.60) (0.59) (0.71) (0.68) (0.59) 
Principal Input on Standards (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.43 1.22 1.43 1.65 1.14 1.46 1.69 1.45 1.35 1.52 
2= major influence) a (0.73) (0.74) (0.73) (0.65) (0.73) (0.71) (0.63) (0.70) (0.76) (0.70) 
Principal Input on Grading (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.53 1.39 1.50 1.70 1.29 1.60 1.68 1.53 1.48 1.58 
2= major influence) a (0.68) (0.71) (0.69) (0.61) (0.72) (0.63) (0.65) (0.68) (0.71) (0.66) 
a. The descriptive statistics for this variable include only schools in which the player was an active decision-maker. 128
 
 
 
    
 
Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Principal Input on Spending (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.60 1.61 1.51 1.68 1.71 1.55 1.56 1.52 1.56 1.77 
2= major influence) a (0.72) (0.68) (0.78) (0.68) (0.63) (0.75) (0.74) (0.72) (0.78) (0.60) 
Principal Input on Professional Development (0= no influence;  1.63 1.52 1.60 1.77 1.57 1.63 1.68 1.51 1.59 1.83 
1= some influence; 2= major influence) a (0.66) (0.68) (0.68) (0.58) (0.66) (0.64) (0.68) (0.70) (0.70) (0.49) 
Teacher Input on Hire/Fire Criteria (0=no influence; 1=some 0.81 0.76 0.82 0.86 0.81 0.86 0.77 0.70 0.78 0.99 
influence; 2= major influence) a (0.74) (0.76) (0.71) (0.75) (0.76) (0.74) (0.72) (0.72) (0.74) (0.73) 
Teacher Input on Textbooks (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.53 1.43 1.49 1.67 1.37 1.58 1.63 1.50 1.47 1.64 
2= major influence) a (0.75) (0.75) (0.79) (0.67) (0.79) (0.72) (0.71) (0.75) (0.77) (0.71) 
Teacher Input on Standards (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.41 1.22 1.43 1.57 1.16 1.45 1.60 1.38 1.37 1.50 
2= major influence) a (0.73) (0.74) (0.75) (0.67) (0.73) (0.74) (0.67) (0.72) (0.76) (0.72) 
Teacher Input on Grading (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.54 1.43 1.48 1.71 1.31 1.63 1.68 1.53 1.54 1.55 
2= major influence) a (0.70) (0.76) (0.71) (0.61) (0.76) (0.65) (0.65) (0.72) (0.69) (0.71) 
Teacher Input on Spending (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.20 1.10 1.23 1.28 1.15 1.27 1.18 1.05 1.24 1.37 
2= major influence) a (0.73) (0.74) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74) (0.71) (0.71) 
Teacher Input on Professional Development (0= no influence;  1.45 1.37 1.48 1.51 1.41 1.50 1.43 1.31 1.49 1.59 
1= some influence; 2= major influence) a (0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.68) (0.72) (0.71) (0.72) (0.77) (0.69) (0.65) 
Parents Input on Hire/Fire Criteria (0=no influence; 1=some  0.30 0.21 0.36 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.20 0.34 0.42 
influence; 2= major influence) a (0.52) (0.42) (0.54) (0.60) (0.49) (0.51) (0.59) (0.42) (0.56) (0.59) 
Parents Input on Textbooks (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.56 0.46 0.68 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.64 0.56 0.56 0.55 
2= major influence) a (0.63) (0.59) (0.69) (0.59) (0.58) (0.69) (0.63) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) 
Parents Input on Standards (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.66 0.60 0.72 0.68 0.52 0.75 0.73 0.72 0.59 0.68 
2= major influence) a (0.63) (0.63) (0.65) (0.60) (0.59) (0.62) (0.65) (0.68) (0.58) (0.61) 
a. The descriptive statistics for this variable include only schools in which the player was an active decision-maker. 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Parents Input on Grading (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.57 0.53 0.68 0.48 0.50 0.63 0.59 0.65 0.53 0.51 
2= major influence) a (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.58) (0.68) (0.65) (0.65) (0.61) (0.64) 
Parents Input on Spending (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.92 0.82 0.99 0.95 0.79 1.04 0.92 0.88 0.93 0.96 
2= major influence) a (0.71) (0.68) (0.74) (0.72) (0.66) (0.76) (0.69) (0.71) (0.72) (0.71) 
Parents Input on Professional Development (0= no influence;  0.38 0.29 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.40 0.42 0.33 0.39 0.47 
1= some influence; 2= major influence) a (0.57) (0.52) (0.59) (0.61) (0.53) (0.60) (0.58) (0.54) (0.58) (0.60) 
School Board Input on Hire/Fire Criteria (0= no influence;  1.20 1.58 1.18 0.82 1.41 1.25 0.94 1.60 1.13 0.71 
1= some influence; 2= major influence) a (0.89) (0.76) (0.88) (0.86) (0.86) (0.87) (0.87) (0.75) (0.88) (0.82) 
School Board Input on Textbooks (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.00 1.41 0.97 0.59 1.52 0.89 0.61 1.21 0.93 0.79 
2= major influence) a (0.79) (0.74) (0.74) (0.66) (0.69) (0.72) (0.67) (0.78) (0.75) (0.79) 
School Board Input on Standards (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.32 1.74 1.23 0.95 1.71 1.38 0.85 1.52 1.24 1.13 
2= major influence) a (0.78) (0.55) (0.77) (0.78) (0.56) (0.75) (0.75) (0.71) (0.78) (0.82) 
School Board Input on Grading (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.21 1.67 1.21 0.71 1.70 1.21 0.72 1.42 1.18 0.93 
2= major influence) a (0.81) (0.61) (0.76) (0.77) (0.58) (0.77) (0.77) (0.73) (0.82) (0.83) 
School Board Input on Spending (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.95 1.24 0.83 0.76 0.89 0.97 0.99 1.40 0.81 0.45 
2= major influence) a (0.82) (0.80) (0.80) (0.78) (0.82) (0.86) (0.78) (0.74) (0.75) (0.65) 
School Board Input on Professional Development (0= no influence;  0.82 1.18 0.76 0.49 1.01 0.76 0.70 1.21 0.71 0.38 
1= some influence; 2= major influence) a (0.76) (0.77) (0.73) (0.60) (0.81) (0.75) (0.69) (0.75) (0.70) (0.53) 
School District Input on Hire/Fire Criteria (0= no influence;  1.26 1.65 1.26 0.77 1.48 1.24 1.00 1.64 1.19 0.78 
1= some influence; 2= major influence) a (0.86) (0.67) (0.85) (0.83) (0.78) (0.86) (0.87) (0.68) (0.85) (0.83) 
School District Input on Textbooks (0=no influence; 1=some  1.28 1.64 1.32 0.78 1.76 1.27 0.70 1.39 1.36 1.00 
influence; 2= major influence) a (0.79) (0.64) (0.73) (0.76) (0.52) (0.75) (0.70) (0.75) (0.75) (0.81) 
a. The descriptive statistics for this variable include only schools in which the player was an active decision-maker. 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
School District Input on Standards (0=no influence; 1=some 1.47 1.79 1.38 1.17 1.83 1.57 0.87 1.54 1.35 1.50 
influence; 2= major influence) a (0.79) (0.57) (0.82) (0.85) (0.51) (0.73) (0.82) (0.77) (0.84) (0.74) 
School District Input on Grading (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.41 1.83 1.34 0.98 1.81 1.45 0.87 1.60 1.33 1.25 
2= major influence) a (0.78) (0.48) (0.80) (0.82) (0.49) (0.75) (0.81) (0.70) (0.83) (0.80) 
School District Input on Spending (0=no influence; 1=some 0.92 1.32 0.84 0.50 1.02 0.90 0.81 1.43 0.75 0.39 
 influence; 2= major influence) a (0.82) (0.71) (0.79) (0.74) (0.77) (0.85) (0.82) (0.70) (0.74) (0.63) 
School District Input on Professional Development (0= no influence;  1.35 1.71 1.37 0.87 1.52 1.40 1.05 1.70 1.27 0.93 
2= major influence) a (0.78) (0.54) (0.79) (0.78) (0.67) (0.78) (0.83) (0.59) (0.81) (0.76) 
SBM Input on Hire/Fire Criteria (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.61 0.45 0.67 0.74 0.55 0.67 0.60 0.41 0.64 0.82 
2= major influence) a (0.76) (0.65) (0.77) (0.85) (0.71) (0.77) (0.81) (0.62) (0.79) (0.83) 
SBM Input on Textbooks (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.90 0.83 0.96 0.89 0.74 1.04 0.91 0.86 0.95 0.88 
2= major influence) a (0.83) (0.83) (0.81) (0.86) (0.79) (0.81) (0.87) (0.83) (0.82) (0.84) 
SBM Input on Standards (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.91 0.82 0.92 1.00 0.76 1.03 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.95 
2= major influence) a (0.84) (0.79) (0.87) (0.86) (0.77) (0.84) (0.91) (0.85) (0.83) (0.85) 
SBM Input on Grading (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 0.82 0.67 0.89 0.92 0.55 1.05 0.86 0.76 0.86 0.84 
2= major influence) a (0.83) (0.76) (0.86) (0.85) (0.70) (0.83) (0.90) (0.79) (0.86) (0.82) 
SBM Input on Spending (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 1.13 1.18 1.06 1.15 1.22 1.17 0.91 0.95 1.25 1.21 
2= major influence) a (0.85) (0.80) (0.89) (0.86) (0.81) (0.84) (0.91) (0.82) (0.85) (0.85) 
SBM Input on Professional Development (0= no influence;  1.12 1.10 1.17 1.07 1.13 1.24 0.89 1.03 1.18 1.16 
1= some influence; 2= major influence) a (0.85) (0.84) (0.85) (0.87) (0.82) (0.83) (0.89) (0.85) (0.87) (0.83) 
  -0.15 -0.43 -0.16 0.15 -0.30 -0.18 0.04 -0.45 -0.14 0.24 
School Autonomy: Hiring/Firing (Range= -1; 1) (0.44) (0.32) (0.38) (0.40) (0.42) (0.38) (0.45) (0.31) (0.36) (0.36) 
a. The descriptive statistics for this variable include only schools in which the player was an active decision-maker. 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 
0.05 -0.24 0.01 0.38 -0.33 0.06 0.40 -0.07 0.02 0.25 
School Autonomy: Textbooks (Range= -1; 1) (0.42) (0.34) (0.30) (0.35) (0.28) (0.27) (0.33) (0.38) (0.37) (0.44) 
 
-0.08 -0.39 -0.08 0.21 -0.44 -0.14 0.31 -0.18 -0.09 0.05 
School Autonomy: Standards (Range= -1; 1) (0.41) (0.28) (0.30) (0.40) (0.24) (0.25) (0.32) (0.37) (0.37) (0.47) 
 
-0.03 -0.35 -0.05 0.32 -0.41 -0.04 0.34 -0.15 -0.04 0.15 
School Autonomy: Grading (Range= -1; 1) (0.41) (0.28) (0.30) (0.35) (0.27) (0.25) (0.32) (0.35) (0.38) (0.46) 
  0.16 -0.05 0.18 0.36 0.14 0.17 0.19 -0.16 0.22 0.51 
School Autonomy: Spending (Range= -1; 1) (0.42) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.35) (0.31) (0.29) 
 
0.09 -0.19 0.07 0.37 -0.08 0.07 0.26 -0.18 0.11 0.40 
School Autonomy: Professional Development (Range= -1; 1) (0.39) (0.33) (0.30) (0.31) (0.38) (0.31) (0.40) (0.35) (0.28) (0.28) 
 
-0.02 -0.33 -0.04 0.30 -0.39 -0.04 0.35 -0.13 -0.04 0.15 
School Autonomy: Instruction (Range= -1; 1) (0.35) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28) (0.15) (0.09) (0.24) (0.30) (0.30) (0.39) 
School Autonomy: Personnel/Administrative Issues  0.04 -0.22 0.03 0.29 -0.08 0.02 0.16 -0.26 0.06 0.38 
(Range= -1; 1) (0.29) (0.20) (0.18) (0.23) (0.28) (0.25) (0.30) (0.14) (0.07) (0.17) 
School Autonomy: Global Measure  0.01 -0.28 -0.01 0.30 -0.24 -0.01 0.26 -0.20 0.01 0.27 
(Range= -1; 1) (0.27) (0.12) (0.06) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14) (0.23) (0.18) (0.16) (0.25) 
Student Body Composition and Academic Performance                     
 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.65 
Proportion of White Students (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.34) (0.35) (0.32) (0.33) 
 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.10 
Proportion of Black Students (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) (0.22) (0.27) (0.27) (0.21) 
 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 
Proportion of Hispanic Students (0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Proportion of Asian Students (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.05) (0.15) 
 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 
Proportion of Students of Other Races (0.14) (0.17) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) 
Proportion of Hispanic Students (1=0; 2= > 0 to less than 5; 3=5 to 
less than 10; 4=10 to less than 25; 5=25 or more) 
2.45 2.36 2.62 2.38 2.53 2.47 2.36 2.33 2.45 2.62 
(1.32) (1.26) (1.37) (1.32) (1.35) (1.28) (1.33) (1.28) (1.27) (1.42) 
Proportion of Black St. (1=0; 2= > 0 to less than 5; 3=5 to less than 10; 
4=10 to less than 25; 5=25 or more) 
2.78 2.98 2.95 2.41 3.02 2.90 2.43 2.78 2.85 2.69 
(1.38) (1.44) (1.38) (1.24) (1.41) (1.38) (1.27) (1.39) (1.47) (1.23) 
 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.49 
Proportion of Male Students (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
 65.91 66.01 66.06 65.67 66.04 65.93 65.78 66.08 66.04 65.54 
Mean Age of Students at K Entry (Months) (Range= 59; 73) (1.97) (1.95) (1.69) (2.22) (1.95) (1.79) (2.16) (1.85) (1.78) (2.28) 
 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.37 0.37 0.47 0.41 0.39 0.41 
Uses Complex Sentences - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.26) (0.25) (0.31) (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) 
  0.38 0.37 0.35 0.43 0.35 0.35 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.39 
Interprets Stories - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.26) (0.25) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) 
 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.33 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.37 
Names Upper and Lower Case - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24) (0.28) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) 
 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.25 
Produces Rhyming Words - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient (0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.28) (0.22) (0.23) (0.30) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27) 
Predicts What Happens in Stories - Proportion Intermediate or  0.35 0.35 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.36 
Proficient (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) (0.30) (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) 
Reads Simple Books Independently - Proportion Intermediate or  0.10 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.10 
Proficient (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.14) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Shows Early Writing Behaviors - Proportion Intermediate  0.10 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.11 
or Proficient (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) 
Understands Conventions of Print - Proportion Intermediate  0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.10 
or Proficient (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) (0.17) (0.19) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.15) 
Uses Computer for Variety of Goals - Proportion Intermediate  0.11 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.14 
or Proficient (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.23) (0.15) (0.25) (0.21) (0.20) (0.24) 
Proportion of Children Who Usually or Always Work at Best Ability - 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.91 
Teacher Rating (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10) 
 80.53 85.26 86.05 70.45 83.64 86.22 71.80 85.03 79.89 75.49 
Percentage of Free Lunch Eligible Students (Range=0; 93) (31.12) (25.48) (24.18) (38.93) (27.59) (24.12) (38.06) (26.09) (31.57) (35.56) 
Percentage of Minority Students (1= < 10; 2=10 to <25; 3=25 to 2.47 2.63 2.52 2.29 2.79 2.36 2.30 2.50 2.42 2.51 
<50; 4=50 to <75; 5=75 or more) (1.48) (1.50) (1.46) (1.48) (1.48) (1.46) (1.47) (1.56) (1.41) (1.48) 
 4.49 4.92 4.98 3.58 5.26 4.79 3.47 4.53 4.78 4.09 
Percentage of Gifted/Talented Students (Range= 0; 24) (6.16) (6.45) (6.22) (5.74) (6.41) (6.32) (5.64) (6.06) (6.43) (5.99) 
 2.83 3.38 3.59 1.54 4.61 2.72 1.29 2.42 3.02 3.14 
Percentage of Students Bussed to Achieve Racial Integration (9.87) (10.02) (12.46) (5.95) (12.84) (9.69) (5.78) (8.12) (10.71) (10.88) 
 83.01 86.04 82.45 80.62 83.11 82.86 83.07 86.89 81.20 80.14 
Percentage of Students from the Neighborhood (27.73) (23.88) (28.43) (30.28) (26.72) (27.73) (28.78) (22.81) (30.76) (29.30) 
 4.10 3.33 5.27 3.69 4.39 4.74 3.17 3.23 4.46 4.79 
Percentage of Students w/ Special Needs from Other Neighborhoods (9.77) (6.66) (12.77) (8.76) (9.73) (11.28) (7.94) (7.31) (11.69) (10.02) 
 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.11 
Children w/ Disabilities Not Served (Yes=1 No=0) (0.27) (0.17) (0.26) (0.34) (0.14) (0.26) (0.36) (0.22) (0.28) (0.32) 
 0.15 0.20 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.10 
Children w/ Disabilities in Separate Class (Yes=1 No=0) (0.35) (0.40) (0.37) (0.27) (0.36) (0.38) (0.32) (0.39) (0.35) (0.30) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.76 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 
Children w/ Disabilities in Regular Class (Yes=1 No=0) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.41) (0.38) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.41) 
 9.24 8.16 9.81 9.72 8.81 8.82 10.06 8.35 10.33 9.09 
Percentage of LEP (Limited English Proficiency) Students (14.47) (13.70) (15.09) (14.58) (14.61) (13.94) (14.90) (13.57) (15.97) (13.70) 
Student's Family Background                     
 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.26 -0.01 0.14 0.21 
Mean SES of Students (Range= -1.3; 1.39) (0.48) (0.46) (0.44) (0.48) (0.48) (0.42) (0.50) (0.45) (0.47) (0.49) 
       
54,948  
      
48,672  
       
51,653  
      
64,339  
      
50,573  
      
48,402  
      
65,743  
      
49,827  
      
55,686  
      
60,680  
Mean Family Income (Range= $4,066; $315,581)        
(31,116) 
     
(25,894) 
     
(25,006) 
     
(38,340) 
     
(26,844) 
     
(21,756) 
     
(39,198) 
     
(28,467) 
     
(30,787) 
     
(33,749) 
 0.36 0.42 0.40 0.27 0.40 0.41 0.28 0.42 0.34 0.31 
Proportion of Parents with High School or Less (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.46 0.51 0.51 
Proportion of Parents with College (Completed or Not) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) 
 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.09 
Proportion of Parents with Masters' Degree (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.06 
Proportion of Parents with Doctorate/Other Higher Degree (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) 
 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Proportion of Parents Other No Degree Education (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 0.85 0.81 0.84 0.90 0.81 0.83 0.90 0.83 0.85 0.88 
Percentage of Students At or Above Poverty Level (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) 
 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.94 
Percentage of Students Whose Home Language is English (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 0.78 0.74 0.77 0.82 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.75 0.77 0.81 
Percentage of Students in Two-Parents Household (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.17) 
 4.38 4.39 4.37 4.38 4.41 4.38 4.36 4.37 4.36 4.42 
Mean Family Size of Students (Range= 2; 7) (0.58) (0.55) (0.56) (0.63) (0.53) (0.58) (0.61) (0.59) (0.54) (0.60) 
 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.83 
Proportion of Children Who Received Center-Based Care (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15) (0.15) 
Proportion of Children Who Spent 20 Hrs/Week or More in 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.22 
Nonparental Care (During K Year) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) 
Proportion of Children Who Spent 20 Hrs/Week or More in 
Nonparental Care (Prior to K) 
0.56 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.59 
Nonparental Care (Prior to K Year) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) 
 0.39 0.27 0.34 0.57 0.29 0.34 0.55 0.29 0.40 0.52 
Proportion of Children Attending School Selected (0.38) (0.30) (0.36) (0.40) (0.32) (0.35) (0.41) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40) 
Proportion of Parents Reporting that 'School Preference Affected  0.26 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.24 
Home Location' (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) 
 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.53 
Proportion of Parents Who Expect Child to Finish College (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) 
Proportion of Parents Who Expect Child to Earn a Higher Degree 
(Master's, PhD, MD or Equivalent) 
0.26 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.28 
(0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
 0.83 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.84 
Proportion of Parents Who Read to Child at least 3-6 times/week (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Proportion of Parents Who Tell Stories to Child at least  0.56 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.54 0.56 0.59 
3-6 times/week (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) 
Proportion of Parents Who Read Books Outside of School at least  0.69 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 
3-6 times/week (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 0.41 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.46 0.39 0.40 0.45 
Proportion of Students Who Have 100 or More Books (0.21) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) 
Proportion of Children Who Watched Sesame Street weekly  0.59 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.59 
for at least 3 months Prior to K (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) 
School Characteristics, Organization and Resources                     
 0.26 0.11 0.20 0.48 0.13 0.20 0.46 0.16 0.27 0.40 
Private School (Yes=1 No=0) (0.44) (0.31) (0.40) (0.50) (0.34) (0.40) (0.50) (0.37) (0.44) (0.49) 
 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.22 
Region: Northeast (Yes=1 No=0) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.35) (0.41) (0.43) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) 
 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.25 
Region: Midwest (Yes=1 No=0) (0.45) (0.42) (0.43) (0.47) (0.41) (0.44) (0.48) (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) 
 0.29 0.34 0.33 0.20 0.38 0.31 0.17 0.29 0.31 0.26 
Region: South (Yes=1 No=0) (0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.40) (0.49) (0.47) (0.38) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) 
 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.27 
Region: West (Yes=1 No=0) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) (0.40) (0.45) 
 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.36 0.44 0.36 0.36 0.52 
Central City (Yes=1 No=0) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) 
 0.35 0.41 0.36 0.28 0.41 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.39 0.29 
Urban Fringe and Large Town (Yes=1 No=0) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45) (0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) 
 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.24 0.17 0.31 0.25 0.29 0.25 0.19 
Small Town and Rural (Yes=1 No=0) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.43) (0.38) (0.46) (0.44) (0.46) (0.43) (0.39) 
 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.20 0.11 0.05 0.26 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Total School Enrollment: 0-149 Students (Yes=1 No=0) (0.35) (0.33) (0.29) (0.40) (0.31) (0.21) (0.44) (0.36) (0.34) (0.34) 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 0.27 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.20 0.33 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.26 
Total School Enrollment: 150-299 Students (Yes=1 No=0) (0.45) (0.42) (0.45) (0.46) (0.40) (0.47) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) 
 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.29 
Total School Enrollment: 300-499 Students (Yes=1 No=0) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.46) 
 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.17 0.27 0.28 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.24 
Total School Enrollment: 500-749 Students (Yes=1 No=0) (0.42) (0.42) (0.45) (0.38) (0.45) (0.45) (0.33) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) 
 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08 
Total School Enrollment: 750 and Above (Yes=1 No=0) (0.28) (0.33) (0.26) (0.24) (0.35) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.28) (0.27) 
 58.90 66.21 63.31 47.41 69.41 63.25 44.64 59.04 61.43 55.74 
Total School K Enrollment (Range=5; 170) (40.04) (42.09) (41.61) (33.50) (43.52) (38.32) (34.01) (41.38) (40.26) (37.97) 
 0.69 0.85 0.73 0.48 0.82 0.74 0.52 0.82 0.67 0.54 
Regular Public School (no magnet or school of choice) (Yes=1 No=0) (0.46) (0.36) (0.44) (0.50) (0.39) (0.44) (0.50) (0.39) (0.47) (0.50) 
School of Choice (charter, open enrollment, non-specialized  0.07 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05 
curriculum) (Yes=1 No=0) (0.26) (0.30) (0.25) (0.22) (0.31) (0.26) (0.20) (0.23) (0.31) (0.22) 
Magnet School (e.g. math/science, foreign language immersion) 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 
(Yes=1 No=0) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.17) (0.27) (0.23) (0.15) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) 
School has SBM Committee 0.60 0.69 0.60 0.52 0.76 0.60 0.46 0.58 0.60 0.64 
(Yes=1 No=0) (0.49) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.43) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) 
 178.33 178.58 178.46 177.94 178.47 178.63 177.88 178.35 178.30 178.32 
School Year Length (Range= 170; 183) (2.98) (3.05) (2.78) (3.06) (3.09) (2.73) (3.07) (3.02) (2.97) (2.94) 
  0.58 0.60 0.66 0.48 0.58 0.67 0.49 0.66 0.54 0.52 
Received Title 1 Funds (Yes=1 No=0) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) 
Additional Funds Received From State Compensatory Funds 0.45 0.45 0.52 0.39 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.56 0.41 0.38 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Additional Funds Received From Community Fundraising 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.46 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) 
Additional Funds Received From PTA Fund-raising 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.80 0.86 0.87 0.81 0.83 0.89 0.81 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.36) (0.36) (0.31) (0.40) (0.34) (0.34) (0.39) (0.37) (0.31) (0.39) 
Additional Funds Received From Local/National Business(es) 0.36 0.35 0.43 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.31 0.35 0.37 0.37 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.48) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
Additional Funds Received From Special Ed Program/Agency 0.56 0.65 0.56 0.46 0.63 0.60 0.45 0.63 0.52 0.52 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) 
Additional Funds Received From Auxiliary/Affiliated Enterprises 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.10 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29) (0.29) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30) (0.29) (0.26) (0.30) 
Additional Funds Received From Medicaid 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.09 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.31) (0.36) (0.29) (0.29) 
Additional Funds Received From Impact Aid 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.05 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.29) (0.32) (0.31) (0.21) (0.32) (0.31) (0.22) (0.35) (0.25) (0.23) 
Additional Funds Received From Bilingual Aid 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.11 0.26 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.16 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.38) (0.42) (0.40) (0.31) (0.44) (0.37) (0.33) (0.41) (0.36) (0.37) 
Additional Funds Received From Migrant Aid 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.09 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26) (0.37) (0.32) (0.27) (0.35) (0.32) (0.29) 
Additional Funds Received From Other Grants 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.38 
(1=Yes; 0=No) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
Composite: Number of Additional Types of Funds (alpha=.599)  3.68 3.85 3.97 3.24 3.80 3.91 3.33 3.97 3.59 3.42 
(Range= 0; 10) (2.05) (2.04) (2.03) (2.01) (1.88) (2.18) (2.03) (2.15) (1.88) (2.06) 
Does Cafeteria Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3=sometimes not;  3.48 3.49 3.46 3.50 3.49 3.49 3.47 3.43 3.49 3.54 
4=always adequate) (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) (0.79) (0.81) (0.80) (0.74) (0.78) (0.83) (0.72) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Does Computer Lab Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.31 3.35 3.27 3.33 3.37 3.25 3.33 3.32 3.27 3.36 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.81) (0.75) (0.89) (0.77) (0.74) (0.90) (0.76) (0.80) (0.84) (0.78) 
Does Library Meet Needs  (1=never; 2=often not; 3.32 3.38 3.33 3.25 3.47 3.30 3.20 3.26 3.33 3.38 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.87) (0.84) (0.89) (0.87) (0.74) (0.88) (0.96) (0.93) (0.85) (0.81) 
Does Art Room Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.45 3.54 3.46 3.37 3.54 3.54 3.29 3.45 3.42 3.48 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.88) (0.85) (0.86) (0.92) (0.84) (0.84) (0.93) (0.92) (0.91) (0.78) 
Does Gymnasium Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.48 3.57 3.50 3.38 3.55 3.54 3.37 3.54 3.47 3.41 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.80) (0.74) (0.72) (0.94) (0.75) (0.77) (0.87) (0.76) (0.81) (0.85) 
Does Music Room Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.45 3.51 3.49 3.35 3.54 3.52 3.28 3.45 3.43 3.48 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.85) (0.84) (0.85) (0.87) (0.81) (0.82) (0.91) (0.91) (0.84) (0.80) 
Does Playground Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.38 3.34 3.36 3.45 3.37 3.34 3.45 3.32 3.40 3.45 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.79) (0.85) (0.81) (0.72) (0.79) (0.82) (0.78) (0.87) (0.78) (0.70) 
Do Classrooms Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.43 3.41 3.42 3.47 3.47 3.37 3.46 3.40 3.44 3.47 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.72) (0.66) (0.78) (0.71) (0.63) (0.79) (0.72) (0.73) (0.69) (0.74) 
Does Auditorium Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.33 3.35 3.34 3.30 3.38 3.34 3.28 3.26 3.42 3.31 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.89) (0.89) (0.84) (0.97) (0.87) (0.90) (0.91) (0.90) (0.86) (0.93) 
Does Multi-Use Room Meet Needs (1=never; 2=often not; 3.10 3.21 3.07 3.03 3.23 3.13 2.97 3.13 3.16 2.98 
3=sometimes not; 4=always adequate) (0.88) (0.89) (0.89) (0.87) (0.93) (0.80) (0.91) (0.93) (0.79) (0.91) 
Composite: Adequacy of the School Facilities (alpha=0.797) 3.37 3.38 3.36 3.37 3.42 3.34 3.35 3.34 3.36 3.41 
(Range= 1; 4) (0.55) (0.54) (0.57) (0.56) (0.50) (0.59) (0.56) (0.59) (0.55) (0.52) 
 59.91 61.70 64.58 53.51 66.55 63.88 49.62 59.67 60.10 59.98 
Total Number of Computers (Range= 0; 160) (39.48) (38.04) (40.28) (39.41) (39.67) (39.56) (37.26) (38.58) (40.15) (40.03) 
 47.73 48.12 52.63 42.49 52.03 50.68 40.69 47.21 47.94 48.17 
Number of Computers for Instructional Use (Range= 0; 130) (33.83) (32.87) (34.37) (33.60) (33.86) (34.65) (31.93) (32.09) (35.25) (34.47) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 78.44 77.51 79.62 78.18 77.91 76.86 80.56 78.07 77.32 80.25 
Percentage of Computers for Instructional Use (20.63) (20.95) (20.65) (20.34) (21.66) (20.57) (19.60) (20.41) (23.31) (17.26) 
 0.56 0.55 0.63 0.51 0.54 0.61 0.54 0.60 0.54 0.54 
Computers w/ LAN Available for Student Use (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.83 0.87 0.85 
Computers w/ CD-ROM Available for Student Use (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.35) (0.38) (0.34) (0.36) 
 0.66 0.62 0.72 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.69 0.64 
Computers w/ Internet Available for Student Use (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.47) (0.49) (0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.48) 
 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.11 
Requires Admission Test (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.28) (0.21) (0.27) (0.34) (0.19) (0.28) (0.35) (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) 
 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.10 
Requires SAT (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.30) (0.24) (0.27) (0.36) (0.24) (0.27) (0.37) (0.27) (0.32) (0.31) 
 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 
Requires Special Needs (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.31) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.31) (0.27) (0.35) (0.31) (0.33) (0.30) 
 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.02 
Requires Special Aptitudes (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.16) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.14) 
 0.21 0.09 0.18 0.35 0.09 0.17 0.36 0.13 0.24 0.27 
Requires Interview with Child (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.41) (0.28) (0.39) (0.48) (0.29) (0.37) (0.48) (0.34) (0.43) (0.45) 
  0.12 0.04 0.11 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.08 0.14 0.13 
Requires Recommendations (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.32) (0.20) (0.31) (0.40) (0.23) (0.27) (0.41) (0.27) (0.35) (0.34) 
 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.14 0.17 0.22 
Requires Academic Record (Yes=1 No=0) (0.38) (0.31) (0.35) (0.44) (0.32) (0.36) (0.44) (0.34) (0.38) (0.42) 
 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Requires Religious Affiliation (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 
Requires Lottery (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.18) (0.28) (0.22) (0.14) (0.20) (0.24) (0.22) 
Composite: Admissions Requirements, Academic Selection 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.22 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.15 0.17 
(alpha=0.852) (Range= 0-1) (0.27) (0.20) (0.26) (0.32) (0.20) (0.24) (0.33) (0.24) (0.29) (0.28) 
 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.73 0.66 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.62 
Placement Test Administered (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.48) (0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.49) 
 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.11 
Test to Determine Eligibility for Child Below Cutoff  (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.36) (0.30) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.33) (0.32) 
 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.21 
Test to Determine Class Placement (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.40) (0.36) (0.38) (0.44) (0.36) (0.40) (0.43) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41) 
 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.57 0.54 0.45 
Test to Identify Need for Additional Testing (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.56 0.54 
Test to Help Teachers Individualize Instruction (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.30 0.25 
Test to Advise Delay for School Entry (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.48) (0.41) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.46) (0.44) 
 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 
Test Used for Other Purposes (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.24) 
School Policy                     
 0.75 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.79 0.71 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.70 
Children Can Be Retained in Kindergarten (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.43) (0.40) (0.44) (0.46) (0.41) (0.45) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) (0.46) 
 1.26 1.31 1.37 1.11 1.41 1.44 0.95 1.22 1.28 1.29 
Number of Students Retained at K Previous School Year (Range= 1; 6) (1.64) (1.72) (1.68) (1.50) (1.72) (1.75) (1.38) (1.61) (1.71) (1.60) 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Emphasis: Language and Number Skills (1=none or minor;  2.93 2.92 2.95 2.90 2.96 2.90 2.92 2.93 2.96 2.88 
2= moderate; 3=major) (0.28) (0.27) (0.22) (0.33) (0.20) (0.32) (0.30) (0.26) (0.19) (0.36) 
Emphasis: Social or Behavioral Skills (1=none or minor;  2.88 2.88 2.89 2.86 2.87 2.89 2.87 2.90 2.86 2.87 
2= moderate; 3=major) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.34) (0.30) (0.35) (0.34) 
Emphasis: Fine and Gross Motor Skills (1=none or minor;  2.63 2.63 2.61 2.64 2.62 2.66 2.61 2.63 2.64 2.62 
2= moderate; 3=major) (0.51) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.53) (0.54) (0.50) (0.50) 
Emphasis: Raising Test Performance (1=none or minor; 2= moderate; 1.92 2.05 2.00 1.71 2.06 2.00 1.71 2.02 1.92 1.79 
3=major) (0.81) (0.80) (0.82) (0.76) (0.81) (0.81) (0.77) (0.79) (0.83) (0.79) 
Emphasis: Quiet/Orderly Environment (1=none or minor; 2.25 2.17 2.35 2.23 2.19 2.27 2.29 2.25 2.29 2.21 
 2= moderate; 3=major) (0.68) (0.71) (0.67) (0.63) (0.70) (0.71) (0.62) (0.69) (0.67) (0.66) 
Emphasis: Challenges for High-Achievers (1=none or minor;  2.48 2.54 2.49 2.43 2.57 2.48 2.41 2.46 2.53 2.46 
2= moderate; 3=major) (0.56) (0.55) (0.59) (0.54) (0.52) (0.56) (0.58) (0.58) (0.55) (0.55) 
Emphasis: Help for Low-Achievers (1=none or minor; 2= moderate; 2.68 2.76 2.68 2.60 2.78 2.66 2.61 2.71 2.66 2.66 
3=major) (0.50) (0.46) (0.52) (0.52) (0.46) (0.53) (0.51) (0.49) (0.51) (0.52) 
Emphasis: Communicating Well w/ Parents (1=none or minor;  2.89 2.91 2.88 2.87 2.92 2.88 2.88 2.91 2.87 2.88 
2= moderate; 3=major) (0.32) (0.28) (0.34) (0.33) (0.28) (0.34) (0.33) (0.28) (0.35) (0.32) 
Emphasis: Working Well w/ Other Staff (1=none or minor;  2.74 2.71 2.76 2.75 2.75 2.69 2.78 2.74 2.74 2.73 
2= moderate; 3=major) (0.50) (0.51) (0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.55) (0.48) (0.50) (0.51) (0.48) 
Emphasis: Open to New Ideas/Methods (1=none or minor; 2.68 2.70 2.69 2.66 2.70 2.67 2.68 2.67 2.73 2.64 
2= moderate; 3=major) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.44) (0.50) 
Emphasis: Professional Development (1=none or minor; 2= moderate; 2.64 2.68 2.71 2.54 2.65 2.71 2.56 2.64 2.72 2.55 
3=major) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50) (0.51) (0.51) (0.48) (0.52) 
Success K Teacher: Language and Number Skills (1=not much; 2.85 2.84 2.86 2.86 2.83 2.85 2.87 2.88 2.81 2.86 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.32) (0.43) (0.36) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Success K Teacher: Social or Behavioral Skills (1=not much; 2.77 2.73 2.77 2.79 2.78 2.72 2.81 2.72 2.81 2.78 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.47) (0.42) (0.46) (0.41) (0.45) 
Success K Teacher: Fine and Gross Motor Skills (1=not much; 2.68 2.69 2.66 2.69 2.68 2.70 2.67 2.70 2.64 2.71 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49) (0.47) 
Success K Teacher: Raising Test Performance (1=not much; 2.26 2.31 2.26 2.22 2.36 2.27 2.17 2.26 2.29 2.23 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.68) (0.62) (0.66) (0.74) (0.66) (0.63) (0.73) (0.61) (0.68) (0.75) 
Success K Teacher: Quiet and Orderly Class (1=not much; 2.63 2.63 2.62 2.65 2.62 2.62 2.65 2.61 2.68 2.61 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.52) (0.50) (0.53) (0.55) (0.50) (0.53) (0.54) (0.51) (0.49) (0.57) 
Success K Teacher: Challenges for High-Achievers (1=not much; 2.47 2.53 2.44 2.45 2.52 2.42 2.48 2.50 2.48 2.43 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.57) (0.54) (0.59) (0.57) (0.54) (0.59) (0.57) (0.56) (0.57) (0.59) 
Success K Teacher: Help for Low-Achievers (1=not much; 2.56 2.58 2.51 2.58 2.59 2.51 2.58 2.55 2.53 2.60 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.55) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.56) (0.54) (0.57) (0.54) 
Success K Teacher: Communicating Well w/ Parents (1=not much; 2.82 2.84 2.82 2.79 2.79 2.81 2.85 2.83 2.83 2.79 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42) (0.43) (0.43) (0.36) (0.42) (0.39) (0.42) 
Success K Teacher: Working Well w/ Other Staff (1=not much; 2.77 2.81 2.78 2.73 2.77 2.77 2.78 2.83 2.75 2.73 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.46) (0.44) (0.44) (0.49) (0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.41) (0.47) (0.50) 
Success K Teacher: Open to New Ideas/Methods (1=not much; 2.62 2.61 2.60 2.65 2.59 2.64 2.62 2.59 2.65 2.62 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.53) (0.55) (0.53) (0.52) (0.55) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.54) (0.55) 
Success K Teacher: Professional Development (1=not much; 2.59 2.63 2.64 2.50 2.66 2.62 2.50 2.57 2.65 2.54 
2= somewhat successful; 3= very successful) (0.55) (0.52) (0.52) (0.60) (0.50) (0.54) (0.60) (0.55) (0.54) (0.56) 
Composite: Emphasis on Student Acad/Develop. Goals (alpha=0.596) 2.54 2.56 2.57 2.48 2.58 2.55 2.49 2.56 2.55 2.50 
(Range= 1; 3) (0.30) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.34) (0.27) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) 
Composite: Emphasis on Teachers Pro. Outlook Goals (alpha=0.710) 2.74 2.75 2.76 2.71 2.75 2.74 2.72 2.74 2.77 2.70 
(Range= 1; 3) (0.34) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) (0.30) (0.36) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Composite: Success at Acad./Dev. Goals (alpha=0.718) 2.60 2.62 2.59 2.61 2.62 2.58 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60 
(Range= 1; 3) (0.32) (0.29) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30) (0.30) (0.34) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) 
Composite: Success at Prof. Outlook Goals (alpha=0.711) 2.70 2.72 2.71 2.67 2.70 2.71 2.69 2.70 2.72 2.67 
(Range= 1; 3) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.33) (0.39) 
Classroom characteristics/environment                     
 19.65 19.53 19.99 19.44 19.52 20.21 19.19 19.44 20.08 19.42 
Mean Kindergarten Class Enrollment (Based on Races) (Range= 9; 30) (4.91) (5.00) (4.36) (5.31) (5.07) (4.37) (5.23) (5.18) (4.08) (5.41) 
 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.93 0.72 0.69 0.87 0.94 
Mean Number of K Paid Aides (Range= 0; 6) (0.71) (0.68) (0.72) (0.75) (0.63) (0.77) (0.72) (0.67) (0.65) (0.81) 
 0.39 0.43 0.41 0.34 0.42 0.42 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.38 
AM Kindergarten classes offered in the school (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.22 
PM Kindergarten classes offered in the school (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.38) (0.44) (0.41) (0.39) (0.43) (0.41) (0.41) 
 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.54 0.61 0.55 0.60 0.56 
AD Kindergarten classes offered in the school (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) 
 5.99 6.49 6.23 5.26 6.45 6.38 5.17 6.13 6.01 5.79 
Average Number of Class Hours per Week: AM (Range= 0; 30) (7.62) (7.75) (7.71) (7.39) (7.72) (7.65) (7.47) (7.81) (7.55) (7.50) 
 3.21 3.75 3.50 2.40 3.87 3.13 2.68 3.40 3.06 3.15 
Average Number of Class Hours per Week: PM (Range= 0; 20) (6.12) (6.47) (6.45) (5.34) (6.61) (6.10) (5.62) (6.22) (6.07) (6.08) 
  17.53 16.55 17.22 18.78 17.06 16.96 18.54 16.84 18.37 17.41 
Average Number of Class Hours per Week: AD (Range= 0; 40) (15.80) (16.14) (15.68) (15.57) (15.85) (16.11) (15.45) (16.05) (15.57) (15.79) 
AM: Proportion of Teachers Who Speak Non-English more than 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.11 
30 minutes/day (0.28) (0.26) (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.25) (0.31) (0.29) 145
 
 
 
    
 
Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
PM: Proportion of Teachers Who Speak Non-English more than 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.04 
30 minutes/day (0.20) (0.23) (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.25) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (0.17) 
AD: Proportion of Teachers Who Speak Non-English more than 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.15 
30 minutes/day (0.33) (0.34) (0.30) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.29) 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Teacher-Directed Whole Class  0.54 0.51 0.53 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.58 
Activities for 2 hrs. or more/day (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) (0.44) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Teacher-Directed Small Group 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.22 
Activities for 2 hrs. or more/day (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) (0.37) (0.32) (0.36) (0.35) (0.33) 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Teacher-Directed Individual  0.07 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.04 
Activities for 2 hrs. or more/day (0.20) (0.18) (0.22) (0.19) (0.17) (0.24) (0.17) (0.20) (0.22) (0.15) 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Child-Selected Activities  0.09 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 
for 2 hrs. or more/day (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.27) (0.21) (0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.23) (0.25) 
Average Adequacy of K Classroom Resources - Teacher Rating 9.16 9.24 9.20 9.05 9.19 9.30 9.01 9.17 9.15 9.18 
(scale 0-11) (1.61) (1.29) (1.73) (1.76) (1.47) (1.61) (1.72) (1.48) (1.60) (1.78) 
 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.28 0.36 0.28 0.34 
Proportion of Teachers Who Think Child Should Learn Reading in K (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.39) (0.42) (0.40) (0.42) (0.38) (0.41) 
Proportion of Teachers Who Think Child Should Get Daily  0.26 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.30 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.26 
Homework in K (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) 
 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.77 
Proportion of Teachers With More than 5 Unpaid Prep Hrs/week (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.37) (0.31) (0.35) (0.38) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) 
Teaching Staff Characteristics                     
 86.12 85.30 84.60 88.43 83.46 86.30 88.42 86.84 86.69 84.52 
Percentage of White Teachers (23.75) (21.13) (25.27) (24.54) (23.15) (23.13) (24.78) (21.55) (23.39) (26.75) 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
 4.71 6.48 5.42 2.28 6.92 5.09 2.26 5.47 4.93 3.48 
Percentage of Black Teachers (9.51) (10.55) (10.28) (6.83) (10.71) (10.20) (6.65) (10.43) (9.36) (8.30) 
 2.88 2.47 3.72 2.44 3.20 3.05 2.41 2.70 2.55 3.51 
Percentage of Hispanic/Latino Teachers (7.37) (6.13) (8.59) (7.11) (7.64) (7.75) (6.68) (6.44) (7.11) (8.67) 
 0.51 0.40 0.50 0.63 0.45 0.48 0.60 0.41 0.54 0.61 
Percentage of Asian Teachers (1.42) (1.21) (1.36) (1.64) (1.25) (1.34) (1.63) (1.25) (1.47) (1.54) 
 7.10 10.60 6.56 4.23 11.31 5.22 5.10 8.82 7.08 4.91 
Percentage of American Native Teachers (24.55) (29.62) (23.61) (19.10) (30.76) (21.09) (20.62) (27.33) (24.20) (20.85) 
 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.25 0.37 0.33 0.25 0.31 0.30 0.33 
Proportion of Teachers With a Master's Degree or above (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.36) (0.37) 
 0.86 0.90 0.87 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.81 0.87 0.87 0.81 
Proportion of Teachers With Regular Certification or Higher (0.30) (0.23) (0.27) (0.36) (0.24) (0.27) (0.36) (0.28) (0.27) (0.35) 
 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.12 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught Pre-School for 5 years or more (0.28) (0.27) (0.24) (0.32) (0.23) (0.26) (0.33) (0.27) (0.30) (0.26) 
 0.60 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.64 0.57 0.60 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught K 5 years or more (0.39) (0.39) (0.36) (0.41) (0.37) (0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) 
 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.09 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught 1st Grade 5 years or more (0.24) (0.28) (0.23) (0.22) (0.27) (0.22) (0.24) (0.27) (0.24) (0.20) 
 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.60 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught at This School 5 years or more (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.41) (0.38) (0.37) (0.42) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) 
Principal's Characteristics                     
 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.46 0.40 0.48 0.38 0.39 
Principal's Gender: Male (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) 1
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Principal's Highest Level of Education: Master's or above 0.91 0.96 0.95 0.83 0.97 0.94 0.83 0.95 0.91 0.88 
 (1=Yes; 0=No) (0.28) (0.19) (0.22) (0.37) (0.17) (0.23) (0.37) (0.22) (0.29) (0.33) 
 12.15 12.36 12.11 11.99 12.36 12.32 11.79 12.02 12.20 12.26 
Principal: Number of Years Teaching (Range= 0; 25) (6.33) (6.63) (6.15) (6.24) (6.57) (6.24) (6.22) (6.51) (6.34) (6.13) 
 9.96 9.15 9.90 10.81 9.05 10.23 10.54 9.51 9.91 10.60 
Principal: Number of Years as Principal (Range= 0; 25) (7.23) (7.19) (7.08) (7.36) (6.85) (7.37) (7.38) (7.47) (7.10) (7.06) 
Principal: Number of Years as a Principal at This School 5.99 5.59 6.14 6.22 5.43 6.14 6.34 5.79 6.15 6.04 
 (Range= 0; 20) (5.23) (4.96) (5.56) (5.16) (4.80) (5.49) (5.34) (5.17) (5.38) (5.17) 
 7.96 8.32 8.47 7.09 8.32 8.74 6.82 8.13 7.67 8.07 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week Working w/ Teachers (Range= 0; 40) (5.68) (5.80) (5.89) (5.25) (5.88) (6.00) (4.94) (5.76) (5.68) (5.58) 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week for School Management 10.47 10.85 9.57 10.99 11.25 9.82 10.39 10.29 10.18 11.04 
(Range=  0; 50) (8.14) (8.65) (7.34) (8.33) (8.76) (7.68) (7.97) (7.84) (8.51) (8.09) 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week for Student Discipline/Absence  5.62 6.39 5.88 4.60 6.12 6.07 4.68 6.16 5.53 5.03 
(Range= 0; 30) (4.73) (5.13) (4.96) (3.87) (4.99) (5.05) (3.98) (4.99) (4.85) (4.17) 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week for Monitoring School Areas  5.80 6.13 6.36 4.93 6.25 6.42 4.75 5.90 6.18 5.24 
(Range= 0; 35) (4.78) (4.75) (4.98) (4.50) (4.64) (5.10) (4.40) (4.73) (5.39) (3.99) 
 2.28 1.99 1.91 2.95 2.12 1.59 3.15 2.34 2.55 1.90 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week Spent Teaching (Range= 0; 35) (5.20) (5.12) (4.26) (6.01) (5.20) (3.44) (6.44) (5.73) (4.95) (4.73) 
 6.23 6.22 6.12 6.35 6.47 6.32 5.92 6.09 5.90 6.81 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week Meeting w/ Parents (Range= 0; 40) (4.71) (4.50) (4.31) (5.28) (4.66) (4.34) (5.12) (4.12) (4.72) (5.36) 
 5.53 5.97 5.66 4.96 6.14 5.58 4.90 5.29 6.05 5.21 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week Meeting w/ Students (Range= 0; 40) (5.09) (5.99) (4.95) (4.16) (6.04) (4.88) (4.21) (4.13) (6.49) (4.23) 
Principal: Number of Hrs/Week for Required Paperwork  8.14 9.62 8.07 6.77 9.75 7.57 7.23 8.76 8.31 7.15 
(local, state, federal) (Range= 0; 80) (8.57) (11.34) (6.59) (6.78) (11.71) (6.05) (6.97) (10.20) (7.78) (6.96) 
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Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Influence of Standardized Test Scores on Principal's Evaluation 2.05 2.19 2.08 1.87 2.20 2.05 1.90 2.12 2.04 1.95 
 (1=None; 2=Some; 3=A Great Deal) (0.70) (0.64) (0.68) (0.75) (0.66) (0.68) (0.73) (0.64) (0.72) (0.74) 
Community Characteristics and Involvement                     
Tension from Differences (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a Problem;  1.27 1.33 1.29 1.20 1.32 1.30 1.20 1.31 1.30 1.20 
3=Big Problem) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.43) (0.47) (0.49) (0.42) (0.49) (0.46) (0.42) 
Problem from Unkempt Areas (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a  1.30 1.34 1.32 1.26 1.32 1.37 1.22 1.30 1.32 1.28 
Problem; 3=Big Problem) (0.53) (0.55) (0.55) (0.48) (0.54) (0.58) (0.45) (0.54) (0.53) (0.51) 
Problem with Substance Abuse (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a  1.45 1.50 1.46 1.38 1.45 1.56 1.33 1.48 1.46 1.39 
Problem; 3=Big Problem) (0.64) (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.69) (0.56) (0.64) (0.62) (0.65) 
Problem with Gangs (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a Problem;  1.38 1.38 1.45 1.33 1.38 1.47 1.30 1.35 1.43 1.38 
3=Big Problem) (0.56) (0.58) (0.56) (0.52) (0.57) (0.57) (0.51) (0.56) (0.55) (0.56) 
Problem with Heavy Traffic (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a 1.56 1.53 1.54 1.60 1.61 1.49 1.58 1.51 1.59 1.58 
Problem; 3=Big Problem) (0.66) (0.69) (0.62) (0.68) (0.70) (0.61) (0.68) (0.68) (0.63) (0.68) 
Problem with Violent Crime (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a 1.14 1.16 1.15 1.11 1.15 1.16 1.12 1.14 1.18 1.10 
Problem; 3=Big Problem) (0.39) (0.41) (0.40) (0.34) (0.39) (0.42) (0.35) (0.40) (0.41) (0.34) 
Problem with Vacant Buildings (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a  1.23 1.25 1.26 1.19 1.24 1.28 1.18 1.24 1.28 1.16 
Problem; 3=Big Problem) (0.49) (0.54) (0.50) (0.43) (0.51) (0.54) (0.41) (0.51) (0.55) (0.38) 
Problem with Crime in the Area (1=No Problem; 2=Somewhat of a  1.47 1.50 1.49 1.41 1.54 1.49 1.38 1.46 1.50 1.45 
Problem; 3=Big Problem) (0.58) (0.61) (0.59) (0.55) (0.60) (0.60) (0.55) (0.60) (0.57) (0.58) 
 
1.35 1.37 1.37 1.32 1.38 1.39 1.29 1.35 1.38 1.32 
Composite: Neighborhood Problems (alpha=0.868) (Range= 1; 3) (0.38) (0.40) (0.38) (0.36) (0.39) (0.39) (0.36) (0.39) (0.38) (0.36) 
Proportion of Children Whose Parents Volunteer Regularly in School 1.57 1.50 1.55 1.65 1.53 1.53 1.64 1.43 1.66 1.63 
(1=1-25%; 2=26-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76% or more) (0.91) (0.88) (0.90) (0.95) (0.87) (0.87) (0.99) (0.84) (0.97) (0.91) 149
 
 
 
    
 
Descriptive Statistics, ECLS-K Variables Used in the Analyses (continued) 
  All SA Global SA Instruction SA Personnel/Administrative 
 
Schools Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 Dose 1 Dose 2 Dose 3 
Variables N=633 N=208 N=212 N=213 N=200 N=219 N=214 N=235 N=215 N=183 
Proportion of Children Whose Parents Attend Teacher Parent 3.43 3.35 3.37 3.57 3.39 3.35 3.56 3.38 3.42 3.52 
 Conferences (1=1-25%; 2=26-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76% or more) (0.96) (0.99) (1.00) (0.87) (0.98) (1.02) (0.86) (0.95) (1.00) (0.92) 
Proportion of Children Whose Parents Attend Open Houses 3.18 3.16 3.13 3.26 3.19 3.10 3.27 3.18 3.11 3.28 
(1=1-25%; 2=26-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76% or more) (0.92) (0.93) (0.93) (0.91) (0.91) (0.94) (0.91) (0.90) (0.98) (0.88) 
Proportion of Children Whose Parents Attend Art Events 3.05 2.90 3.07 3.18 2.96 3.03 3.16 2.94 3.15 3.08 
(1=1-25%; 2=26-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76% or more) (1.03) (1.08) (0.99) (1.01) (1.10) (1.00) (0.99) (1.03) (0.98) (1.08) 
Proportion of Children Whose Parents Attend PTA/PTO 1.61 1.55 1.63 1.65 1.63 1.49 1.72 1.52 1.62 1.72 
(1=1-25%; 2=26-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76% or more) (0.91) (0.86) (0.96) (0.90) (0.96) (0.78) (0.97) (0.84) (0.92) (0.97) 
Proportion of Children Whose Parents Do Fundraising 2.51 2.35 2.53 2.65 2.39 2.48 2.67 2.41 2.55 2.59 
(1=1-25%; 2=26-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76% or more) (1.13) (1.06) (1.16) (1.16) (1.07) (1.14) (1.17) (1.11) (1.12) (1.17) 
Proportion of Children Whose Parents Attend Plays/Fairs 2.78 2.57 2.80 2.96 2.63 2.74 2.95 2.69 2.77 2.89 
(1=1-25%; 2=26-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76% or more) (1.07) (1.11) (1.07) (1.00) (1.11) (1.09) (1.00) (1.09) (1.08) (1.04) 
Composite: Parental Participation School Activities - Principal Rating 2.61 2.49 2.59 2.74 2.54 2.54 2.74 2.52 2.61 2.71 
(alpha=0.810) (Range= 1; 4) (0.68) (0.72) (0.68) (0.64) (0.71) (0.67) (0.65) (0.67) (0.69) (0.69) 
 
0.89 0.89 0.87 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.88 
Proportion of Parents Who Attended Conferences (Teacher Rating) (0.17) (0.15) (0.21) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) 
Proportion of Parents Who Came for Informal Meetings 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.71 
 (Teacher Rating) (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) 
 
0.68 0.70 0.67 0.66 0.71 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.69 
Proportion of Parents Who Returned Phone Calls (Teacher Rating) (0.28) (0.25) (0.29) (0.30) (0.26) (0.28) (0.31) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) 
 
0.52 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.53 0.47 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.52 
Proportion of Parents Who Volunteered in School (Teacher Rating) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) 
 1
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APPENDIX B 
Illustration of Recoding of Survey Questions Related to Decision-Making in the Schools 
Table B1 shows the survey questions from the ECLS-K School Administrator’s questionnaire that were used to construct the 
school autonomy variables. Possible answers were: 0=no influence; 1=some influence; 2=major influence; 3=not applicable, which 
were selected by the principal in each school. 
Table B1. 
ECLS-K Questions Related to Decision-Making in the School (Administrator’s Questionnaire) 
 151
 
 
 
    
 
 These questions required special attention in the interpretation and recoding of the response category “3=not applicable” for 
the following reason: “3” could either mean that (a) a particular decision-maker is not an active player in that school; (b) a particular 
decision-maker is an active player in the school, but has no authority over that given area of control. To help determine which was the 
proper interpretation of the answers, the patterns of response across all areas of control had to be examined.  
I first created a dummy variable to indicate whether that given actor was an active player in the school (1=yes; 0=no). A player 
was coded 1 when an answer different than “3” (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 2=major influence) was reported for that decision-
maker in any of the other areas of control in the school; it was coded 0 otherwise. Next, the response category “3=not applicable” was 
recoded into “0=no influence” across all six areas of control.  
Tables B2 and B3 exemplify this recoding process. Table B2 shows examples of the original answers given by the principal 
about the level of influence of the School Board over given areas of control. Table B3 shows the answers after recoding of the 
response category “3”. There is evidence, for example, that the School Board is an active decision-maker in schools 2, 3, and 4, but 
not in schools 1 and 5. 
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Table B2. 
Examples of Original Answers Given by the Principal about Decision-Making Influence of the School Board (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 
2=major influence; 3=not applicable) 
 How much influence does the School Board have over the following decisions?  Is the School 
Board an 
Active Player 
in the School? 
(0=no; 1=yes) 
School Establishing 
criteria for 
hiring and 
firing teachers 
Selecting 
textbooks and 
other 
instructional 
materials 
Setting 
curricular 
guidelines and 
standards 
Establishing 
policies and 
practices for 
grading and 
student 
evaluation 
Deciding how 
school 
discretionary 
funds will be 
spent 
Planning 
professional 
development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 3 3 3 3 3 3  0 
2 3 1 3 3 1 2  1 
3 0 3 3 3 0 0  1 
4 3 1 3 1 3 3  1 
5 . . . 3 3 3  0 
 
Table B3. 
Examples of Answers Given by the School Principal about Decision-Making Influence of School Board After Recoding of Response Category 
“3=not applicable” (0=no influence; 1=some influence; 2=major influence) 
 How much influence does the School Board have over the following decisions?  Is the School 
Board an 
Active Player 
in the School? 
(0=no; 1=yes) 
School Establishing 
criteria for 
hiring and 
firing teachers 
Selecting 
textbooks and 
other 
instructional 
materials 
Setting 
curricular 
guidelines and 
standards 
Establishing 
policies and 
practices for 
grading and 
student 
evaluation 
Deciding how 
school 
discretionary 
funds will be 
spent 
Planning 
professional 
development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
2 0 1 0 0 1 2  1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0  1 
4 0 1 0 1 0 0  1 
5 . . . 0 0 0  0 
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APPENDIX C 
  
 
List of School-Level Covariates 
  
 
Reading Variables 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
  
 
Mean Reading IRT Score, Fall 1998 Direct Child Assessment Continuous 
   
Student Body Composition and Academic Performance 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
    
Proportion of Asian Students Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Students of Other Races Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Hispanic Students Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Black Students Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Male Students Parent Continuous 
Mean Age of Students at K Entry (Months) Parent Continuous 
Uses Complex Sentences - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Interprets Stories - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Names Upper and Lower Case - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Produces Rhyming Words - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Predicts What Happens in Stories - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Reads Simple Books Independently - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 154
 
 
 
    
 
List of School-Level Covariates (continued) 
 
Shows Early Writing Behaviors - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Understands Conventions of Print - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Uses Computer for Variety of Goals - Proportion Intermediate or Proficient Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Children Who Usually or Always Work at Best Ability - Teacher Rating Parent Continuous 
Percentage of Free Lunch Eligible Students  School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Minority Students School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Gifted/Talented Students School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Students Bussed to Achieve Racial Integration School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Students from the Neighborhood School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Students w/ Special Needs from Other Neighborhoods School Administrator Continuous 
Children w/ Disabilities are Served in a Separate Class School Administrator Dichotomous 
Children w/ Disabilities are Served in a Regular Class School Administrator Dichotomous 
Percentage of LEP (Limited English Proficiency) Students School Administrator Continuous 
   
Student's Family Background 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
   
Mean SES of Students  Parent Continuous 
Mean Family Income Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents with College (Completed or Not) Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents with Master's Degree Parent Continuous 
 
1
55
 
 
 
    
 
List of School-Level Covariates (continued) 
 
Proportion of Parents with Doctorate/Other Higher Degree Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents with Other, No Degree Education Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Students At or Above Poverty Level Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Students Whose Home Language is English Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Students in Two-Parents Household Parent Continuous 
Mean Family Size of Students Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Children Who Received Center-Based Care Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Children Who Spent 20 Hrs/Week or More in Nonparental Care (During K Year) Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Children Who Spent 20 Hrs/Week or More in Nonparental Care (Prior to K) Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Children Attending School Selected Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents Reporting that 'School Preference Affected Home Location' Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents Who Expect Child to Finish College Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents Who Expect Child to Earn a Higher Degree (Master's, PhD, MD or 
Equivalent) 
Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents Who Read to Child at least 3-6 times/week Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents Who Tell Stories to Child at least 3-6 times/week Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Parents Who Read Books Outside of School at least 3-6 times/week Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Students Who Have 100 or More Books Parent Continuous 
Proportion of Children Who Watched Sesame Street weekly for at least 3 months Prior to K Parent Continuous 
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List of School-Level Covariates (continued) 
   
School Characteristics, Organization and Resources 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
   
Private School School Administrator Dichotomous 
Region: Northeast School Administrator Dichotomous 
Region: Midwest School Administrator Dichotomous 
Region: West School Administrator Dichotomous 
Central City School Administrator Dichotomous 
Urban Fringe and Large Town School Administrator Dichotomous 
Total School Enrollment  School Administrator Continuous 
Total School K Enrollment School Administrator Continuous 
School of Choice (charter, open enrollment, non-specialized curriculum) School Administrator Dichotomous 
Magnet School (e.g. math/science, foreign language immersion) School Administrator Dichotomous 
School has SBM Committee School Administrator Dichotomous 
School Year Length School Administrator Continuous 
Received Title 1 Funds School Administrator Dichotomous 
Composite: Number of Additional Types of Funds School Administrator Continuous 
Composite: Adequacy of the School Facilities School Administrator Continuous 
Total Number of Computers School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Computers for Instructional Use School Administrator Continuous 
Composite: Admissions Requirements, Academic Selection School Administrator Continuous 
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List of School-Level Covariates (continued) 
 
Placement Test Administered School Administrator Dichotomous 
School Uses Test to Determine Class Placement School Administrator Dichotomous 
School Uses Test to Identify Need for Additional Testing School Administrator Dichotomous 
School Uses Test to Help Teachers Individualize Instruction School Administrator Dichotomous 
School Uses Test to Advise Delay for School Entry School Administrator Dichotomous 
School Uses Test for Other Purposes School Administrator Dichotomous 
   
School Policy 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
   
Children Can Be Retained in Kindergarten School Administrator Dichotomous 
Number of Students Retained in Kindergarten in the Previous School Year School Administrator Continuous 
Composite: Emphasis on Student Academic/Developmental Goals School Administrator Continuous 
Composite: Emphasis on Teachers Professional Outlook Goals School Administrator Continuous 
Composite: Success at Academic/Development Goals School Administrator Continuous 
Composite: Success at Professional Outlook Goals School Administrator Continuous 
   
Classroom characteristics/environment 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
   
Mean Kindergarten Class Enrollment Teacher Continuous 
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List of School-Level Covariates (continued) 
 
Mean Number of Kindergarten Paid Aides Teacher Continuous 
AM Kindergarten classes are offered in the school School Administrator Dichotomous 
PM Kindergarten classes are offered in the school School Administrator Dichotomous 
Average Number of Class Hours per Week: AM Teacher Continuous 
Average Number of Class Hours per Week: PM Teacher Continuous 
Average Number of Class Hours per Week: AD Teacher Continuous 
AM: Proportion of Teachers Who Speak Non-English more than 1/2 hour/day Teacher Continuous 
PM: Proportion of Teachers Who Speak Non-English more than 1/2 hour/day Teacher Continuous 
AD: Proportion of Teachers Who Speak Non-English more than 1/2 hour/day Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Teacher-Directed Whole Class Activities for 2 hrs. or 
more/day 
Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Teacher-Directed Small Group Activities for 2 hrs. or 
more/day 
Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Teacher-Directed Individual Activities for 2 hrs. or more/day Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Conducting Child-Selected Activities for 2 hrs. or more/day Teacher Continuous 
Average Adequacy of Kindergarten Classroom Resources - Teacher Rating Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Who Think Child Should Learn Reading in K Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Who Think Child Should Get Daily Homework in K Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers With More than 5 Unpaid Prep Hrs/week Teacher Continuous 
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List of School-Level Covariates (continued) 
   
Teaching Staff Characteristics 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
   
Percentage of Black Teachers School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Hispanic/Latino Teachers School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of Asian Teachers School Administrator Continuous 
Percentage of American Native Teachers School Administrator Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers With a Master's Degree or above Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers With Regular Certification or Higher Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught Pre-School for 5 years or more Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught Kindergarten 5 years or more Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught First Grade 5 years or more Teacher Continuous 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught at This School 5 years or more Teacher Continuous 
   
Principal's Characteristics 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
   
Gender: Male School Administrator Dichotomous 
Highest Level of Education: Master's or above School Administrator Dichotomous 
Number of Years Teaching School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Years as Principal School Administrator Continuous 
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List of School-Level Covariates (continued) 
 
Number of Years as a Principal at This School School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week Working with Teachers School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week for School Management School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week for Student Discipline/Absence School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week for Monitoring School Areas School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week Spent Teaching School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week Meeting with Parents School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week Meeting with Students School Administrator Continuous 
Number of Hrs/Week for Required Paperwork (local, state, federal) School Administrator Continuous 
Influence of Standardized Test Scores on Principal's Evaluation School Administrator Continuous 
   
Community Characteristics and Involvement 
Source Questionnaire in 
ECLS-K 
Level of 
Measurement 
   
Composite: Neighborhood Problems School Administrator Continuous 
Composite: Parental Participation in School Activities - Principal Rating School Administrator Continuous 
Average Score of Parental Involvement with Child Progress - Teacher Rating Teacher Continuous 
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APPENDIX D 
Comparison of Teachers and Principals’ Education and Experience  
by School Sector 
Variable 
Public 
Schools 
(N=466) 
M (SD) 
Private 
Schools 
(N=167) 
M (SD) t-test p-value 
Proportion of Teachers with a Master’s 
Degree or Above .35 (.37) .20 (.37) 4.572 .000 
Proportion of Teachers with Regular 
Certification or Higher .90 (.22) .72 (.42) 5.472 .000 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught  
Pre-School for 5 years or more .08 (.19) .27 (.41) -5.782 .000 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught K  
5 years or more  .62 (.36) .57 (.44) 1.320 .188 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught 1
st
 
Grade 5 years or more .13 (.25) .06 (.21) 3.423 .001 
Proportion of Teachers Who Taught at 
This School 5 years or more .62 (.37) .58 (.46) .952 .342 
Principal: Number of Years as Principal 9.40 (7.19) 11.51 (7.13) -3.276 .001 
Principal: Number of Years Teaching 12.27 (6.12) 11.81 (6.90) .812 .417 
Principal: Number of Years as Principal 
at This School 5.43 (4.92) 7.54 (5.75) - 4.224 .000 
Note. The t-tests were conducted on imputed dataset number 1. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
 
Distribution of School Autonomy Measures: 
by School Sector (All Schools, N=633); 
by Schools of Choice (Public Schools, N=466); and  
by Adoption of SBM Committees (Public Schools, N=466) 
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Figure E1. Distribution of School Autonomy Variables by School Sector (N=633)  
 Public (N=466) 
            Mean = -.05; St. Dev. = .23 
 
 Private (N=167) 
            Mean = .17; St. Dev. = .31 
 
 
 Public (N=466) 
            Mean = -.09; St. Dev. = .30 
 
 Private (N=167) 
            Mean = .19; St. Dev. = .37 
 
 
 Public (N=466) 
            Mean = -.01; St. Dev. = .27 
 
 Private (N=167) 
            Mean = .16; St. Dev. = .32 
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Figure E2. Distribution of School Autonomy Variables by Schools of Choice (Public Only, 
N=466)  
 Schools of Choice (N=45) 
            Mean = -.05; St. Dev. = .20  
 
 Other Schools (N=421) 
            Mean = -.05; St. Dev. = .23  
 
 
 
 Schools of Choice (N=45) 
            Mean = -.13; St. Dev. = .30 
 
 Other Schools (N=421) 
             Mean = -.09; St. Dev. = .30  
 
 
 
 Schools of Choice (N=45)  
            Mean = .04; St. Dev. = .22  
 
 Other Schools (N=421) 
            Mean = -.01; St. Dev. = .28 
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Figure E3. Distribution of School Autonomy Variables by Adoption of SBM (Public Only, 
N=466) 
 SBM Schools (N=338) 
            Mean = -.06; St. Dev. = .22 
 
 No SBM (N=128) 
            Mean = -.02; St. Dev. = .25 
 
 
 
 SBM Schools (N=338): 
             Mean = -.13; St. Dev. = .29 
 
 No SBM (N=128): 
            Mean = .01; St. Dev. = .32  
 
 
 
 SBM Schools (N=338) 
            Mean = .01; St. Dev. = .27 
 
 No SBM (N=128) 
            Mean = -.06; St. Dev. = .27 
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